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In social history, as in so much else, special cases of ten turn out 
to be the most deeply representative: Venice, Cairo, California. 
East Sumatra, whose evolution from commercial enclave to poli-
tical nightmare Karl Pelzer took as the subject of his last and 
finest work, is a most unstandard place. Nowhere else in Indo-
nesia, not even Central Java, did plantation agriculture develop so 
extensively, so resourcefully, so profitably, or so destructively. 
Nowhere else did Western interests and Indonesian ones clash so 
directly, harden so completely, and grow so unmanageable. 
Nowhere else did ethnic diversity, ideological contrast, and class 
difference crystallize into so convolute a form; nowhere else was 
local administration so thoroughly enfeebled by national politics; 
and nowhere else were the death throes of colonialism more 
clamorous, more visible, or more drawn out. It is Pelzer's great 
virtue to have seen all this and yet to have seen th at it exem-
plified a much more general process - the one that in dis-
mantling the East Indies assembied Indonesia. 
The beginnings of the story whose ending Pelzer tells here 
- the hapless struggle of the Dutch tobacco, rubber, tea, and oil 
palm growers to reestablish their enterprises in the supercharged 
political climate of revolutionary Indonesia - we re set forth in 
his 1978 volume Planter and Peasant, which traced the develop· 
ment of the East Sumatran plantations during the colonial 
period, and to which the present work, unfinished at his death, 
was originally designed to be the concluding section. From 1863, 
when Jacobus Nienhuys first came to East Sumatra to set up an 
experimental tobacco plantation of seventy-five hectares worked 
by a couple of dozen Chinese laborers imported from Singapore, 
to the eve of the Second World War, when the land formally 
allotted to commercial exploitation - Dutch, German, British, 
American - reached upwards of half a million hectares, the 
region was utterly transformed. By that time, more than sixty 
percent of the cultivated land was European controlled, three-
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fifths of the population (itself quintupled) was javanese or 
Chinese, and the area had become the single most important 
source of export earnings in the archipelago - "the dollar land", 
as Pelzer, who is not much given to vivid statement, puts it, "of 
Indonesia". 
The changes he traced in that background work, which set the 
stage for the political pantomime he delineates here, were 
extremely diverse in kind. juridical changes in property law, 
technological changes in agricultural methods, economic changes 
in investment, marketing, and employment practices, political 
changes in authority relations, sociological changes in community 
structure, and cultural changes in self-definition proceeded along 
their separate courses, separately fueled. But they all converged 
in the end to a single crux, never neutralized and never resolved: 
land use. Seventy-five years of the most intense agrarian modern· 
ization produced the most classic of agrarian conflicts: 
determined enclosers vs. defiant squatters. 
The juridical issues - who had what sort of enforceable rights 
in what - were central to East Sumatran development from the 
beginning, and Pelzer gives more attention to them than to any 
other aspect of the matter, both in Planter and Peasant and in 
Planters against Peasants. The original granting of iII-defined, do-
as-you-will concessions by local rulers, with the nudging "ap-
proval " of the colonial government; the subsequent campaign by 
that government, conscience struck by what adventurism had 
wrought, to convert the concessions to properly drawn lease con-
tracts fixing rights in black-Ietter clauses; the Sisyphean effort to 
mediate between formalized Roman-Dutch concepts of real 
property and a host of highly particular folk-law views of prior 
claim and appropriate use that such a conversion entailed: all this 
formed the rhetorical frame within which "the agrarian struggle" 
took place, until populist nationalism provided another. If this 
sometimes lends a rather academical tone to Pelzer's discussion 
- all those briefs, directives, commentaries, codifications, and 
algemene beschouwz'ngen following one another into to oblivion 
of administrative history - and a sense of seeing things from the 
Governor's house, it is not because of a lack of feeling for con-
crete reality or some sort of partz" przs. It is a result of the simple 
fact that law and lawyers set, before the war and for a fair while 
af ter it, the general terms of public argument. 
In any case, the issues animating this clause and codicil dis-
course were anything but abstract, and Pelzer brings them out 
(again, some in this book, some in its predecessor) with biting 
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clarity. On the technological level, there was the inherent con-
flict between labor-intensive plantation agriculture, particularly 
tobacco, and land-intensive shifting cultivation, which came to a 
head in a rising passion of debate over how much land the 
planters ought to leave to the indigenous population for sub-
sistence cultivation. On the economic level, there was the virtual-
ly exclusive reliance on international marketing, which led to an 
active dis courage ment (in the case of tobacco, to an outright 
prohibition) of small-holder involvement in commercial agri-
culture, and on imported labor, which led to a massive in flux of 
indentured workers, mostly Javanese. And on the politicallevel 
there was the peculiar three-cornered, he pressures me, I pressure 
you, you pressure him, bargaining relation among outback 
planters, petty sultans, and field-level administrators, which ex-
cluded the mass of the Indonesian population, indigenous and 
immigrant alike, from any role in policy making at all. By the 
time the J apanese invaded in 1942, growing mercantile crops on 
preempted land with articled labor had become an extremely 
difficult proposition. By the time they left in 1945, it had become 
an impossible one. 
Pelzer's concern in these final, broken-off pages of his work is 
to portray how the reality of this fact came at last to be clear to 
everyone - estate owner and civil servant, native ruler and 
nationalist politician, local farmer and intrusive laborer. The 
story of East Sumatra, violent, delusional, and Machiavellian by 
turns, between the end of 1946 when the Dutch returned and the 
end of 1957 when they were summarily dispossessed, is one of a 
gradually collapsing attempt to restore the unrestorable. 
The movement, beginning during the J apanese occupation but 
continuing af ter it, of thousands of squatters, most of them 
former estate laborers, onto the estates altered the whole nature 
of the land use issue. What had been a matter of allowing in-
digenous farmers to grow subsistence crops for a time under tight 
regulation on fallowed estate land became a matter of co ping 
with the occupation of large tracts of such land as private home-
steads by erstwhile field hands. The great migration, this one 
spontaneous, into the area, otherwise Muslim, of ambitious, well-
educated, Christian Bataks - Rhenish Lutherans, no Ie ss - from 
the interior highlands around Lake Toba as clerks, tradesmen, 
and minor professionals (as weIl as, to a degree, squatters too) 
which began in force right af ter the war and increased steadily 
thereafter, added yet another disturbing "foreign" element to the 
already explosive ethnic mix. The so-called "social revolution" of 
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early 1946, in which a large part of the Malay aristocracy was 
massacred and much of the rest of it imprisoned by Republican 
irregulars, destroyed the power of the native states. The rise of 
mass labor organizations, most of them Communist-dominated, 
provided for the first time a popular force of enormous con-
sequence. And the very Revolution itself introduced democratic 
concepts of citizenship and social rights equally inimicable to 
coloniallaw and tribal custom. 
The decade, 1947-1957, upon which Pelzer concentrates his 
attention in Planters against Peasants, was thus one ofthose times 
- more rare than the crisis-mongering nature of much of modern 
historiography would suggest - when one species of social order 
disappeared and other species formed. The Dutch attempt to 
reinstate the prewar legal regime in the federalist "State of East 
Sumatra" foundered in the face of ethnic conflict, class bitter-
ness, and nationalist radicalism. The efforts by the planters and 
the more accommodative elements in the Republic to remove the 
squatters and reenclose the estate lands led to a series of violent 
confrontations between estate tractors and hoe-waving peasants, 
to incessant maneuvering among highly ideologized peasant 
unions, social movements, and political parties, and to a string of 
standstill agreements with all the force of Mideast ceasefires. The 
growing militancy of Sukarno integralism - "one nation, one 
language, one people" - led to the projection of the East 
Sumatran conflict into the all-Indonesia stage. Wh en his 
campaign in the United Nations to recover West Irian failed in 
November 1957, he declared martiallaw, expropriated the Dutch 
estates, and turned them over to the army to run. Pelzer calls it 
"the end of the road". But the road had really ended fifteen 
years earlier. What ended here, and ends with Pelzer's fragmen-
tary final pages on the military takeover - themselves a portent 
of things to co me - was what Francis Hutchins, speaking of the 
British in India, on ce called "the illusion of permanence". 
Karl Pelzer is, of course, not the only scholar to write of all 
this. Anthony Reid, Michael van Langenberg, R.W. Liddle, 
Mohammad Said, and Clark Cunningham (himself a student of 
Pelzer's) have also made critical contributions, and important 
work is continuing, especially in Australia and Indonesia. But in 
1. Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of 
Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University 
Press, 1979; Reid, "The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra", Indonesia, 
12:12-46 (1971); Michael van Langenberg, "Class and Ethnic Conflict in 
Indonesia's Decolonization Process: A Study of East Sumatra", lndo-
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his pages, the relationships between gcographical, agricultural, 
economic, political, legal, sociological, and cultural factors are 
treated with a breadth, precision, balance, and sensitivity alto-
gether exemplary. Our regret that he did not live to provide us 
with his general conclusions is more than offset by the distinction 
of what he has here accomplished. 
Clifford Geertz 
Institute of Advanced Study 
Princeton, U.S.A. 
nesia, 33:1-30 (1982); R.W. LiddIe, Ethnicity, Party and National In· 
tegration: An Indonesian Case Study, New Haven, Vale University Press, 
1970; Muhammad Said, "What was the 'Sodal Revolution of 1946' in 
East Sumatra?", Indonesia, 15:145-86 (1973); Clark E. Cunningham, 
Postwar Migration of the Toba Bataks to East Sumatra, New Haven, Vale 
Southeast Asian Studies, Cultural Report Series, No. 5, 1958. See also, 
inter alia, A.A. Schiller, The Formation of FederalIndonesia, The Hague, 
Van Hoeve, 1955; John R.W. Smail, "The Military Politics of North 
Sumatra, December 1956-0ctober 1957", Indonesia, 6: 122-87 (1968); 
Douglas Paauw (ed.), Prospects for East Sumatran Plantation Industries, 
New Haven, Vale Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph Series, No. 3, 
1962; J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates and Their 
Masters", Paczfic Affairs, 34:337-60 (1962), and Pelzer's own "The 
Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra", Pacific Affairs, 30: 151-59 (1957). 
EDITORlAL NOTE 
Professor Kar! J. Pelzer submitted the manuscript of the sequel 
to his Planter and Peasant, Colonial Policy and the Agrarian 
Struggle in East Sumatra 1863-1947, published in the Verhande-
lingen series of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthro-
pology in 1978, to the Institute's Editorial Department in April 
1980. He stated in an accompanying letter that the manuscript 
lacked "the final chapter which will deal with the destruction of 
the Communist Front Organization or the Barisan Tani Indo-
nesia. I am on my way to Indonesia and plan to spend five 
months in Sumatra in search of material for a final chapter. I 
intend to write the final chapter in Medan. As soon as the 
chapter is written I shall send it to you". Professor Pelzer died on 
9th November 1980. The promised final chapter had not yet 
been received by the Institute at that time. 
With the permis sion of Prof. Pelzer's widow, Ms. Elizabeth 
Pelzer, it was subsequently decided to publish the manuscript in 
the form it had been left by the author. Even without a final 
chapter it forms a reasonably rounded off whoIe, which is not in 
absolute need of further addition. Following this, Professor 
Clifford Geertz undertook, at our request, to write a foreword 
for this last, posthumously published book of Prof. Pelzer's. In it 
he sets out the significance of Prof. Pelzer's books on the 
economie history of East Sumatra. 
In the editorial preparation of the manuscript the general rules 
normally used for Institute publications we re followed. Geo-
graphical names and names of organizations have been respelt 
according to the current orthography, while personal names 
have been left in the oid spelling. 
A list of abbreviations used and an index were compiled by the 
Editorial Department. In a few cases, however, it proved lm-
possible to trace the meanings of particular abbreviations. 
We have decided against adding a bibliography because the 
sources consulted by Prof. Pelzer are mostly unpublished reports 
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and archive documents. All the relevant bibliographical in forma-
tion on these as weIl as on the published literature consulted may 
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van Sumatra - General Association of Rubberplanters on 
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Badan Nasionalisasi Perusahaan Belanda - Nationalization 
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Badan Pusat Penguasa Perusahaan-Perusahaan Industri dan 
Tambang Belanda - Central Administrative Committee of 
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Badan Kerja-Sama Organisasi Tani Sumatera Timur - Co-
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unknown 
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Peoples' Labor Federation 
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Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij - Royal Mailship 
Company 
Kantor Penyelenggara Pembagian Tanah - Office for the 
Execution of Land Distribution 
Kantor Reorganisasi Pemakaian Tanah - Office for the Re-
organization of Land Use 
unknown 
Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia - Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Moslems 
N asionalis-Agama-Komunis - N ationalism-Religion-Com-
munism 
Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij - Netherlands Trading 
Company 
Nahdatul Ulama - Islamic Scholars 
Organisasi Buruh Pancasila - Pancasila Labor Organization 
Organisasi Buruh Sosialis Indonesia - Indonesian Socialist 
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Partai Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Timur - Party of the 
Special Territory East Sumatra 
Partai Kristen Indonesia - Indonesian Christian Party 
Perusahaan Dagang Negara - State Commercial Enterprises 
Perjuangan Semesta - Over-all Struggle 
probably Persatuan Tarbyah Islamyah - Islamic Educa-
tional Movement 
Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian Nationalist 
Peasant Union 
Persatuan Tani Nahdatul Ulama - Nahdatul Ulama Peasant 
Union 
Partai Indonesia Raya - Great-Indonesia Party 
Partai Komunis Indonesia - Indonesian Communist Party 
Perusahaan Negara - State Enterprises 
Partai Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian Nationalist Party 
Pusat Perkebunan Negara - Government Estates Admi-
nistration 
Pusat Perkebunan Negara Baru - New Government Estates 
Administration 
Panitya Persiapan Negara Kesatuan untuk Sumatera Timur 
- Preparatory Commission for the Incorporation of East 
Sumatra into the Unitary State 
Panitya Penyelenggara Pembentukan Propinsi Sumatera 
Utara - Committee for the Establishment of the Province 
of North Sumatra 
Panitya Pusat Urusan Tanah Pertanian - Central Com-
mission for Agricultural Land Affairs 
Partai Rakyat Nasional - National People's Party 
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia Revo-
lutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
Partai Sosialis Indonesia - Indonesian Socialist Party 
Part ai Sarekat Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Party 
Persatuan Sumatera Timur - East Sumatran Union 













Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij "Amsterdam" - Rubber 
Plantation Company "Amsterdam" 
Ronde Tafel Conferentie - Round Table Conference 
Rukun Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasant Union 
Sarekat Tani Indonesia - Indonesian Peasant Association 
Sarekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia - Indonesian Moslem 
Wor kers Union 
Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Indo-
nesian Estate Workers Trade Union 
Sarekat Buruh Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Labor 
Union 
Serikat Buruh Kristen Indonesian - Indonesian Christian 
Labor Union 
Serikat Kaum Tani - Peasants Union 
Sentra! Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia - Ali-Indo-
nesian Centra! Labor Organization 
Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Peasants 
Union 
Tentara Islam Indonesia - Indonesian Islamic Army 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NEGARA SUMATERA TIMUR AND 
THE AGRARIAN ISSUE 
By mid-1947 the Republic of Indonesia was under attack from 
two sides in East Sumatra. "On 21 July, Dutch troops in Sumatra 
and Java began their first full-scale military campaign against the 
Republic. In East Sumatra Dutch planes dropped leaflets with 
Malay, Batak, and Acehnese texts claiming th at the Dutch were 
coming not as enemies but to restore law and order ... Well-
equipped armored columns pushed out from the bridge-head of 
Medan with the intent of bringing the valuable plantation belt of 
East Sumatra under their con trol and thus clearing the way for 
the planters, who no less than twenty-two months af ter the 
Japanese surrender were still waiting impatiendy for an oppor-
tunity to return to their plantations."l Meanwhile, anti-Republic 
local leaders began to agitate for East Sumatran autonomy. 
The Netherlands Indies commissioner for administrative affairs, 
J.J. van de Velde, the ranking military officer in East Sumatra, 
Colonel P. Scholten of the "Z" Brigade, and the head of tempor-
ary administrative services, J. Gerritsen, formally reviewed a 
demonstration for East Sumatran autonomy held in Medan on 31 
July 1947. Acting as spokesman for the demonstrators, Djomat 
Purba, a member of the Simelungun nobility, explained th at the 
autochthonous people of East Sumatra wished to bring to the 
attention of the Netherlands Indies government some sentiments 
the people had been holding back since independence. The he art 
of the matter was resentment of Republican power, which had 
led to replacement of "representatives of the autochthonous 
population" in the administration of East Sumatra by self-seek-
ing individuals litde interested in the welfare of the local people 
and, worse, to the terror of the Social Revolution. With not one 
Malay left in any position of importance, the time was clearly 
come for the people, in concert with the Netherlands Indies 
government, to act to restore their rights. Djomat Purba then 
presented a petition requesting recognition of a committee of 
indigenous leaders whose purpose was establishment of an 
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autonomous "Special Territory" of East Sumatra (Daerah 
Istimewa Sumatera Timur) in accordance with the Linggarjati 
Agreemen t 's provision. 2 
Replying for the Netherlands Indies government, Van de Velde 
commended Djomat Purba and the rest of the committee for 
their great courage in making public their readiness to cooperate 
with the Netherlands Indies government and promised to bring 
the petition to the attention of Dr. H.J. van Mook, the Dutch 
Lieutenant Governor-General in Jakarta. The committee was 
urged to proceed meanwhile with plans for translating its ideas 
into realities. 
Similar demonstrations were staged during the next few weeks 
in Lubukpakam, Binjai and Pematangsiantar. Meanwhile Rcpubli-
can extremists retaliated by killing several relatives of Daerah 
Istimewa Sumatera Timur supporters. The movement gained 
momentum following a mass meeting in Medan on 27 September 
at which Datuk Hafiz Haberham announced formation of the 
Partai Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Timur (PARDIST) by the 
fusion of two smaller wartime underground organizations. The 
older of the two, Persatuan Sumatera Timur (East Sumatran 
Union), also had a prewar history dating back to its founding in 
1936 by Tengku Mansur. The other, Selamat Sejahtera (Welfare 
and Happiness), was the wartime creation of Datuk Hafiz Haber-
ham, the new PARDIST leader. Both organizations had fought 
the Republicans from the beginning, but neither had dared come 
into the open until af ter the arrival of substantial Dutch forces. 3 
Victory came to the autonomists on 8 October 1947 with 
promulgation of a Netherlands Indies decree giving provisional 
recognition to the Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Timur and transfer-
ring to the Medan committee members as a temporary represen-
tative council the powers formerly delegated to the sultans and 
other petty princes. The council was additionally charged with 
the task of drafting a constitution. A decree officially creating 
the Negara Sumatera Timur (State of East Sumatra) was signed 
on 25 December by Van Mook. 
Under a constitution closely modeled on that of the Negara 
Indonesia Timur (State of East Indonesia) and approved in 
February 1948, a state government was set up comprising a Chief 
of State (Wali Negara), a five-member Cabinet, a Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan) , and a Board of Delegates (Badan 
Amanah). The Representative Council had thirty-eight elected 
and twelve appointed members, who in turn chose seven from 
their own ranks to serve on the Board of Delegates, a kind of 
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working committee for the larger body.4 Three lndonesians and 
two Dutch officials filled the posts in the first Cabinet and 
Tengku Mansur, doyen of the autonomy movement and an unde 
of the former sultan of Asahan, was elected Wali Negara by the 
Representative Council. 
The official transfer of power to the Negara Sumatera Timur 
on 9 March 1948 followed too quickly to all ow adequate 
preparation, so that actual administrative transfers in Agrarian 
Affairs, Agriculture, Forestry, Public Health, Public Works, and 
other such services were still being made many months afterward. 
An immediate increase in the number of lndonesians was 
apparent in all offices but with so few lndonesians being profes-
sionally qualified, most of the top positions continued to be held 
by Dutch officials who, although theoretically responsible solely 
to the new Chief of State of the Negara Sumatera Timur, in 
practice reported also to their respective services in Jakarta and 
kept an eye on Dutch interests. 5 
The Postwar Plantation Situation 
Overshadowing all other problems inherited by the new govern-
ment was the great agrarian tangie, immensely complicated by 
the fact th at the war had not only interrupted negotiations on 
the conversion question but also brought the plantation economy 
to a standstill. Returning planters hardly recognized their 
holdings. Above and beyond the effects of years without proper 
management, all plantations had suffered the inroads of wartime 
food crop cultivators. There were wide differences in the extent 
of the damage from the conversion of lands to food production, 
depending on the type and location of the plantation. Those 
lands nearest to population centers or to major roads and those 
lands most readily convertible, i.e. the tobacco fields, had borne 
the brunt of the wartime damage. It was possible for a few less 
accessible estates whose stands of perennial crops had to varying 
degrees been left untouched to go back into production immedi-
ately. A much more serious sÎtuation existed where large stands 
had been cut to make room for food cultivators, as the continu-
ing presence of these squatters made systematic replanting im-
possible, thereby gravely handicapping plantation operations. But 
the tobacco planters faced by far the most discouraging prospect. 
A considerably higher percentage of their fields had been used 
for food production and, as to growing tobacco, it was practic-
ally impossible to find stretches of land that had been fallow the 
4 Planters against Peasants 
requlSlte eight or more ycars. Everywhcrc the sccond-growth 
forests so typical of the tobacco rcgion in prewar years had given 
way to the tall alang-alang. Tegalan, patches of sawah, and truck 
gardens pockmarked estate lands. Even a beginning to the 
restoration of the field rotation systcm hinged on the chances of 
evicting thousands of squatters. 
Thcre was little more encouragement for the returning planters 
in the political climate though some reassurance could be found 
in the fact that, in contrast to the Republic of Indonesia where 
the essential prewar agrarian laws - the legal foundation of 
plantation agriculture - we re being repealed, the Negara 
Sumatera Tz"mur was headed by Tengku Mansur, who had just 
published an article stating: 
" ... no Indonesian with a sense of reality win doubt the fact 
that Indonesia also in its newly won state of independence will 
require help and support from the Dutch for many years - if not 
generations. The Dutch element is truly rooted in this land. It 
possesses attributes and knowledge which the great majority of 
Indonesians lack but which are absolutely necessary for the 
further progress and development of this part of Asia .... It 
would be a twisting of historical facts if we did not admit that 
this area ... owes most of its prosperity and development to the 
pioneering spirit of Dutch entrepreneurs. Without doubt, East 
Sumatra would never have gained such an overwhelming econ-
omic importance had the Dutch planters not wrested such great 
wealth from the fertile soil with their daring and spirit of entre-
preneurship, if the West had not invested such large sums of 
capital in plantation agriculture .... Netherlanders like Nienhuys, 
Cremer, and Janssen we re the on es who converted the jungle and 
swamps of East Sumatra into a region which still has enormous 
economic potentialities. 
No honest person can deny that this gives the European entre-
preneurs a sort of birthright - and even under the new circum-
stances this right is not affected. This is an obligation for us, one 
of which we will have to take cognizance ... for reasons of right 
and justice but also because of the fact that the continuation and 
further development of Western enterprises in this State must be 
regarded as of general interest to the people."6 
By itself this apologia for the plantation economy - for what 
Mansur at another point in his article referred to as "the goose 
that lays the golden eggs" - could have generated a real wave of 
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optimism amoung the planters, but there we re other factors to 
consider. An indication of the precarious balance a political 
leader had to maintain between economic and social pressures 
can be found in the next few sentences: 
"However, this can hardly be a one-sided obligation. The entre-
preneur, too, has his obligations, his new responsibilities, which 
stem from the awakening of the Indonesian people. These obliga-
tions are of a socio-economic nature ... "7 
Government and planters a1ike recognized the dilemma presented 
by the squatters. Their occupation of plantation land admittedly 
had a quasilegal basis, the majority being able to cite the Com-
pulsory Cultivation Ordinance of 1939, various decrees of the 
Japanese military, or the 1 May 1947 order of the Resident to 
the Republican Agricultural Service. 8 There was a1so the 
squatters' sheer number, made up, as surveys in 1947 showed, of 
both Javanese and Chinese prewar plantation laborers, autoch-
thonous villagers, Chinese market gardeners and hog breeders 
(some of prewar status and some who turned to these occupa-
tions af ter 1942), as weIl as various immigrant groups from North 
Tapanuli and other parts of Sumatra who had remained outside 
tbe plantation sector. 
An arbitrary policy of immediate expulsion of all squatters - a 
policy openly advocated by a few planters - seemed inadvisable 
on several counts. There was, first of all, the cdntinuing food 
crisis, whose possible a1leviation with rice imports was still 
precluded by the stringent quo tas of the international postwar 
rice allocation system. Another impediment to summary action 
arose from local political realities. The squatters, as citizens and 
prospective citizens, constituted an important voting bloc which 
tbe pro-Dutch government had to satisfy or risk losing to the 
Republican cause. 
It was the cIear need for a cautious approach that had led to 
the compromise whereby the planters had agreed to give tempor-
ary occupation permits to those squatters a1ready on their land in 
return for a government promise to enact new laws for the 
protection of plantation property by 31 May 1948. The Nether-
lands Indies government finally issued an ordinance against 
squatting on 8 June 1948 and the Negara Sumatera Timur, which 
meanwhile had assumed power, declared the ordinance effective 
in East Sumatra. This new law,9 established 8 June 1948, acted as 
a standfast beyond which unauthorized new squatters on public 
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domain or plantation lands became subject to immediate eviction 
and to either a prison term of three months or a fine of five 
hundred Rupiah. Squatters from before 8 June 1948 received 
official permission to stay in their fields until satisfactory re-
settlement arrangements could be made for them. 
Fully aware that any resettlement of squatters raised anew the 
question of agrarian rights, the Negara Sumatera Timur prepared 
a guidance directive whose classification of squatters according to 
land rights may be summarized as follows: 10 
Autochthonous population Right to a land allotment as 
provided by concession 
agreements 
Nonautochthonous lndonesians Agrarian rights but no claim on 
since accepted into adat plantation lands 
community 
Former plantation laborers No land rights (expected to 
return to their jobs) 
Nonfarmers occupying land 
for speculative purposes 
Refugees 
Chinese and other foreigners 
No land rights 
No land rights (temporary 
arrangements to be made for 
their relief) 
No land rights (free to make 
rental or long lease agreements 
as before the war) 
The planters noted with approval the exclusion of immigrants or 
any other new category from the raster of land claimants and the 
government stand on the return of former plantation laborers to 
their jobs. There were encouraging steps toward restoring planta-
tion operations. Looming ever larger, however, was the conver-
sion question which by 1948, with fourteen concession agree-
ments already expired and most others soon to expire, carried a 
real sense of urgency. 
The Social Revolution, which swept through East Sumatra in 
March 1946, had meanwhile robbed the planters of their best 
allies, the sultans, and thereby much of their great prewar in-
fluence over local affairs. 
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The Investigation of the Bureau of Land Planning 
Ir. J.H. de Haan, director of the Bureau of Land Planning, a new 
agency of the Netherlands Indies Department of Agriculture and 
Fisheries in Jakarta, made several trips to East Sumatra in 1948 
and 1949 to study firsthand the complex land problem there, 
and his detailed reports constitute a rich source of information 
on agricultural conditions during this politically unsettled period. 
As interesting as the statistical data is the general approach of 
De Haan. Recognizing the futility of attempting a solution of the 
agrarian problem on the basis of legal reasoning, since legal 
arguments were no longer acceptable to the Indonesians, what-
ever their political philosophy, De Haan and his staff set out to 
find a rational solution to the problem of how to delimit and 
relate, in a fair, economically sound, and politically acceptable 
manner, the agrarian rights of the peasants and the legal rights of 
the planters. To arrive at such a solution the Bureau of Land 
Planning intended first to undertake a careful reassessment of all 
economic and political factors as weIl as a scientific evaluation of 
the agricultural potentialof the area considered as a whoie. 
Of the many factors to be examined, the purely economic 
necessarily ranked high. The Netherlands Indies govemment, like 
the Negara Sumatera Tz"mur govemment, was firmly committed 
to the defense of the autochthonous population against all 
encroachments on their rights by the planters. Vet no one was 
more aware than De Haan of the importance to the general 
welfare of a healthy plantation economy. A solid basis for the 
argument lay in his figures comparing yields from tobacco cul-
tivation in the years just before the war and yields from the crops 
being grown by Indonesians on roughly the same land in the 
postwar years. Statistics assembied for the years 1930 to 1938 
showed th at the tobacco plantations, using an average annual 
total of 13,000 hectares had produced an income of 19 million 
guilders (including the value of the rice grown af ter the tobacco 
harvest) for an ave rage annual yield per hectare of 182 guilders. 
Estimates of Indonesian production, adjusted to prewar price 
levels, put the average income per hectare for a rice crop at 
91 guilders and for a com crop at 40 guilders. On the basis of the 
prevalent four-year cultivation cyc1e - two years of double-
cropping and two years of fallow - these estimates indicated an 
average annual yield per hectare of 65 guilders. ll 
That the Indonesian production estimates might be high was 
implied in additional data showing that many peasants on former 
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tobacco lands found their rice yields off as much as 20 percent 
the second year and 50 percent the third and that some peasants 
were allowing as much as four years of fallow. In such cases the 
annual yield feIl to 40 or 50 guilders. But, as the Bureau of Land 
Planning pointed out, even an average annual income of 65 
guilders compared unfavorably with the 240 guilders a man and 
his wife could earn by working on a plantation. Nor did th is 
figure, based on the prewar averages of 150 guilders for a male 
laborer and 90 guilders for a female laborer reported by Baron 
van Lynden, include the medical care of high professional quality 
or other fringe benefits plantation employees enjoyed. All in all, 
De Haan concluded, a major shift in land use from plantation 
operation to the subsistenee agriculture of the peasants would 
entail a serious economie loss for the country as a whoie. 
Just how to reconcile this fact with the inherent right of the 
indigenous population to land posed a problem with no easy 
solution. The postwar political ferment, anticolonialist and 
militant, precluded the use of legal arguments in dividing the land 
between plantation and indigenous sectors. De Haan knew this 
but knew too that the planters had to have a legal basis for their 
operations and that in a generation or two, unless other means of 
livelihood could be found for the growing population, an even 
greater land shortage would make the renewal of long leases 
poiitically impossible. 
His recommendation was to give the plantations long leases for 
sufficient land to permit operations on approximately the prewar 
scale in return for the release of most of their reserve lands to the 
government for distribution to indigenous cultivators. De Haan 
estimated that the tobacco industry needed 120,000 hectares and 
could release 135,000 hectares. The perennial-crop plantations, 
retaining all land actually under cultivation, would have 160,000 
hectares and could release 105,000 hectares. About a third of the 
284,000 hectares of forest reserve was also to be released. 12 It 
seemed reasonable to suppose th at the total area of the released 
estate land and forest reserve, together with the remaining idle 
land in the public domain and various agricultural lands un-
claimed af ter the war, would take care of the local cultivators, 
especially if all potentially irrigable land were converted to 
sawah. 
The real departure from earlier proposals along these lines 
could be found in the ambitious plans for putting this realloca-
tion of land on a sound scientific basis. Rather than try un-
tangling the rights accrued from concession agreements signed up 
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to seventy years before, or rather than leave to the planters the 
choice of lands to be released, the Bureau of Land Planning set 
out to make a thorough reappraisal and agrological classification 
of the entire agricultural area of East Sumatra as the basis for a 
permanent assignment of land to either the export or the sub-
sistence sector of agriculture. All land was to be classified as to 
suitability for irrigated rice cultivation, forest reserve, perennial-
crop cultivation af ter terracing, or plantation tobacco cultivation. 
Only by discarding the habit of seeing the land in terms of 
specific parcels or plantations and moving to consideration of the 
whole area of a hydrographic basin or watershed could a rational 
division of the land be made, and serious repercussions on plains, 
bottom lands, and coastal are as of any interference with their 
headwaters be avoided. Maximal development of the country's 
agricultural resources for the ultimate benefit of all interests 
depended on finding a scientifically sound solution to the land 
problem. The next stop was to organize a practical program for 
accomplishing this. 
A branch of the Bureau of Land Planning was opened in Medan 
in April 1948 and the government began looking for such special-
ized personnel for the branch as an irrigation engineer, a land use 
expert, and a rural sociologist with a thorough knowledge of 
adat. Study maps of the area covered by the states of Langkat, 
Deli, and Serdang were made and the whole area divided into 
three regions, each extending from the coast southward to the 
highlands. Subregions were marked off on the basis of topo-
graphical unity, i.e. according to elevation and terrain, and a 
request forwarded to the central office for an aerial survey from 
which maps on a sc ale of 1: 20,000 could be drawn. These plans 
were never fully implemented. The Medan office remained hope-
lessly understaffed during its short existence and, so far as I 
could determine from my own study of the records, the aerial 
survey was never begun. 
More progress seems to have been made in the matter of a 
proposed census of the squatter population according to the 
categories defined earlier by the Negara Sumatera Timur. Table 1 
summarizes some of the data gathered for Region I, an area 
bounded on the east by the Deli river and on the west by the 
Bingai river with a total of 104,000 hectares, of which the planta-
tions held 73,830. 
There were among the squatters only about 6,900 autoch-
thonous families, whose valid claims to land would have totaled 
about 35,000 hectares, leaving roughly 39,000 for the tobacco 
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Table 1 
Squatter population of Region I (area between Deli and Bingai 
rivers) as of 1948 
Location and Heads of Depen-
ethnic group households dents Total 
Living in non-estate kampongs 
Autochthonous people 6,341 19,005 25,346 
Other Indonesians 4,383 12,286 16,669 
Chinese, Indians and 
Other non-Indonesians 803 1,444 2,247 
Total 11,527 32,735 44,262 
Living dispersed 
Autochthonous people 510 1,456 1,966 
Other Indonesians 3,304 7,710 11,014 
Chinese, Indians and 
other non-Indonesians 517 11141 11658 
Total 4,331 10,307 14,638 
Living in estate kampongs 
(almost without exception 
Javanese) 9,182 23,472 32,654 
Grand total 25,040 66,514 91,554 
Souree: j.F. Wolterson, Streekplan I, Medan, 18 June 1949. These figures 
differ somewhat from those found in the same author's Nota betreffende de 
conversie van de tabaksconcessies en de plaats die daarin de Sectie Land-
inrichting inneemt, March 1949. 
plantations. These figures, for Region I as a whoie, revealed 
nothing of the real problem, however, which lay in the con-
centration of autochthonous claimants in the only areas suitable 
for plantation tobacco cultivation. This uneven distribution of 
resources and population among the four topographical sub-
regions marked off by the Bureau of Land Planning is shown in 
Table 2. 
The indicated solution was clearly a major resettlement of 
people among subregions, together with the conversion of some 
tobacco land into sawah, and there were apparently some pre-
liminary calculations along these lines. But whether the Bureau 
of Land Planning, given a longer existence, would have been able 
to devise a workable plan remains problematical in view of the 
many factors - social and political as well as economie - any 
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Table 2 
Region I: Total area, land belonging to concessions, and land 
requirements of autochthonous population as of 1948 (in hec· 
tares) 
Subregion Total Area Land Land suited Land needed 
belonging for tobacco for autoch-
to con· cultivation thonous 
cessIOns population 
1 23,330 4,200 2,181.125 
2 58,710 55,440 55,440 24,201.52 
3 10,670 10,465 4,536.575 
4 11,360 3,725 3,961. 75 
Total 104,070 73,830 55,440 34,880.97 
Souree: J .W. Wolterson, Streekplan I, Medan, 18 June 1949. 
plan would have had to accommodate. The complexity of the 
squatter problem is perhaps best illustrated by closer examina· 
tion of the actual situation on a typical plantation. 
The Squatter Problem on Marihat Estate: A Case Study 
A request from the Assistant Resident of Simelungun to the 
Negara Sumatera Timur in 1948 for an investigation of the 
squatter problem on Marihat Estate, a former German plantation 
ne ar Pematangsiantar confiscated in 1940 as enemy alien prop· 
erty, resulted in a survey by the Bureau of Land Planning which 
highlights the predicament of many planters in postwar East 
Sumatra. The original concession of 5,200 hectares, known as 
Concession Bah Kasinder, had been granted on 18 March 1908 
by the Raja of Tanah Jawa and the Pertuhan of Huta Bayu 
Merubun. Of three kampongs within the concession at the time, 
Jawa Dolok and Marihat Jandi had been bought out and the six 
families of the third kampong, Nagori Asih, given a total of 26.5 
hectares of land and allowed to remain as an enclave within the 
plantation. In 1917 an adjoining concession, Belimbingin, was 
granted to the Handelsvereeniging "Amsterdam" (HV A), at 
which time three kampongs with the names Merubun, Dolok 
Merubun, and Huta Bayu Merubun we re created on the northerly 
border of the Bah Kasinder concession. In careful compliance 
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with eXIstmg legislation, the concessionaires allottcd four 
hectares to each of the 51 households in these thrcc ncw villagcs. 
The situation was considerably changed by 1948. In the villages 
a natural population growth had been augmented in the 1930s by 
an in flux of unemployed J avanese plantation laborers. Their 
pligh t during the depression had caused general concern and the 
Netherlands Indies government, finding the offer of repatriation 
to Java only a partial solution, had put pressure on the Sime-
lungun rajas to allow these laborers to settIe in Sirnclungun 
villages. 13 In ad di ti on to the J avanese, there had been some 
migrants from Tapanuli. The resultant rise from 1917 to 1948 in 
the population of these four villages is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Area and number of households in the four villages of Nagori 
Asih, Merubun, Dolok Merubun and Huta Bayu Merubun 
Village Area Number of Number of 
(hectares) households households 
in 1917 in 1948 
Merubun 96.8 24 159 
Dolok Merubun 36.3 9 103 
Huta Bayu Merubun 71.7 18 118 
Nagori Asih 26.5 6 79 
Total 231.3 57 459 
Source: Wolterson, Advies inzake grondbehoefte van de Pertuhanan Huta 
Baju Merubun, Simelungun, Medan, 27 December 1948. 
In the census of these households, the Bureau of Land Planning 
also recorded ethnic background and these data for 1948 reveal 
the radical shift in ethnic composition from 1917 when the 
villages were populated entirely by Simelungun Batak (Tabie 4). 
Able to question 251 of the 290 Javanese families, the Bureau 
of Land Planning found that 158 had been residents sin ce before 
1942, living mainly as tenants of Simelungun landowners, an-
other 60 had turned to subsistence agriculture between March 
1942 and July 1947, and 33 were new arrivals in the villages, 
having moved there since July 1947. 
Their lands badly eroded and totally exhausted, the villagers 
from these four kampongs had poured forth with the encourage-
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Table 4 
Ethnic composition of the population of the villages of Huta 
Bayu Merubun, Dolok Merubun, Merubun and Nagori Asih in 
1948 
Ethnic group Number Percent Number Percent 
of house- of tota! of of tota! 
holds pers ons 
Loca! Simelungun 
Batak 71 15.5 292 18.5 
Simelungun Batak 
bom in another 
Pertuhanan 21 4.6 65 4.1 
Javanese 290 63.2 902 57.0 
Sundanese 13 2.8 41 2.6 
Toba Batak 42 9.1 191 12.1 
Mandailing Batak 11 2.4 49 3.1 
Banjarese 10 2.2 36 2,3 
Indo-Arabs 1 0.2 6 0.3 
Tota! 459 100.0 1,582 100.0 
Source: Wolterson, Advies inzake grondbehoefte van de Pertuhanan Huta 
Baju Merubun, Simelungun, Medan, 27 December 1948. 
ment of the authorities in the war and postwar years to practice 
swidden cultivation on Marihat property. So too had the villagers 
from five other villages on the periphery of Marihat which were 
politically outside the jurisdiction of the Pertuhanan Huta Bayu 
Merubun (presumably all five we re so-called "estate villages"). 
Census data for these villages yielded the ethnic breakdown 
shown in Table 5. 
With 1,017 squatter families of a!together 3,695 persons, the 
Marihat managers did have a problem - and no one saw easy 
solutions. Here as elsewhere in East Sumatra the Bureau of Land 
Planning investigators faced the sometimes open hostility of 
squatters who knew their land was forfeit under the terms of the 
Negara Sumatera Timur directive. There was also a constant 
stream of new squatters despite reaffirmation on 22 May 1950 
by Tengku Mansur, as head of Negara Sumatera Timur - at the 
time one of the states, belonging to the newly independent 
"United States of Indonesia" -, and Colonel M. Simbolon, the 
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Table 5 
Ethnic composition of the population of Tongah Maligas, Karang 
Mulia, Suhi Nagodang, Suhi Mahasar, andJawa Tenga in 1948. 
Ethnic group Number Percent Number Percent 
of house- oftotal of of total 
holds pers ons 
Local Simelungun 
Batak 139 24.9 506 23.9 
Simelungun Batak 
bom in another 
Pertuhanan 42 7.5 160 7.6 
Javanese 177 31.8 620 29.3 
Sundanese 3 0.5 12 0.6 
Toba Batak 192 34.4 793 37.5 
Mandailing Batak 3 0.5 8 0.4 
Banjarese 2 0.4 14 0.7 
Total 558 100.0 2,113 100.0 
Source: WoIterson, Advies inzake grondbehoefte van de Pertuhanan Huta 
Baju Merubun, Simelungun, Medan, 27 December 1948. 
military govemor for North Sumatra, of the continued legality of 
the 8 June 1948 standfast ordinance against all such new squat-
ting. The combination of a fluid situation and a limited staff 
made it all but impossible to complete a truly current census. 
The data did, however, suffice for consideration of one aspect 
of the problem - allotment of land to rightful claimants - and 
the Bureau of Land Planning proceeded to make recommenda-
tions in three areas. First there were the indigenous claimants. 
The Negara Sumatera Timur directive explicitly excluded all non-
indigenous people from those with a valid land claim and, in the 
case of Marihat, this was interpreted as applying as weIl to those 
Simelungun Batak outside the jurisdiction of the Pertuhanan 
Huta Bayu Merubun, i.e., in the five "estate villages", whose 
claims would have to be made in their home districts. This left 
only the 71 Simelungun Batak families of Nagori Asih, Merubun, 
Dolok Merubun, and Huta Bayu Merubun, with a total claim to 
284 hectares. Of the 232 hectares allotted to Simelungun Batak 
families within the concession in 1917, only 135 were still in 
Simelungun Batak hands, 97 hectares having been acquired by 
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Javanese families. Taking into account this loss of 97 hectares 
and the natural increase from 57 to 71 Simelungun Batak 
families, the Bureau of Land Planning advised the Marihat man-
agement to release 30 hectares of wet-rice land (the equivalent of 
120 hectares of unirrigated land) for use by these families. 
A second and larger category of c1aimants arose in the form of 
367 families who though not Simelungun Batak had been 
assimilated into the adat community and given "citizen" status in 
the Pertuhanan. The great majority of these people, originally 
drawn from surrounding areas by the lure of wages, were former 
plantation workers and as such were expected to return to their 
jobs. To alloweach of these families 0.4 hectares, adequate for a 
house and small garden, the Bureau of Land Planning suggested 
the release of an additional 150 hectares of potential sawah for 
their special needs. 
The third recommendation related to the predictabIe natural 
population growth of the future. Clearly it would have been 
absurd to attempt a permanent solution to the problem of 
providing land for future generations but it would have been 
equally absurd to repeat the mis take of making no provision 
whatever. As a conciliatory gesture it was proposed that the total 
allowance of 180 hectares of potential sawah be raised by a flat 
25 percent in anticipation of new claims within the Pertuhanan 
Huta Bayu Merubun, this additionalland to be held in reserve by 
the government. 
The "Second Revolution" 
Thus things stood at Marihat and elsewhere when on 17 August 
1950 the Republicans declared Indonesia a unitary state, abolish-
ing at one stroke such "special" territories as the Negara 
Sumatera Tz"mur and all other vestiges of the federal structure 
imposed by the Netherlands Indies three years earlier. The 
transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 had in a formal 
sense ended the struggle for independence but, as history was to 
prove, also marked the beginning of an even more intense 
struggle for national identity. The creation of a unitary state was 
the first major victory in this "second revolution". 
For the planters it was a period of immobilizing uncertainty. 
Signs that a radical change had just taken place were inescapable. 
In East Sumatra the incoming Republican acting governor almost 
immediately transferred responsibility for agrarian matters to the 
civil administration officials of the resident's office (kabupaten), 
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reducing the Bureau of Land Planning to a purely advisory rale. 
More ominous was the swift metamorphosis of the essentially 
economic conversion tangle into a political issue for the Republic 
of Indonesia with the question framed in terms of colonialism 
and foreign exploitation. 
Vet it was difficult for the planters to judge if or when the 
Republicans would repudiate the agreements regarding the future 
of the plantations that the Netherlands Indies had so pain-
stakingly attached to the transfer of sovereignty. For a year the 
planters had been relying on Republican guarantees, made some-
what reluctantly at the Hague Round Table Conference, of the 
recognition and restoration of all "rights, concessions, and license 
properly granted under the law of the Netherlands Indies" and 
the continuation of those conditions "rendering investments 
required for normallong-term operations possible" - any excep-
tions to be handled "in accordance with legally prescribed 
procedure". 
At the same time the planters were uneasily aware of events in 
the territory administered by the Republic of Indonesia where 
the Republicans had used their five years of contral to effect 
revolutionary changes in the agrarian situation in Java. 
CHAPTER 11 
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE 
AGRARIAN PROBLEM 
Whereas, for the sake of the economic benefits which the 
country would derive from the reconstruction of a flourishing 
plantation industry, the leaders of the Negara Sumatera Timur 
had been willing to agree to the return of the planters, the 
Republican government in Yogyakarta was overwhelmed by the 
popular demand for a thoroughgoing examination of the old 
agrarian legislation and for agrarian reform. 
The first target turned out to be the plantations of the 
principalities in Central Java - the same plantations that had 
aroused Governor-General Van der Cap ellen 's ire in 1823 and, 
contrarily, been defended by Du Bus de Gisignies in 1827. On 6 
March 1948, possibly in response to demands coming from the 
grass roots, President Sukarno appointed an agrarian commission, 
known as Panitya Tanah Konversie, which was requested to 
study the agrarian problems of the J avanese principali ties of 
Y ogyakarta and Surakarta. Among the studies available to the 
commis sion was Soepomo's thoroughly documented thesis on 
the agrarian history of this region, written under the guidance of 
Van Vollenhoven in Leiden, in which Soepomo had demon-
strated that the Western planters had drastically altered the 
agrarian structure in the principalities to the detriment of the 
peasants. 1 
Originally, as Soepomo pointed out, the Javanese mIer, who 
claimed to be the owner of all land and regarded his subjects as 
his tenants, had demanded a share of the crop, known as pajeg, 
amounting to one-half of the rice harvest on irrigated sawah, 
one-third of the rice harvest on tegalan and rain sawah (or sawah 
tadahan), and one-third of all dry-season crops. The princes of ten 
transferred parts of their lands to relatives or state officials as 
apanage lands with pajeg and other traditional services thereafter 
belonging to the hol der of the apanage. 
The Western planters who leased these apanage lands, or those 
lands still held by the princes, had no interest in a share of the 
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ordinary crops, their concern being to produce the more profit-
able export crops - coffee, cacao, tobacco and sugar. This 
required control of the land, which the Western planters assumed 
by taking one-half of the village land subject to pajeg payment 
and compelling the Javanese to cultivate export crops without 
payment for their labor. In addition, the planters demanded 
other compulsory services, such as guard duty. In the course of 
the nineteenth century, the planters were able to exact more and 
more favorable terms from the princes, thus increasing the 
burden on the peasants. Strictly speaking, the Western planters, 
in the opinion of Soepomo and Van Vollenhoven, had no right 
other than to collect a share of the harvest and to demand the 
customary labor services from the population; specifically, they 
had no right to the land itself. But the planters proceeded delib-
erately to change the pajeg system into the glebagan and bengkok 
systems. Under the glebagan system, a planter would divide the 
arabIe land into two equal parts and rotate his fields, using one 
half himself in alternate years. Under the bengkok system, the 
land was also divided into two equal parts - one part designated 
estate land for the cultivation of perennials and the other part 
left in the hands of the peasants for production of their own 
food crops. This was a tampering with adat. Moreover, the tradi-
tional practice by mIers and high state officials of impressing 
J avanese for service on such special occasions as the funeral of a 
rul er was also converted by the planters into a basis for com-
pulsory agriculturallabor without compensation. 
From time to time the Netherlands Indies government 
attempted to stop clear cases of violation of Javanese adat, but 
by and large the planters' demands for services grew unchecked. 
By 1900 the difference between the agrarian systems of the 
principalities and of those parts of Java under direct Dutch rule 
had become so great as to make the need for agrarian reform 
obvious to all. Therefore, af ter years of study and preparation, 
the government finally decided in 1909 to reorganize the agrarian 
structure of the principalities, with the following four major 
aims: abolition of the apanage system, assignment of more 
adequate agrarian rights to the Javanese peasants, formation of 
village communities, and revision of the system of taxation. It 
took another nine years to translate this decision into the 
reforms of 1918, amended in 1925. These reforms reflected the 
new view that the land-lease system of the principalities, which 
was based on special agrarian relations, no longer had a place in 
modern times and must be substituted by new regulations more 
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in line with changing concepts of land rights. But since the 
planters were holding contractual rights they drove a very hard 
bargain, demanding the right to use their share of the village 
lands for another half century in exchange for the surrender of 
their "right" to compulsory unpaid labor services. This right 
became known as the "conversion right". For the Javanese 
peasants it meant not using one-half of the original village for 
another fifty years, despite the fact that their number had, 
beyond doubt, at least quadrupled since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The majority of the peasants found them-
selves no longer able to farm enough land to earn a decent living, 
and a high percentage of the families we re completely land-
less - left with no choice, if they could not find employment in 
Java, but to become contract laborers in Sumatra. 
Though the officially stated reason for the agrarian reform of 
1918 was to give the farming population a more decent and 
independent position in society, the people we re to wait no Ie ss 
than half a century for the final fruition of the reform which was 
considered absolutely necessary. This strange inconsistency of 
the government caused one Dutch observer to remark: 
"Progress is not going to be suspended for fifty years, and yet the 
servitude imposed on agricultural land in the conversion area is 
fixed for half a century. The future will show whether the steady 
growth of the population, the rise of the educationallevel among 
the lowest strata of the population, and the accompanying in-
crease in their requirements will not compel the government and 
the planters to follow another course, a course which must be 
directed towards an assimilation of the agrarian conditions in the 
principalities with those prevailing in regions under direct rule.,,2 
It is therefore not at all surprising that in 1947-48 the peasants of 
Central Java clamored for an immediate reform and an abolition 
of the rights which the planters had been given under the terms 
of the 1918 agrarian reform. 
The various peasant organizations which sprang up af ter the 
declaration of independence repeatedly passed resolutions urging 
the leaders of the Republic to abolish the conversion rights of the 
planters. In the forefront was the BTI (Barisan Tani /ndonesia or 
Indonesian Peasant Front) which at its congress of 29 December 
1946 held in Jember called on the government to buy all private 
landed estates, concessions, and long leases. A year later, at a 
congress held in Blitar on 16 December 1947, the BTI became 
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even more emphatic, passing resolutions to demand the abolition 
of conversion rights and of all other vestiges of the Western 
planters' privileged position in the greatly overpopulated prin-
cipalities of Java. Literally dozens of BTI branches passed similar 
resolutions. Meanwhile, on 13 November 1947, the Peoplc's 
Representative Council of Surakarta had gone on record for 
suspension conversion rights, a stand promptly endorsed by STIl 
(Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Peasants 
Union). When to meet this rising clamor a special parliamentary 
committee finally recommended abolition of conversion rights, 
the BTI organized large demonstrations in Yogyakarta, Klaten, 
and other towns in the principalities to assure the members of 
Parliament that there was enthusiastic popular support for the 
motion. 
The Panitya Tanah Konversie concluded that the peasants' 
demand for immediate abolition of conversion rights was entirely 
reasonable and just, sin ce these rights we re based on a feudal 
system in conflict with the principles of democracy and, in parti-
cular, with Articles 27 and 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia. The commission further stated that con-
tinued imposition of the conversion rights was morally indefens-
ible because the rights violated the fundamental principles of 
social justice by thwarting the economic development of the 
people and giving unfair advantages to the planters. 
Furthermore, their continuation not only would disturb peace 
and order but would endanger the people's food supply. The 
commis sion was not opposed, however, to truly voluntary agree-
ment between foreign entrepreneurs and Indonesian peasants, 
provided a higher land rental and higher wages we re paid by the 
entrepreneurs. It was pointed out that such cooperation in the 
raising of export crops by the Indonesian peasants and their 
processing by the factories of the Western entrepreneurs would 
assure the continued vital flow of foreign-exchange-earning 
export crops. The commissioners submitted the draft of a bill 
revising the Land Lease Regulation of the Principalities (Vorsten-
landsche Grondhuurreglement) to President Sukarno in a letter 
dated 28 March 1948. Parliament ended the conversion rights by 
Law No. 13 of 1948. 
Admittedly rather hurried observations in Central Java in 1956 
gave me the impression that the tobacco plantations did not 
resume their operations, despite the financial and economic con-
ditions attached to the transfer of sovereignty. Most sugar 
planters had found their factories completely demolished as a 
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result of the Republic's scorched-earth policy, in reply to Dutch 
military actions, so that they too did not attempt to revive their 
operations. Those sugar factories which did operate bought most 
of the sugar cane from independent peasants or else rented land 
on the open market. The conversion rights had not been restored. 
A professor of Gadjah Mada University maintained that, even if 
the government had tried to help the planters to reestabIish 
themselves in their former position, the resistance of the highly 
militant peasant and labor uni ons would have prevented it. 
The Panitya Agraria Yogyakarta 
On 21 May 1948 President Sukarno appointed an Agrarian Com-
mission or Panitya Agraria (usually referred to as Panitya Agraria 
Yogyakarta to distinguish it from a later Panitya Agraria Jakarta 
which was established by presidential order of 19 March 1951). 
The 1948 Commission had sixteen members, including Chairman 
Sarimin Reksodihardjo and Vice-Chairman R. Gaos Hardjasoe-
mantri, both from the Ministry of Interior. Besides government 
officials, the commission was made up of representatives of 
peasant organizations - such as BTI and STIl - and members of 
Parliament; its assignment was to formulate the Republic's 
agrarian program. 
The following is a summary of the objectives concerning 
agrarian matters to be found in the National Program which the 
Agrarian Commission recommended to Parliament in July 1949: 
l. Unification of the agrarian law to eliminate the dualistic 
system, which distinguishes between Western and Eastern 
agrarian rights, and permit the development of collective 
and/or cooperative agriculture. 
2. A system for giving each peasant a piece of land which can 
guarantee him and his family a decent living. 
3. Expansion of the amount of land available for the peasantry 
through return to the State and redistribution of land 
belonging to plantations operating either under concessions 
or under long leases and small holdings operating under long 
leases. 
4. Abolition of the private estates (partz"culiere landerzjen) 
whose owners have seigneurial rights. 
5. Granting of easy and cheap credit to peasants. 
6. Formation of marketing cooperatives for the sale of pro-
ducts, both domestically and abroad. 
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7. A program to free the rural people of all burdens which are 
a heritage of feudalism. 
8. Protection of the small peasant who rents land by means of 
speciallegislation regulating the division of the crop yield. 
9. Encouragement of small-scale village industries and of migra-
tion from Java to the Outer Islands. 
10. lntensification of agriculture by means of seed improvement 
and expansion of irrigation systems. 
11. A plan that would let the peasants share in the profits of 
factories to which the peasants deliver their products for 
processing. 
12. State coordination and administration of irrigation works as 
well as state participation in the distribution of water. 3 
The most important goal was the first one, calling for a uniform 
agrarian law which would apply to all without regard to race or 
nationality. The lndonesian nationalists strongly resented the 
prewar dualistic agrarian law, which distinguished between a 
European legal sphere and an Indonesian sphere. Originally all 
land in Indonesia belonged to the lndonesian legal sphere, but 
beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, and 
especially af ter 1870, extensive areas were declared to be free 
state domain, that is, land unencumbered by any lndonesian 
rights. Westerners, both individuals and corporate bodies, were 
given jus z·n rem to this land by way of long leases, which in turn 
were entered in public registers. Besides the right of long leases, 
the European legal sphere knew the right to private ownership 
(recht van opstal). All land not subject to Dutch civil law 
belonged automatically to the Indonesian sphere. 
In this sphere the student of adat distinguishes between: the 
right of disposal (beschz·kkz·ngsrecht)4 which is held by a com-
munity and the rights of the individual, such as the native right 
of possession (hak milik), the right of usufruct, the right of pref-
erence to the land, the right of exclusive option, or the right of 
utilization of land belonging to one's kin groUp.5 There is some 
variation in the recognition of these rights from one group to 
another and differing emphases. Among the Karo and Toba, for 
example, the right of disposal by the marga which claims the 
land, combined with the rights of preferenee and exclusive 
option, makes it extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, 
for a person who is not a Karo or a Toba to acquire land in Karo 
or Toba' communities. This is not the case in the coastal regions 
of East Sumatra, which do not ob serve Batak adat. While this 
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regional difference in adat in respect to land eases the migration 
of Toba to East Sumatra, it would raise insurmountablc obstacles 
for people of the coastal regions of East Sumatra or for J avanese 
if they wished to settle as peasants in Tapanuli. 
The Netherlands Indies government was careful to guard 
against unbridled transfer of land from the Indonesian to the 
European legal spheres, even in instances where adat would have 
permitted it. This was done to prevent ignorant, improvident, or 
ill-advised Indonesians from selling or otherwise transferring their 
land to non-Indonesians, either Westerners or Orientals. Some 
Indonesian nationals with whom I discussed this particular aspect 
of Dutch agrarian law argued that it reduced the market value of 
land and effectively prevented an educated Indonesian headed 
for a profession or a business career from obtaining that amount 
of capital through the sale of his land that he would be able to 
receive were it legally possible for him to sdI his land to buyers 
other than Indonesians - that is, Chinese or Westerners, who 
presumably would be able to pay a higher price than an Indo-
nesian buyer would pay. 6 
Professor Soepomo, in 1947, suggested th at in formulating an 
agrarian law Indonesia could learn from the example of the 
Soviet Union. There was nothing, however, in Article 38 of the 
Provisional Constitution of 1950 to indicate that Soepomo's 
suggestion was followed. In fact, Soepomo himself interpreted 
the same article to mean that the State would regulate the agrar-
ian rights in all parts of Indonesia on land already under cultiva-
tion, as weIl as on primeval-forest land and on land not yet under 
cultivation; the latter would make unnecessary the practice, 
formerly common in the Netherlands Indies, of declaring waste 
land to be under state ownership. Further evidence th at 
Soepomo's suggestion was rejected by the majority of the Agrar-
ian Commission can be found in the recommendation that each 
peasant be given a piece of land that would guarantee him and his 
family a decent living, a basic distinction from Soviet agrarian 
law. 
As to the agricultural concessions or long leases under which 
foreign planters operated their plantations, the Commission 
recommended a new type of agrarian right, hak usaha atas tanah, 
but this new right was not spelled out in enough detail to 
determine whether it would have come closer to the old Dutch 
law or to Indonesian adat. 
In July ] 949 the Republican government ordered the return of 
plantations to their rightful owners, but with the stipulation that 
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their agrarian rights be brought into harmony with the govern-
ment's new economic policy. This meant, in effect, that only 
those plantation lands requiring the investment of foreigncapital 
or technical knowledge and management would be returned to 
the planters. Furthermore, the National Program of July 1949 
stated that the holders of long leases would be expected to 
recognize and respect the new aims of the government regarding 
the social welfare of their laborers; that the foreign entrepreneurs 
would be expected to support the government in its efforts to 
improve the level of living of peasants and laborers; and that 
Western entrepreneurs, in taking advantage of the ample oppor-
tunities for investment of their capital, would have to be sure 
their activities were not conducted at the expense of the people 
or of the State. 
In keeping with the financial and economic provisions of the 
Round Table Conference Agreement, concluded between the 
Indonesians and the Dutch in December 1949, the Indonesian 
government issued instructions early in 1950 regarding the return 
of the planters to those plantations which had not yet been 
reclaimed. It was stated that the provincial governor could upon 
request issue provisional permission for inspection and/or 
resumption of management of a plantation. The same instruc-
tions contained the following important provisions: 
1. Regional committees were to be appointed for the preparation 
of the return of foreign enterprises in which would be in-
cluded, besides officials representing the government, one 
representative each for the plantation company, for the labor 
organization, and for the peasant organization. 
2. No infringement was to be permitted on the position of the 
laborers nor of the estate lands which had in the meantime 
been occupied by laborers and peasants. 
3. Inspection and/or reestablishment of management would be 
permissable provided the entrepreneur accepted in advance the 
condition that he would submit to all future regulations of the 
government and that all laborers then working on the planta-
tions would be left on their own jobs. 
4. All work plans were to be submitted to the commission and 
had to show that the local people participated in the enter-
prise. 
5. Every effort would be made to leave those estate lands that 
had been occupied by the people at their disposal, be it 
through expropriation or through cancellation of the long 
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leases; the possibility was left open by way of negotiations to 
obtain the permission to continue the use of estate land on a 
loan basis and also to transfer the squatter to other parts of 
the estate if this could be proved necessary for technical 
reasons. 
6. Where the squatters had to be removed from an estate, they 
had to be given sufficient time and aided in the transfer. 
7. None of the above conditions were to be interpreted as con-
stituting a renewal of the long leases. 
In July 1950 the Minister of Interior ruled that in the case of 
plantations of great economie importance for the country whose 
long lease would expire before 1970 an extension of eight years 
would be made to compensate the management for its inability 
to operate the enterprise between 1942 and 1950. Such an exten-
sion would have been of questionable value to plantations whose 
leases had already expired, so owners of these plantations were 
invited to apply for a new lease. For all plantations with more 
than twenty years of unexpired long-lease time there was, in the 
opinion of the government, no need to grant the eight-year 
extension. This ruling reflected a spirit of moderation and a 
recognition of the importance of plantations as a source of 
foreign exchange. The moderate spirit was not, however, shared 
by the more extreme nationalists or by Communists. 
Early in 1951 the Minister of Interior gave the provincial 
governors authority to renew long leases for a period of twenty-
five years, plus a period of ten years for rehabilitation purposes, 
provided that (1) the enterprise was of great economie interest to 
Indonesia and its people, (2) the enterprise required capital and 
technical management not available in indonesia, and (3) the 
squatter problem could be solved in a satisfactory manner. The 
goal \'Tas to convert the right of long lease into a new type of 
right once the new agrarian law had been written, to give the 
Indonesian capital an opportunity to participate in the manage-
ment, and to make certain th at the entrepreneur assisted local 
government in its efforts to improve the people's welfare in the 
respective territory. 
In March 1952 the Minister of Interior directed a circular to all 
provincial governors on the proper steps to be taken to solve the 
agrarian problem of the plantation industry. He also stated the 
conditions under which a new long lease could be issued: the new 
long lease could have a duration of thirty years, to which could 
be added a rehabilitation period of ten years, and the rental had 
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to be adjusted to current conditions with a review every lïve ycars. 7 
Furthermore, the entrepreneur had to give lndonesian capital an 
opportunity to invest in his enterprise, provide positions in 
management for Indonesians, replace staff members who in the 
opinion of the govemment had not made the proper adjustment, 
submit operational plans of the enterprise to the government for 
approval, keep the area of the plantation being used in the proper 
ratio to the number of laborers employed as established in the 
operational plan, maintain only the limited reserve area approved 
by the government, draw up a plan for the training of Indo-
nesians for staff positions, and be prepared to assist in the im-
provement of the level of living of the people living around the 
plantation. The government reserved the right to cancel a long 
lease for violation of any of these conditions. 
The Republic of Indonesia thus initiated a critical examination 
of the colonial agrarian legislation, but before it had the oppor-
tunity to draft a new agrarian law the transfer of sovereignty 
imposed the condition that Indonesia recognize all old contracts 
and leases which had not yet expired. This meant that it would 
take until about the year 2000 before the last of the long leases 
would expire. This took the urgency away. Nevertheless, every 
one of the seven cabinets between August 1950 and May 1959 
had as one of its aims the drafting of a new agrarian law. 
The task of writing a new agrarian law was, however, a most 
difficult one. The Panitya Agran·a Y ogyakarta called for a law 
which would be modem and suitable for the development of new 
enterprises but at the same time in harmony with both adat and 
Islamic law. This agrarian law had to be in harmony with the 
"living law" but at the same time had to permit rights which 
were clearly new concepts for the Indonesian community and 
thus had the character of a "positive law". By now, the diffi-
culties of writing a law acceptable to the left-wing, moderate, 
conservative and extreme right-wing parties, as weIl as to the 
Indonesian rural folk and urban masses, had become only too 
apparent. Even if such a law had passed the drafting stage and 
been approved by Parliament it would have remained to be seen 
whether the govemment could have enforced it throughout Indo-
nesia. The difference between an agrarian law based on adat and 
one based on modern legal principles, such as those found in 
Western law, is so great that it is hard to see how a law which 
meets all the demands of both could ever be written. 
The development of a firm consistent policy in agrarian 
matters, with its concomitant, a clear-cut policy on the future of 
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plantation agriculture, was made extremely difficult by the 
highly divergent views held by Indonesian leaders and by the 
various political parties. 
All agreed th at the colonial economic legislation, particularly 
agrarian legislation, had brought great profits to the Dutch state 
until 1870 and to Western entrepreneurs and corporations from 
1870 on. All agreed th at Indonesia must see to it that the 
product of Indonesian soil and labor benefited the country to a 
greater degree than in the past. But the Indonesian parties could 
not agree on the best policy for achieving this goal. 
The moderates recognized the great importance of the planta-
tions as earners of foreign exchange and were anxious to assure 
the future of plantation agriculture. They would have been 
satisfied with a legislative program that assured (1) better real 
wages for Indonesian laborers than they received before, (2) 
Indonesian participation in management, and (3) a higher tax 
rate than the Netherlands Indies had applied to Western enter-
prise. The moderates saw a need to attract new foreign private 
capital for certain sectors of the Indonesian economy while 
reserving other fields for Indonesian nationals or the Indonesian 
government. 
The right-wing nationalists were opposed to foreign planters 
and demanded their expulsion with proper compensation, since 
they felt that if there were any sector in which Indonesians 
could work alone it was the agricultural sector. Many of them 
believed th at plantations should be preserved as an institution, or 
form of economic enterprise, with management transferred to 
Indonesians. They recognized the need for foreign capital and 
technical skill in manufacturing and would have been prepared to 
accept new foreign investments, particularly in the form of 
government loans. 
The left-wing nationalists, and particularly the left-wing 
Marxists, also demanded expulsion of all Western planters, but 
without compensation. The Communists were on record as 
demanding 
"abolition of landlordism and its replacement by peasant control 
of the land. This can be effected only by confiscating the land of 
foreign and Indonesian landlords without compensation and re-
distributing this land without charge on an individual basis to the 
peasants, particularly to the poor and landless peasants, to be 
their private property. The abolition of these remnants of feudal-
ism means laying down strong foundations for full national in-
dependence. ,,8 
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Even the Communists, however, were ambivalent. Their demand 
for confiscation and wholesale distribution of land was followed 
by the statement that 
"the confiscation of the land of foreign ... landlords does not 
mean that modern estates ... must be confiscated for distribu· 
tion to the peasants. Technically, modern estates and also forest 
lands must be controlled by the State." 
Actually, the government-owned and operated plantations in 
East Sumatra were just as much subject to illegal squatting by 
members of the BTI as were any foreign-owned plantation, this 
despite the demand in the "Urgency Program" of the BTI "to 
maintain and develop agricultural enterprises and state planta-
tions". The ambivalence may be eXplained by Aidit's statement 
of early 1955: 
"The PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist 
Party) is of the opinion that Indonesia has to go through a 
bourgeois democratic revolution first before the proletarian revo-
lution. At present Indonesia is in the stage of the bourgeois 
democratic revolution. "9 
Even members of the same party of ten did not agree on the 
agrarian program. Basic differences within the ranks of the PNI 
(Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian Nationalist Party) and 
Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, or Consultative 
Council of Indonesian Moslems) we re sometimes as great as the 
differences between the two parties. The two parties shared the 
power in the Wilopo Cabinet from April 1952 toJune 1953. The 
Wilopo Cabinet was forced to resign because the PNI was in favor 
of nationalization of the North Sumatra oil fields, while Masyumi 
wanted to return them to the oil company. Masyumi was in favor 
of resettlement of all squatters on land which was to remain in 
the hands of the Western plantations; PNI wanted to stop all 
efforts of resettlement and attacked the Minister of Interior, 
Mohamad Roem, whose ministry was responsible for Governor 
Hakim 's resettlement program. The immediate cause of the 
downfall of the Wilopo Cabinet was the Tanjungmorawa incident 
(see following chapter) but the basic causes had much deeper 
roots. 
Government officials, aware of these differences between 
parties, knew only too weIl that action - even action in line with 
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official instructions from Jakarta - migh t cause them great di ffi-
culties and even cost them their position. Postponement of 
action and the cautious avoidance of any action which could be 
interpreted as being in the interest of Western entrepreneurs and 
a violation of the spirit of the revolution was the inevitable 
result. 
CHAPTER 111 
THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND 
THE AGRARIAN ISSUE 
Sharing with Communist parties in other parts of the world the 
conviction that the industrial working class should be regarded as 
the most progressive, revolutionary, and receptive element of 
society, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) centered political 
activity exclusively on the workers in the immediate postwar 
years. Not until just before the abortive Madiun coup in 1948 did 
the Politburo admit its error and belatedly turn its attention to 
the peasantry. The Fifth National Party Congress, scheduled for 
later that year, was ordered to redirect the party's work program. 
But the stunning defeat of the party at Madiun in September 
caused such heavy casualties among party cadres that the surviv-
ing leaders were forced to curtail their work and feIl back again 
to a concentration on the proletariat. 
The first sign of a revived interest in the peasantry came as 
D.N. Aidit took over the leadership of the PKI in 1951. The 
party announced a new agrarian program in November 1951 that 
for the first time stressed the need of a worker-peasant alliance 
for the revolution, and by 1953 Aidit was urging party cadres to 
redouble their efforts to win the support of the peasantry.l As a 
result of the lack of experts on the sources of agrarian discontent 
or on the peasantry in general, the party had not only failed to 
develop an agrarian program acceptable to the peasants but had 
actually antagonized a peasantry starved for land with such 
slogans as "nationalization of all land" and "the right of the state 
over all land". Aidit, aware of this, drew up a long list of new 
slogans based on the real grievances of the peasants, such as high 
land rents, high taxes, and compulsory village lab or. 2 Most 
applied more to Java than to other parts of Indonesia, but a few 
such as "land for the peasants", "peasants' personal ownership of 
the land", and "raise the wages of agriculturallaborers" struck an 
immediate response throughout Indonesia, except possibly in the 
thinly settled swidden regions where land was still abundant. 
The Fifth National Party Congress in March 1954 endorsed 
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Aidit's plan to shift the main focus of the party from the wor kers 
to the peasants, acknowledging that "the agrarian revolution is 
the essence of the People's Democratic Revolution in Indo-
nesia" - a concept to which the PKI adhered faithfully th ere-
af ter. But Aidit admitted that progress toward a united national 
front had been very disappointing for "we cannot possibly speak 
of areal, broad, and strong united national front until the 
peasants have been drawn into it ... the peasants comprise more 
than 70 percent of the population ... As yet, only about 7 
percent of the peasants are organized". Aidit set out to formulate 
a new approach whose immediate goals would be: 
"to eliminate the survivals of feudalism, to develop the antifeudal 
agrarian revolution, to confiscate the land of the landlords, and 
to give it free of charge to the peasants, in particular to the 
landless and poor peasantry, as their own private property. The 
first step to be taken in our work among the peasants is to assist 
them in the struggle for their everyday needs... This is the 
foundation on which to create the alliance of workers and 
peasants as the basis of apowerfui, united national front.,,3 
Convinced that it was a mis take to view the peasantry as an 
amorphous mass, Aidit urged the cadres to take cognizance of 
the several classes of peasants in the villages and of the striking 
regional differentiation. His advice to the cadres, repeated on 
numerous occasions, was to study village conditions carefully in 
order to make the cadres' work more effective. But the response 
was slow, as evidenced in this complaint included in a party 
report to the PKI First National Peasants' Conference in 1959: 
"The majority of Party cadres at the subsection and branch levels 
in the villages have not yet deeply studied the class divisions, the 
characteristics of each class and the class relations in the village. 
In general they are still unable to distinguish the landlord from 
the rich peasant, and still do not know the difference between 
the rich peasant and the medium peasant. This means that they 
do not yet thoroughly know who are the friends and who are the 
enemies of the revolution.,,4 
Aidit himself at first distinguished four categories in the village 
population: landlords, rich peasants, middle and poor peasants, 
and finally agricultural laborers. In the course of time his land-
lord and rich-peasant categories were elaborated by the identifi-
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cation of seven evil characters (setan-setan, or devils) who were 
exploiting the middle and poor peasants and the agricultural 
laborers. s These seven village devils were: the wicked landlord, 
the usurer, the buyer of green paddy (tukang-zjon), the middle-
man, the bureaucratie capitalist (kaum kapitalis birokrat, or 
kabir), the manager, and the village bandit. 6 
As "survivals of feudalism ", the landlords constituted the 
natural enemy of the revolution, and party cadres had no troublc 
tracing to their feudal privileges all the village ills. The four major 
grievances of the peasants as perceived by Aidit were: 7 
1. monopoly of land by the big landlords, which deprived the 
majority of peasants of an opportunity to own land of their 
own, 
2. exhorbitant rents in the form of erop sharing, which impover-
ished large segrnents of the peasant population, 
3. the right of landlords to requisition labor in lieu of rent, which 
reduced peasants to the position of serfs, and 
4. the usurious interest rates, which enslaved the peasants in an 
accumulation of debts. 
Having spearheaded the attack against the landlord class, Aidit, 
however, in his report to the Sixth National Party Congress in 
September 1959 proceeded for tactical reasons to exonerate 
"patriotic" landlords, at least for the time being, explaining that 
only "evil" landlords were the immediate target of the Com-
munists. An "evil" landlord could be recognized by his sym-
pathies with the Darul Islam, Tentara Islam Indonesia (TIl), the 
PRRI-Permesta movement, and foreign imperialists and capital-
ists. The land of any such enemy of the nation should be con-
fiscated and distributed free of charge to the peasants. The 
"patriotic" landlords, on the other hand, were to remain in the 
possession of their land. 8 But, by 1964 the definition of an "evil" 
landlord had been expanded to include one who either openly 
opposed or deceitfully circumvented such progressive agrarian 
reform legislation as the Crop Sharing Law (No. 2/1960) or the 
Basic Agrarian Law (No. 5/1960).9 
Aidit was ready to make other distinctions too. In contrast to 
the landlord who lives by exploiting those who cultivate his land, 
the rich peasant leases only part of his land and cultivates the rest 
himself as a true member of the peasantry. Though there were 
some ri eh peasants who as usurious moneylenders and as brutal 
exploiters of their tenants and agriculturallaborers came close to 
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being in the landlord class, in general the rich peasants could be 
counted on not to obstruct the revolutionary peasant movement 
and even to join it on such issues as abolishing feudal customs 
and obligations. Aidit argued th at the rich peasant could be 
neutralized in the struggle against the landlord. 10 
A sympathetic role was seen for the middle peasants, whose 
economic independence did not as a rule bear the taint of usury 
or the exploitation of others and whose need to rent additional 
land from the landlords of ten put these peasants, like their 
poorer relatives, at the mercy of imperialists, evil landlords, and 
members of the bourgeoisie. Aidit expressed confidence that the 
middle peasants could not only become a part of the anti-
imperialist revolution and the agrarian revolution but could also 
accept socialism. Consequently they were one of the important 
forces pushing the revolution forward and were a reliable aIly of 
the proletariat. He saw their attitude toward the revolution as a 
decisive factor for victory or defeat because the middle peasants 
comprised the majority in the country-side af ter the agrarian 
revolution. 
But Aidit saw what he called the village semiproletariat, the 
poor peasants and agricultural laborers, as the largest force push-
ing the revolution forward. It was natural for them, he said, to be 
the most reliable of the allies of the proletariat and a basic part 
of the forces of the Indonesian revolution. The poor and middle 
peasants th at made up the majority of the inhabitants of the 
villages, he averred, could only win their emancipation under the 
leadership of the proletariat, and the proletariat could only give 
leadership to the revolution if it had made a firm alliance with 
the poor and middle peasants. 
Cadres were urged to go down into the villages, in order to 
become more thoroughly familiar with the social and economic 
- esp~cially agrarian - conditions in the rural areas, to practice 
the "three withs" (work with, eat with, and sleep with the 
peasants), and to ascertain and translate into political slogans the 
specific grievances in various villages. At the Sixth National Party 
Congress Aidit reported: 
"The movement of 'going down to the masses', implementing 
the 'three withs', has cIarified agrarian relations for us, it has 
cIarified the degree to which feudal survivals still dominate in the 
countryside. The knowledge which we have obtained by these 
direct means is far more valuable and creates a far deeper impres-
sion than the knowledge we could get from reading many books 
on the same question." 11 
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Aidit's practical advice to the cadres had later expanded beyond 
the "three withs" to include the "four don'ts" and the "four 
musts". The "four don 'ts" were: (1) don 't stay in the house of a 
village exploiter, (2) don't lecture to the peasant, (3) don't harm 
your peasan t host, and (4) don 't take notes in front of the 
peasant. The "four musts" were: (1) apply the "three withs" 
fully, (2) be modest, respectful, and well-behaved and be willing 
to learn from the peasant, (3) know the language and acquaint 
yourself with the local adat, and (4) assist in solving the problems 
of your host, of the peasants, and of the local Party. 12 
Thus there was a gradual broadening of party goals in the rural 
areas af ter 1951. The Communists pressed for reform on a wide 
front, demanding the abrogation of exploitative colonial land 
laws, compulsory written tenancy agreements between landlords 
and tenants, security for the tenant, lower interest on loans, 
higher wages for agricultural laborers, nationalization of foreign-
owned estates, non-renewal of expired agricultural concessions 
and long leases, permission to squatters to continue cultivation of 
land technically within boundaries of estates for forest reserves, 
proper compensation and adequate financial assistance to squat-
ters who must be resettled, a ban on the use of tractors on 
squatter-occupied land, and cancellation of coloniallaws regulat-
ing the relationship between sugar estates and peasants. Many of 
these demands had special appeal to peasants in the plantation 
reglOns. 
Nor did the PKI stop with giving political utterance to peasant 
grievances. As pressure on the government yielded a new decree 
or a new law, party workers carefully watched its implementa-
tion, using any evidence of laxness or of deliberate sabotage by 
"reactionary" elements among landlords and government 
officials to press for stronger legislation. 
Another shift in party strategy became discernible af ter 1955. 
Cadres began to concern themselves with purely agronomic 
problems or with research whose results were then publicized as 
widely as possible among the peasants - activities that 
encroached on some of the normal functions of the Department 
of Agriculture. A PKI pamphlet issued in 1955 recommended 
that cadres quickly undertake concrete activities in defense of 
the peasants' interests, such as distribution of fertilizer, seedlings, 
and tools at a cheap price; repair of irrigation canals; repair of 
fish ponds and distribution of fish eggs; establishment of co-
operatives; the sinking of wells; repair of village bridges and 
roads; establishment of burial associations; programming of 
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general education and the education of agrarian leaders; defense 
of peasants brought to court; and the organization of anti-illiter-
acy campaigns and of sports and cultural programs. 13 Cadres 
working in the villages preached the five principles of land cul-
tivation - "plough deeply, plant closely, (use) more fertilizer, 
better seeds and better irrigation" - together with such admoni-
tions as "treat the rice fields with devotion and care, exterminate 
pests, improve agricultural implements". It was a sign of success, 
Aidit wrote in 1959, th at the peasants "have full confidence in 
the good intentions of the Party and ... therefore joyfully wel-
come the Party Volunteer Brigades which are helping them work 
their land .... We must form as many of these Volunteer 
Brigades as possible as proof that the Party is indeed genuine in 
its desire to unite with the peasants, and also as a means of 
encouraging the development of production co-operatives in the 
villages. "14 
In the years between 1957 and 1962 the Indonesian govern-
ment passed a considerable number of laws, decrees, and regula-
tions meeting many of the demands which the PKI and its mass 
organizations had been pressing with increasing intensity. The 
party claimed triumph in the seizure of all Dutch plantations and 
other enterprises in December 1957 and the first few months of 
1958. Another triumph was claimed with the abolition of the 
so-called "private estates" - feudal enclaves dating from the days 
of the East India Company and the first years of the Netherlands 
East Indies government. Extensive areas had been sold at that 
time to European and Chinese entrepreneurs by the colonial 
governments as a means of bolstering their treasuries. To make 
the offer attractive, the colonial governments gave the buyers 
seignorial rights over the inhabitants of their lands. These "lords" 
appointed village officials, set up markets, collected fees, levied 
taxes (as much as one-fifth of the crop or equivalent rent on land 
used for the raising of fruit trees or of fish in fish ponds), and 
requisitioned labor at will. Although the Netherlands East Indies 
government over the years had repurchased many of these, at the 
time of the transfer of sovereignty there were still close to 200 
such private estates with a total area of about 32,000 hectares -
which the Indonesian government, under the prodding of the 
Communists, decided to eliminate once and for all. 
Two more far-reaching laws were passed in 1960. The first of 
these, the Crop Sharing Law (Law No. 2/1960), was designed to 
regulate the landlord-tenant relationship, to proteet the weak 
tenant against the strong landlord, and to provide the tenant with 
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incentives for increasing production. Since this law went into 
effect, all tenancy agreements have had to be made in writing and 
be signed by the two parties, two witnesses (one chosen by the 
landlord, the other by the tenant), and the district officer, or 
camat. Such a contract may not cover more than three hectares 
per tenant and must be Valid for a minimum of three years for 
irrigated land, five years for unirrigated land. Under this law it is 
the responsibility of the bupati, as head of the kabupaten, to 
determine the rates for the sharing of crops af ter deduction of 
expenses for cost of seed, fertilizer, cattle, and labor employed 
for planting and harvesting. The bupati is to take into considera-
tion the type of crops produced, the quality of the soil, the 
density of population, and the obligation to pay alms (zakat). 
Though the bupati has considerable freedom, the law sets as 
guidelines a sharing of 1: 1 for rice produced on sawah and 2: 1 for 
all crops produced on unirrigated land. The PKI had originally 
demanded a ratio of 6:4 in favor of the tenants in the case of the 
rice crop but acceded to the argument that, given this ratio, 
landlords would dismiss their tenants and hire agricultural 
laborers to till their land, thereby forcing many poor peasants to 
become agriculturallaborers. 15 
The second law, the Basic Agrarian Law (no. 5/1960), was 
much wider in scope, being intended in fact as the cornerstone of 
a whole new program of agrarian legislation. With this law the 
government set out to bring the agrarian situation into harmony 
with the philosophy of modern Indonesia, the principles of 
Pancasila, and the so-called Manz'pol-USDEK policies announced 
by President Sukarno in his Independence Day speech of 17 
August 1959. The legislative objectives were to lay the basis for 
the creation of a nationally applicable legal structure for agrarian 
affairs, to eliminate impediments to unity and simplicity in the 
law, and to establish guidelines for determining the rights on land 
for the entire people. The new agrarian lcgislation was to be 
grounded on adat, without the dualistic character of the old laws, 
and to take cognizance of relevant religious law. Only in this 
way, it was thought, could the new legislation meet the needs of 
a modern society and utilize the natural resources for the benefit 
of the whole nation. 
In line with these purposes, the Basic Agrarian .r.,aw canceled 
such landmarks of colonial legislation as the Agrarian Law of 
1870 which had been incorporated as article 51 in the Indies 
Regulation of Government of 1925, the Agrarian Decree of 
1870, the various Domain declarations, and all articles of the 
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Second Book of the Indonesian Civil Code conceming soil, water, 
and the natural resources therein. It limited hereditary proprietary 
rights to land (hak milik) to Indonesian citizens only, with the 
proviso that, in the interest of public welfare, the amount of land 
that could be owned by one family would be regulated in accord-
ance with subsequent legislation. Land not subject to hak milik, 
e.g. state land, could be leased by Indonesian citizens or by cor-
porate bodies established under Indonesian law and domiciled in 
Indonesia. Such a lease bestowed a right to temporary use (hak 
guna-usaha) for a period of twenty-five years, or, in the case of 
estates engaged in the cultivation of perennial crops (which do 
not begin production immediately), for thirty-five years. 
Provision was also made for the conversion of agricultural conces-
sions as weIl as leases into a right of exploitation (hak guna-usaha) 
for the remaining period of the concession or long lease with a 
maximum of twenty years. There was, furthermore, a time limit 
of one year in which application could be made to the Minister 
of Agrarian Affairs for conversion of the old concessions and 
leases into the new right of exploitation. The Dutch estates taken 
over by the Indonesian govemment and managed by the Govem-
ment Estates Administration (Pusat Perkebunan Negara or PPN) 
were affected as weIl as the estates held by American, British, 
Belgian, and French companies, and all were forced to reorganize 
their companies in order to qualify under the new law. 
As promised, later in 1960 a law was passed regulating the size 
of hak milik holdings. A minimum of two hectares of either 
irrigated or unirrigated land became uniform through Indonesia 
while in recognition of the sharp contrast in population density 
between Java and the Outer Islands, a scale of maxima based on 
population densities set the maximum limit for any locality (see 
Table 6). 
Table 6 
Maximum permissible size of farm holdings (in hectares) 
Population density per 
square kilometer 
Very high density (over 400) 
Fairly high density (251-400) 
Fairly low density (51-250) 
Low density (50 or under) 
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A review of PKI demands and the government's legislativc and 
executive action during the years 1958 to 1964 revcals thc taut 
interplay between new government measures and ncw PKI 
pressures. Thus the seizure of the Dutch entcrprises brought a 
PKI demand for nationalization. The resultant nationalization 
legislation was attacked for not ruling out indemnification of the 
former owners and for not covering other foreign estates as weil. 
Taking fuU advantage of international political developments, 
Communist-dominated labor and youth organizations used the 
Congo rebeUion as an excuse to take over the Belgian estates, the 
Malaysia issue for actions against British enterprises, and the 
American military presence in South Vietnam for actions against 
the Uniroyal and Goodyear Company rubber estates in East 
Sumatra and other American property. The pattern was a1ways 
the same. Af ter weeks and months of anti-Belgian, anti-British, or 
anti-American propaganda, labor uni ons and youth organizations 
openly violated the law to take over foreign companies. There 
was perfunctory condemnation of the iIlegality by cabinet 
ministers who were careful to express at the same time their fuU 
sympathy with the deep feelings of indignation on the part of 
laborers and youths over the Belgian actions in the Congo, the 
British support of Malaysia, or the American military support of 
South Vietnam. Shortly afterward there would be a new govern-
ment order authorizing the Government Estates Administration 
to take over the respective plantations. 
The PKI similarly used the rapidly rising cost of living, notably 
the soaring textile and rice prices, to keep up their pressure on 
the government. President Sukarno was never mentioned in anti-
government attacks, but cabinet ministers not fuUy sympathetic 
to the PKI, officials in the ministries and various government 
enterprises, and many army officers in managerial positions on 
the plantations and other nationalized enterprises came under 
attack regularly. The Communists considered the army their 
main opponent and held army officers responsible for the ban on 
strikes in all enterprises including the plantations, classified as 
vital sources of foreign exchange. Army officers and othcr 
officials in charge of estates were a1so accused of corruption and 
given the epithet, OKB (Drang Kaya Baru, Newly Rich) or some-
times OKM (Drang Kaya Mendadak, Suddenly Rich). 
A subsidiary pressure was maintained by BTI, SOBSI (Sentral 
Drganisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, AII-Indonesian Central 
Labor Organization), and Sarbupri (Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan 
Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Estate Workers Trade Union) 
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who demanded that their representatives be included in the 
management of state-operated plantations in implementation of 
Manipol, Nasakom (acronym for nasionalis-agama-komunis; the 
cooperation between nationalist, religious and communist organi-
zations ), and other policy statements by President .Sukamo. 
Every clash between the Govemment Estates Administration or 
local estates management and the Communist-led mass organiz-
ations served to intensify the clamor for such representation. 
A recurrent PKI argument was that the nationalization of 
capitalistic enterprises had been a sham, with con trol vested not 
in the people as promised but in private property, these extract-
ing private profits by abusing their authority in the absence of 
effective supervision. In a 1963 speech titled "Dare, Dare, and 
Dare Again" Aidit charged that the nationalized enterprises had 
become a burden for the state treasury because of their un-
productive use of credits and continuous waste of funds. 16 This 
arose from the corruption of the new management and the lack 
of proper supervision from above by competent authorities. 
Supervision from below, from the masses, i.e. "social con trol ", 
was precluded by the bureaucratic capitalists' deliberate delay in 
creating enterprise councils or advisory councils where, as part of 
the demonstration of management, there would have been 
representatives of the laborers. Aidit approvingly cited Sukamo's 
statement in his Independence Day speech of 1961 that "produc-
tion ... is the stomach of the state, and this is why the reaction-
aries always concentrate their sabotage on this stomach of the 
state". In his campaign to rid the state enterprises of "bureau-
cratic capitalists" Aidit suggested the "retooling" of the officials 
in charge of administrative, economic, and fiscal policies and he 
lumped together as Old Established Forces (Oldefos) all reaction-
ary bureaucratic capitalists, landlords, bourgeois reactionaries, 
compradors, and members of the right-wing middle class. The 
"Oldefos" pay lip-service to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, 
Manipol, USDEK, Necolim, and other current political terms, 
Aidit noted, but really do not believe in the revolution and are 
not willing to apply the principle of Nasakom to the cabinet and 
to the management of state enterprises. By contrast, the PKI and 
affiliated mass organizations we re easily identifiable with the 
Newly Emerging Forces. The struggle to transform the colonial 
economy into a truly national economy was se en as inextricably 
linked with the agrarian struggle, whose immediate goals must be 
implementation of the Crop Sharing Law and implementation of 
the Basic Agrarian Law. 
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But these two laws were not the whole answer and, in a com-
prehensive new attack on the problem of raising agricultural pro-
duction, Aidit proposed a Movement of Six Goods: (1) lower rent 
on land, (2) lower interest on loans, (3) higher wages for agricul-
tural workers, (4) higher agricultural production, (5) improve-
ment of the cultural level among the peasants, and (6) greater 
political consciousness among the peasants. 17 
Rent reduction appealed directly to nearly all peasants, a factor 
"of great significance in the struggle for demanding the im-
plementation of the Basic Agrarian Law, a law which, if fully 
implemented on the insistence of the peasants, will constitute the 
realization of limz'ted land reform" (italics added). It was equally 
true th at by rousing the peasant masses in the movement for rent 
reduction - or, as the cadres were instructed, helping the 
peasants "throw off the burden of oppression from their 
shoulders" according to the principle, "the peasants emancipate 
themselves" - peasant pressure could also be mobilized for the 
consistent implementation of the Crop Sharing Law. 18 
Aidit skillfully linked his program for higher agricultural pro-
duction with the peasants' attempt to use lands belonging to 
plantations and forest reserves, putting forward demands such as: 
"to carry out effective reafforestation, to use reserve plots and 
uncultivated estate lands, to raise (catch crops) on lands of the 
Forest Service and estates, to demand the immediate setting up 
of Committees of Irrigation and Councils of Agricultural Produc-
tion by enlisting the participation of revolutionary mass organiza-
tions, etc.,,19 
The movement for higher wages, aside from its practical value 
in enlisting the support of agricultural wor kers , supplied one 
more issue with which to isolate and weaken the landlord. 
The PKI benefited greatly from Sukarno's use of party slogans. 
In his Berdz'kari speech of 17 August 1965, for instance, Sukarno 
reminded his listeners: "We have rich natural resources, our 
people are diligent, but, so far, the fruits of their labor have been 
devoured by the landlords, the usurers, the ijon brokers, the 
middlemen, the village devils, and others". The audience needed 
no prompting to identify village devils whom the peasants would 
crush. Sukarno warned in the same speech: "I have been very 
patient, 1 have displayed the patience of a father. But there is a 
limit to my patience - still more, to the patience of the people! 1 
have given sufficient opportunity to implement land reform - I 
even postponed the deadline - and, if necessary, I am willing to 
extend it another year." 
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In late 1963 the Communists had begun accusing the landlords 
and their supporters in the ministries and in provincial and kabu-
palen offices of a failure to accept and implement the agrarian 
legislation of 1960. The Ministry of Agrarian Affairs in 1960 had 
estimated th at a total of one million hectares might become avail-
able for redistribution among land-needy peasants from such 
sources as land in excess of the permissible maximum (Law No. 
56 Prp 1960), land of absentee landlords, former proprietary 
lands, former plantation lands returned to the government in 
connection with the conversion of agricultural concessions and 
long leases into hak guna-usaha, and lands administered by the 
Forest Service. Referring to this estimate of the Ministry , Aidit 
noted in 1964: "Only one-fifth (of 1,000,000 hectares) of it has 
been registered. Of this one-fifth, a mere 9 percent has been 
distributed, while half of this 9 percent has fallen into the hands 
of those who are not entitled to it. Vet it has been stated that 
within the year 1963 the land reform based on the Basic Agrarian 
Law should be completed. 20 Aidit's demands for "land reform 
courts" and for a stepping up of the implementation of the agrar-
ian legislation were met in November 1964 by Minister of Agrar-
ian Affairs Hermanses, who decreed the establishment of a 
Command for the Completion of Land Reform (Komando 
Penyelesaian Landreform) with the task of breaking through the 
barriers standing in the way of land reform implementation. The 
centra! command, consisting of the Minister himself as central 
commander, two deputy commanders, a chief and a deputy chief 
of staff, and three members, was assisted at the regionallevel by 
regional subcommands. A month before, the Ministry of Justice 
had announced the forthcoming establishment of land reform 
courts, and by December there were twelve such courts in various 
areas. Charged with the disposition of all land reform disputes, 
these courts had a judge, an official of the Department of Agrar-
ian Affairs, and th ree representatives of mass peasant organiza-
tions and the National Front, intended by Sukarno as an in-
strument for mass-mobilization. 
About a year passed between the start of this particular 
campaign and the creation of new offices for the solution of the 
new agrarian complaints. It is quite possible that these new 
offices would not have been established had the Communists not 
shifted from the speaker's platform to actual violent action in the 
villages in mid-1964, encouraged by "President Sukarno's appeal 
that the masses must also carry out 'revolutionary gym-
nastics' ".21 In late June 1964, clashes occurred between peasants 
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and local officials and police in districts of Central and East Java, 
followed by protest meetings at which resolutions and petitions 
were passed and sent to local, provincial, and national officials, 
including President Sukarno and cabinet members. Wh en Co-
ordinating Minister for Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs Sadjarwo 
condemned the "arbitrary action" campaign initiated by Com-
munist cadres, the PKI demanded his "retooling".22 
Clashes spread to West Java with the so-called Indramayu 
Affair of October 1964. On two occasions large numbers of 
demonstrators carrying BTI and Pemuda Rakyat (the P.K.I. youth-
organization) posters attacked state forest guards, seriously 
wounding seven guards in the first incident and three in the 
second. The arrest of thirty-five demonstrators brought new 
demonstrations for their release. The governor of West Java 
found that land hunger among peasants was in conflict with 
Forestry Department efforts to develop the forest resources. 
Sidik Kertapati, vice-chairman of BTI, charged that the land in-
volved in the Indramayu Affair really belonged to the villagers 
and accused the Forest Service of having caused the incident in 
order to "wrest the land from the peasant". Forestry Minister 
Sudjarwo was more cautious in order to avoid the fury of the 
PKI and spoke of an acute demand for Lebensraum, at the same 
time promising that "the utmost wisdom" would be applied in 
the settlement of the issue. On 20 November 1964, the first 
deputy prime minister, Dr. Subandrio, met with Forestry 
Minister Sudjarwo and State Minister Mudjoko for a discussion of 
the dispute between the Forest Service and mass peasant organi-
zations. While the ministers urged avoidance of "cracks in the 
unity of the progressive revolutionary forces" and called for 
carefully planned large-sc ale migrations from Java, the Central 
Secretariat of Peasant Organizations of the National Front 
criticized the government for delays in land reform, for the im-
prisonment of peasants and leaders of peasant organizations, and 
for lack of coordination between central and regional policies 
regarding the administration of forest reserves. 
A delegation of peasants from North Lampung in South 
Sumatra protested in Jakarta in early November against decisions 
rendered by Sumatran authorities. Brigadier General Mudjoko, 
chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Agrarian Matters, 
failed to back the Sumatran officials, declaring that their 
decisions were "of a temporary nature and not binding". He also 
urged the delegation up on their return to demand the forming of 
a "new-style" land reform committee based on Nasakom.23 
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With the establishment of the Komando Penyclesaian Land-
reform and the creation of land reform courts, the PKI and the 
mass peasant organizations had achieved two important victories. 
A Presidential Instruction (No. 022/1964) addressed to the 
Ministerial Committee on Agrarian Matters charged the officials 
concerned to prevent new illegal occupation of state lands 
coming under the jurisdiction of the F orest Service and the 
Government Estates Administration. On the other hand, disputes 
with squatters who had been holding land illegally for a consider-
able time were to be settled through individual negotiations on 
the basis of policies worked out with the leaders of the local 
peasant organizations. The Ministers of Agrarian Affairs and of 
Interior jointly instructed the land reform authorities to ensure 
the continuation of all crop-sharing agreements whose time limits 
had expired but made exceptions in those cases where the land 
was to be genuinely worked by the owner, where the cultivator 
had violated his obligations, or where the cultivator voluntarily 
refused to renew the agreement. 24 
Despite the various actions of the ministers concerned with 
agrarian affairs and their warnings against unilateral actions (aksi 
sept'hak), agrarian disturbances involving several thousand people 
and resulting in the burning of houses and crops occurred in nine 
desa in the Banyuwangi district of East Java. Representatives of 
Petani and Petanu (the peasant organizations affiliated with PNI 
and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) respectively) had called on the leaders 
of the local BTI to consult with them prior to any actions 
designed to "bring land reform to completion" (mensukseskan 
landre/orm). The followers of the BTI, however, preferred to "go 
it alone" and take full credit for their revolutionary fervor. Their 
competitors charged that the BTI had violated the pledge, con-
tained in the Bogor Declaration of 13 December 1964, which 
called for a "system of consultation and musyawarah . ... Par-
ticularly with regard to land questions, officials and peasants are 
obliged to musyawarah without using insinuations, intimidation, 
and arms". Minister Sadjarwo led a partially successful "Nasakom 
mission" (i.e. amission composed of members representing PNI, 
NU, and PKI) to East Java for discus si ons and deliberations. 
By mid-1965, with all foreign enterprises by then under govern-
ment control, Aidit could no longer point to foreign capitalists as 
the chief enemies of the Indonesian people, in particular of the 
peasants, and so singled out the "bureaucratie capitalists" as the 
new target. On the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Party, 
Aidit declared: 
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"The Indonesian Communist Party holds that to achieve self-
reliance in economy it is necessary to emancipate the peasants, 
the basic productive force of the Indonesian people, from all 
feudalistic fetters. The peasant movement now developing 
throughout the country shows that the peasants are a decisive 
force in support of the govemment's progressive foreign p0licy, 
... The emancipation of the productive forces in the rural areas 
makes it possible for us to put into force the principle of 
developing the economy with agriculture as the foundation and 
industry as the guiding factor. To achieve economie self-reliance 
it is also necessary to end the history of foreign monopoly capital 
in Indonesia, first of all to confiscate British and U.S. imperialist 
capital and to nationalize it. The other serious obstruction to 
economie self-reliance eomes from the dominance of bureau-
cratie eapitalist plutocraey. Since the bureaucratie capitalists had 
originally raked in their capital from the theft of state property 
and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises, the transforma-
tion of the colonialist organizations in the lndonesian economy is 
entirely to their disadvantage (italies added). 2S 
Mass Peasant Organizations and the lndonesian Communist Party 
The first Indonesian Peasant Congress was held in Jakarta in late 
November 1945 and was followed up by the founding of the 
Barisan Tani Indonesz·a. lts stated objective was the economie and 
social improvement of the peasants' position by freeing the 
peasants of the double yoke of imperialism and feudalism. 26 The 
BTI found especially fertile ground among the discontented 
peasants of the former principalities of Central Java and in the 
sugar distriets of Central and East Java where prior to the war 
Dutch sugar and tobacco companies and during the war J apanese 
Estates Control Board, or Saz"baz" Kzgyoo Kanri Koodan, had put 
economie and political pressure on the villagers to sign lease 
agreements giving the companies con trol over a substantial part 
of the land. 27 
Soon other peasant organizations sprang up such as RTl, or 
Rukun Tam" lndonesz"a (Indonesian Peasant Union), and Sakti or 
Sarekat Tam" lndonesia (Indonesian Peasant Association). These 
organizations all supported the revolution while fending for the 
interests of the peasants. They repeatedly negotiated with the 
new revolutionary govemment agencies, which took over from 
the wartime Japanese agencies concemed with agriculture and 
the management of plantations, and with pamong praja, the 
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administrative civil service. The peasant organizations of the early 
days were moderate in their demands. As time went on, however, 
they came gradually more and more under the influence if not 
the con trol of Communists. 
In January 1951, the time when D.N. Aidit assumed the leader-
ship of the PKI, the party had links with all three peasant organi-
zations. RTl was openly controlled by the PKI, BTI was covertly 
controlled, while Sakti was infiltrated. 28 
In July 1951 these three peasant organizations formed the FPT 
(Front Persatuan Tani, United Peasant Front), which became 
the mouthpiece of the three affiliated organizations. Early in 
1953 the Communist leadership of RTl suggested a fusion of the 
three organizations. This suggestion, however, ran into opposi-
tion in Sakti, whose executive committee was not backed by a 
majority of the membership. The joint BTI and RTl congress, 
held in September 1953 in Bogor, approved the fusion and 
adopted the name BTI. A Sakti congress approved a fusion with 
BTI in June 1955. 
Once the competition between these three peasant organiza-
tions had come to an end, BTI began to expand its membership 
rapidly. It claimed a membership of 800,000 in March 1954 and 
about 2,000,000 by April 1955. At the time of the elections at 
the end of 1955 the BTI secretariat reported a membership of 
some 3,300,000. This remarkable growth resulted from the 
strenuous membership drive which the Communists conducted 
prior to the elections. In the next ten years BTI greatly increased 
its membership and by 1965 claimed no less than 8,500,000. The 
bulk of the BTI membership, as one should expect, was found in 
Java, but there were secondary centers of concentration in both 
East and South Sumatra, two regions which have large Javanese 
communities thanks to a concentration of estate agriculture and, 
in the case of South Sumatra, immigration of landless Javanese 
who preferred a life as pioneers to one as plantation workers. 
In 1965 BTI branches could be found in practically all kabupa-
ten of Indonesia and in more than 80 percent of all kecamatan, 
but initially BTI concentrated its activities in parts of the 
country where squatters held extensive tracts of land belonging 
legally to estates or to forest reserves. Here the BTI cadres had an 
ideal field for their propaganda and with alacrity took the si de of 
the squatter against the foreign planter as the representative of 
capitalism and imperialism and against an Indonesian bureau-
cracy which served foreign interests under the terms of the 
Round Table Conference Agreement. 
46 Planters against Peasants 
The aggressiveness of the BTI varied from district to district 
and from kecamatan to kecamatan, reflecting differences in the 
political sophistication and militancy of the local leaders. The 
quality of the BTI was of constant concern to the PKI leadership, 
which over the years had spent a great deal of effort on the 
training of the BTI leadership. This bore frui t in the party's firm 
hold on the peasantry and in the size of the peasant organization. 
The competitors of BTI - Petani, affiliated with PNI; Petanu, 
affiliated with NU; STIl, affiliated with the Partai Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia (PSII) - could claim nowhere near the same strength. 
No other party laid as much stress on village investigations as did 
the PKI and its affiliated BTI. This permitted the party to make 
use of local social, economie, and physico-environmental con-
ditions in its efforts to win the support of the peasantry and to 
give traditional village institutions a new political orientation. A 
high degree of flexibility characterized the work of the PKI and 
BTI in the rural areas, as comparison with the activities of the 
BTI in East Sumatra and Java showed. 
Shortly af ter the miscarried coup of 30 September 1965, 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs Hermanses attempted to divest the 
Communist Party of its appeal among the peasants by emphasiz-
ing that land reform was not conceived by the Communist Party 
but was "an integrated part of our revolution, the basis of 
the country's over-all national dev~lopment plans". He also 
announced the suspension of all members of the National Land 
Reform Committee who had been identified with the BTI. The 
Minister charged that the PKI had been waging a campaign to 
convince the peasants that only the Communist Party really 
promoted land reform, whereas actually his Ministry "will carry 
out land reform according to plan and within a set time limit".29 
This statement failed to explain why the laws were being im-
plemented at such slow pace and failed to give any information 
about the date set for the completion of the reforms. 
CHAPTERIV 
THE AGRARIAN CONTROVERSY IN SUMATERA TIMUR 
FROM THE TIME OF TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY TO 
THE TANJUNGMORAWA INCIDENT 
The incorporation of the Negara Sumatera Timur into the 
unitary Republic of Indonesia had immediate repercussions in 
the agrarian struggle, by far the most profound of these stem-
ming from the social and economic principles embodied in the 
new constitution. Three articles from the Constitution of 1945 
had, at the insistence of Republic of Indonesia leaders, been 
taken over to the Provisional Constitution of 1950 which now 
replaced the interim Constitution of the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia. In view of the great impact these three short 
articles were to have on subsequent developments in East 
Sumatra, it will be useful to set forth here their texts as pro-
mulgated in the Provisional Constitution of 1950: 1 
Article 7 
1. All citizens have the same status before the law and in the 
govemment and shall, without exception, respect the law and 
the govemment. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right to work and to expect a 
reasonable standard of living. 
Article 18 
1. The State shall be based up on the belief in God the Almighty. 
2. The State shall guarantee the freedom of the people to profess 
and exercise their own religion. 
Article 38 
1. The economy shall be organized cooperatively. 
2. Branches of production that are important to the State and 
that affect the life of most of the people shall be controlled by 
the State. 
3. Land and water and the natural riches therein shall be con-
trolled by the State and shall be exploited for the greatest 
possible welfare of the people. 
It was clear from the beginning that the sharp distinction which 
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the Negara Sumatera Timur had maintained between the rights of 
the rakyat penunggu or anak asli, the truly autochthonous 
population, and the rights of immigrants to the area would no 
longer be allowed. Article 7 of the Provisional Constitution of 
1950 imposed on the East Sumatran situation the uniform treat-
ment of all citizens - autochthonous people, Javanese, Tapanuli 
Batak, Chinese holding Indonesian citizenship, or any other. The 
squatter problem suddenly took on an entirely new dimension. 
J ust as radical in their implications were the new economic 
principles of Article 38, which provided the foundation for the 
Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (see Chapter VII). Less apparent 
were the changes that would be brought about by Article 18. The 
establishment of Christian communities had long been hampered 
in the former self-administering territories along the coast of East 
Sumatra where Moslem sultans had opposed the settlement of 
Christian Toba Batak. 2 There was not a Batak church in the 
sultanates of Langkat, Deli, Serdang, or Asahan prior to 1940; 
the church in Medan was built in 1930 on land belonging to the 
town of Medan and thus outside the jurisdiction of the sultanate. 
There was little or no room for Toba Batak in East Sumatra, 
ex cept as clerks in the offices of the estates and in Medan, but 
certainly not for landseeking Toba Batak farmers. Simelungun 
was the only part of the Residency of East Sumatra that sawa 
large influx of Toba Batak af ter the second decade of the present 
century when the government began to encourage the immigra-
tion and settlement of land-needy Toba in the irrigation districts 
of Tanah J awa and other parts of the Simelungun upland areas. 
Not many Batak churches we re established between 1940 and 
1949 in either the coastal regions or the Simelungun upland 
regions, but the situation changed dramatically af ter December 
1949. Toba Batak by the thousands began pouring from the 
highlands of Tapanuli as weIl as the upland areas of Simelungun 
into the coastal plains and lowlands of East Sumatra where most 
established themselves as squatters on estate lands. 
Two months af ter the signing of the agreement between Vice-
President Hatta and WaH Negara Mansur, the first steps were 
taken to incorporate East Sumatra into the Republic. On 14 July 
1950 Minister of Interior Anak Agung gde Agung decreed a Pre-
para tory Commission for the Incorporation of Sumatera Timur 
into the Unitary State (Panitya Persiapan Negara Kesatuan untuk 
Sumatera Timur or PPNKST) under the chairmanship of Sarimin 
Reksodihardjo.3 This commission, which included representatives 
of the Republic of Indonesia as weIl as of the Negara Sumatera 
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Timur, was given to preparing a working plan for the incorpora-
tion of the Negara into the Republic. Only six days later, how-
ever, Sarimin announced his Urgency Program, under which 
Sumatera Timur lost its autonomy and became an administrative 
unit embracing the prewar residency of East Sumatra without 
Bengkalis.4 The parliament of the Negara was thereupon 
dissolved and provisional councils were set up for each of the six 
kabupaten of Sumatera Timur. In September 1950 Sarimin 
created the Committee for the Establishment of the Province of 
North Sumatera (Panitya Penyelenggara Pembentukan Prop ins i 
Sumatera Utara or P4SU) assuming the chairmanship himself. 
Regarding the agrarian situation, the Urgency Program called 
for the formulation of new principles for the determination of 
optimum land use, for a plan based on these principles for the 
reallocation of returned estate lands, and (Article IV) for a 
scheme to ensure public benefits from all future plantation 
operations. As the subsequent instructions (commonly referred 
to as the "Sarimin Plan") for the implementation of Article IV 
made clear, the PPNKST expected the estates to furnish evidence 
that part of their profits were going to the people in the form of 
technical assistance in land reclamation, drainage, and irrigation 
projects.5 
A special Commission for Agricultural Land Affairs (PanzOtya 
Pusat Urusan Tanah Pertanian, or PPUTP) was instalIed on 28 
September 1950 to administer the "Sarimin Plan", with Sarimin 
himself as chairman, Munar Hamidjojo as vice-chairman, and 
fourteen other members (five from the government, six from the 
peasant uni ons, one from the labor unions, and two from 
planters' associations). Reporting to this Central Commission 
(PPUTP) were six local commissions for the six kabupaten 
making up the keresidenan Sumatera Timur. A series of meetings 
conducted by the PPUTP toward the end of 1950 resulted in 
general agreement between provisional authorities and the 
planters (the peasant and labor representatives withheld their 
assent) that the tobacco industry should return approximately 
135,000 hectares to the provincial government and the perennial 
crop estates about 215,000. The talks also established consensus 
for the reservation of forested areas on watersheds, along banks 
of rivers, and on steep hillsides, and the classification of land into 
such categories as land easily and inexpensively convertible into 
sawah and land convertible into sawah only at considerable 
expense. In the only major departure from earlier proposals, the 
PPUTP cancelled the principles of selection developed by the 
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government of the Negara Sumatera Timur and established in-
stead the rule that every adult lndonesian citizen who had 
resided in East Sumatra for more than six months and expressed 
his intent to eam his living as a cultivator had the right to apply 
for land_ Specifically there was to be no distinction between 
autochthonous population and immigrants. Regarding the 
amount of land to be granted to land applicants, plots of two 
hectares of unirrigable land or one hectare of sawah were sug-
gested, on the following conditions: 
1. the land would have to be in use within three months; 
2. the land would have to be cultivated by the grantee himself or 
with the help of his family; 
3. the land could not be sold for a period of five years and could 
be transferred to another only with the permission of the he ad 
of the kabupaten; 
4. the land would have to be used., if at all possible, for per-
manent cultivation (sawah, tegalan, or pekarangan), not for 
shifting cultivation (ladang); 
5. the land would be covered initially by the right of usufruct 
(hak memperusahai) to be replaced later by the right of posses-
sion (hak milik). 
PPUTP decided to transfer discussions to Jakarta in December 
1950 in order to obtain the approval of the central government 
for what was called the Deli Plan, the main points of which were: 
1. Government and tobacco companies agreed that an integral 
solution of the agrarian problem was desirabie. The govern-
ment, recognizing the economie value of the industry as an 
earner of foreign exchange and its own obligations under the 
terms of the Round Table Agreement, stood prepared to grant 
long-lease rights for 40 years, with the understanding that the 
industry would return 130,000 hectares to the government, 
retaining 120,000 hectares (which was deemed enough to 
permit an annual tobacco area of 16,000 hectares with a seven-
year rotation). 
2. Those soils especially suited for the growing of tobacco would 
go to the tobacco industry, irrigable land to the government 
for subsequent distribution to the population, and certain 
parcels of land weIl suited both for tobacco and for sawah 
cultivation, to the tobacco industry or government in that 
order. 
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3. Of the 130,000 hectares being retumed to the govemment, it 
was estimated that 12,000 hectares we re irrigable practically 
immediately, 88,000 hectares were either not irrigable or 
irrigable only with the help of considerable investment, and 
30,000 hectares should be added to the forest reserve for 
hydrological reasons. 
4. It was estimated th at the 40,000 families then squatting on 
land of the tobacco estates could be given enough land to 
assure them areasonabIe economic base but there would have 
to be safeguards against land speculation and some means of 
ensuring good land management. 
5. If the experiments in which govemment agencies had been 
participating proved the feasibility of a shorter rotation 
period, additional land might have to be retumed by the 
tobacco industry.6 
While the PPNKST was attempting to come to grips with the 
agrarian problem, the number of squatters increased quite stead-
ily, so that on 28 September 1950, Sarimin Reksodihardjo found 
it necessary to issue a public statement urging the peasant and 
labor organizations to stop their illegal invasions of estate lands 
because such actions, by complicating the PPUTP's efforts to 
implement Article IV of the Urgency Program, only delayed the 
improvement of economic conditions for all. It is wor th noting 
that this announcement, in contrast to the Joint Proclamation of 
Tengku Mansur and Simbolon of 22 May 1950, made no refer-
ence to Ordinance 110 of 1948 against illegal squatting - an 
ordinance issued by the Netherlands Indies govemment and 
therefore stigmatized as a "coloniallaw". 7 Rather than recall the 
ordinance, Sarimin Reksodihardjo preferred to appeal to the 
population. 
The PPNKST limited the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land 
Planning (Balai Perancang Tata Bumz), which had studied the 
squatter problem very closely since 1948 and had conducted a 
census of the squatters, by relegating it to an advisory status. 
PPNKST was abolished 30 September 1950, having completed 
its assignment. On the same date the central govemment ap-
pointed Sarimin Reksodihardjo to serve as coordinator of the 
provincial govemment until a govemor could be nominated. On 
25 January 1951, Abdul Hakim took the oath of office as gov-
emor of North Sumatra, while Sarimin Reksodihardjo, who had 
played such an important role in the reshaping of the agrarian 
policy in East Sumatra, retumed to the Agrarian Service of the 
Ministry of Interior in Jakarta. 
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Interdepartmental discussions in Jakarta in late December 1950 
and early 1951 showed that the central govemment approved the 
Deli Plan in principle but would want to re duce slightly the area 
to be left to the tobacco companies. On 24 March 1951, three 
representatives of the tobacco companies met with high officials 
of the Ministries of Agriculture and Interior and submitted maps 
showing the 125,000 hectares of land which the companies 
wished to retain and the 130,000 hectares to be returned. The 
maps too were approved in principle and the ensuing discussion 
revealed a far-reaching understanding between govemment 
officials and representatives of the tobacco companies. The 
spokesman of the Agrarian Service in the Ministry of Interior 
reported that a law was under consideration that would empower 
the central govemment to issue new agrarian rights for an area of 
125,000 hectares on which no occupation by squatters would be 
permitted and squatters of long standing found on this land 
would be resettled. The govemment expected, however, that the 
cost of resettlement would be borne, in part at least, by the 
tobacco companies. The leading spokesman of the tobacco in-
dustry, af ter noting the industry's disappointment over earlier 
attempts by the local govemment to prevent expansion of illegal 
squatting, expressed confidence in the new proposal, particularly 
since only about 15,000 hectares of squatted land feIl within the 
target areas requested by the companies, while another 20,000 
hectares of squatter-held lands were a part of the 130,000 
hectares to be returned. Thus reassured by the central govem-
ment, the tobacco companies were prepared to invest new capital 
and to undertake further experiments toward shortening the 
rotation, so that at some future date additional land might be 
retumed to the govemment.8 
Since it was quite apparent that the proposed legislation could 
not be expected in the near future and that the tobacco industry 
urgently needed a new legal base for its activities, Minister of 
Interior Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo issued a decree on 28 J une 1951 9 
authorizing provisional measures pending the promulgation of a 
new agrarian law. The decree sanctioned the propos al th at the 
tobacco companies keep 125,000 hectares for a maximum period 
of 30 years under conditions to be determined later and that 
130,000 hectares be retumed to the govemment. The govemor 
of N orth Sumatra was instructed to decide on the geographic 
location of these lands within a period of three months, to which 
end he appointed the East Sumatran Agrarian Commis sion 
(Komisi Agraria Sumatera Timur), headed by Bupati Munar. 
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The Minister of Interior also created, by a decrce datcd 27 J une 
1951, the Office for the Execution of Land Distribution (Kantor 
Penyelenggara Pembagian Tanah, or KPPT), which, as its name 
indicates, was given the extremely difficult assignment of ad min-
is tering the land distribution program in East Sumatra. 10 
The division of tobacco lands as proposed by the tobacco com-
panies on maps submitted 24 March 1951 did not meet with the 
approval of Governor Hakim, who was fully aware of the popular 
demand for easily accessible, easily irrigable or actually irrigated 
land. He therefore insisted that a new map be prepared which 
would include, among the lands to be returned, all sawah are as as 
weIl as areas suited for wet-rice cultivation and, furthermore, 
strips of land with a depth of 250 meters on both si des of the 
major highways running across the tobacco region. In these 
demands he departed from the Deli Plan developed in 1950. On 
28 September, before the expiration of the three-months period 
allowed by the Minister of Interior, Governor Hakim was able to 
issue a decree, 11 accompanied by a map, giving the tobacco com-
panies a right in rem (hak benda) for 125,000 hectares on con-
ditions to be determined later by law. It stipulated specifically 
the return to the government of the following: 
1. all existing sawah areas; 
2. land on both si des of the road from Tanjungpura to Tebing-
tinggi via Binjai and Medan, as weIl as of the road from Medan 
to Bandarbaru to a depth of 250 meters, except for those plots 
on which were located houses or other buildings, canals, roads, 
stands of teak or bamboo - provided these plots were not yet 
occupied by the population; 
3. lands occupied by kampongs plus a reserve area adequate for 
expansion during the next 30 years; 
4. land bordering rivers in strips 50 meters wide and land within a 
100-meter radius of springs. 
The decree, an important landmark in the postwar agrarian 
history, was welcomed by government and plantation circles as 
weIl as moderate peasant and labor organizations because it 
seemed to provide the basis for economic reconstruction. Unfor-
tunately it met with violent opposition from the more radical 
organizations. 
For more than 75 years, from about 1865 to 1941, the planters 
had with great tenacity and remarkable success resisted every 
change that had threatened to affect their financial interests. 
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Now, af ter the transfer of sovereignty, they faced a situation 
never experienced before. Peasants and laborers, who had not 
been directIy represented by spokesmen out of their own ranks 
in any negotiations, played a critical role. While during the 
Negara Sumatera Timur period the prewar pattern had been 
maintained, the officials of the Republic, under pressure from 
the people and from parliament, began to insist on participation 
of representatives of peasant and labor uni ons in any negotiations 
which in any way affected the economic interests of these 
elements of society. Governor Hakim's decree stood in violation 
of this new policy, as did the Deli Plan and the subsequent con-
ference in Jakarta on 24 March 1951. All these negotiations had 
been conducted without representation from the peasant organi-
zations. 
East Sumatra had eight peasant organizations in early 1950, 
which competed with each other in their efforts to win followers. 
The multiple development of peasant organizations had begun in 
November 1945 when the Republican leaders issued a call for the 
creation of a multiparty system in order to disprove the claim 
that the Republic of lndonesia wanted to establish a totalitarian 
system. This led to a proliferous growth not only of parties, 
referred to in Chapter l, but also of peasant organizations, many 
of which became associated with a political party or were actual-
ly set up by a political party seeking followers among peasants 
(see Table 7, pp. 56-57). 
East Sumatra appeared to be a particularly attractive field for 
peasant organizations originating in Java. Some of the East 
Sumatran peasant unions, however, were strictIy local in origin 
and did not spread outside its boundaries. By 1950 the leading 
peasant organizations we re BTl or Barz"san Tanz" Indonesz"a, whose 
leadership included Socialists, Communists and others, and which 
had national headquarters in Yogyakarta; RTl or Rukun Tani 
Indonesz"a, openly linked with the Communist Party; GTl or 
Gerakan Tanz" Indonesia, affiliated with the lndonesian Socialist 
Party; Sekata or Sen"kat Kaum Tanz"; Gaperta or Gabungan Per-
satuan Buruh Tani; STIl or Sarekat Tanz" Islam Indonesz"a, affili-
ated with Masyumi, Gabungan Buruh Tanz" Tz"onghoa, represent-
ing the interests of Chinese squatters; and finally Badan Per-
juangan Rakyat Penunggu (BPRP) or Council for the Struggle of 
the Autochthonous Population, representing the agrarian in-
terests of the rakyat penunggu who felt seriously threatened by 
the policy of the Republic. 12 
All of these organizations, exceptBadan Perjuangan Rakyat 
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Penunggu, insisted on equal treatment of immigrants and local 
population. Their emphasis on equal treatment was not only in 
keeping with the constitution but politically realistic, sin ce the 
immigrants by far outnumbered the autochthonous inhabitants. 
Any party anxious to win a large following had to oppose a land 
poliey that treated the majority of the voters of East Sumatra as 
second-dass citizens. Such had been the policy of the discredited 
federalists of the Negara Sumatera Timur. The only party, ap-
parently, prepared to support the cause of the anak asli was the 
National People's Party (PRN or Partai Rakyat Nasional) which, 
however, was strikingly unsuccessful in the territory in the 1955 
elections. 
Of the smaller number of other peasant organizations which 
sprang up in East Sumatra af ter 1950 - some strictly Sumatran 
and some as branches of nationwide organizations - the most 
notabIe was Petani, or Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia. Petani 
was affiliated with the lndonesian Nationalist Party and first 
appeared in East Sumatra in 1951, gaining considerable im-
portance in subsequent years. 
Peasant as weIl as labor unions differed greatly both as to 
programs and degree of militancy. In East Sumatra in 1950 the 
most aggressive peasant unions were BTI and RTL STIl and 
BPRP were by comparison so moderate and relatively law-abiding 
that their opponents derisively called them puppets, kaki tangan, 
of the planters. Aggressiveness within any one organization 
varied, however, depending up on the leadership, with the result 
that some East Sumatran chapters of a peasant organization were 
more moderate than their counterparts in Java. But the militants 
were able to influence the course of events in Sumatra Timur by 
sabotaging the efforts of the provincial government. Their policy 
of noncooperation, of deliberate violation of laws and regula-
tions, was pursued on such a scale th at the law-enforcement 
mechanism at times came to a standstill. Unpopular officials were 
intimidated by means of a barrage of attacks. Anyone attempt-
ing to en force the law found himself accused of being "colonial-
minded" for taking action against peasants on the basis of laws 
passed during the colonial period to protect the interests and 
rights of foreign capita!. 
The Medan press, too, played an important role in the contro-
versy over land. Papers such as Pendorong and Suara Rakjat 
became outlets for virulent attacks on planters as weIl as the 
provincial and central governments; Waspada, the organ of the 
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against planters and against the policy of the cabinets of Sukiman 
and Wilopo, which held office from 1951 to 1953. Mestika, 
founded by the information service of the Negara Sumatera 
Timur, defended the interests of the rakyat penunggu or autoch-
thonous population. Mimbar Umum, a Masyumi paper, reflected 
the moderate views of the party in economie matters and de-
fended the economie and agrarian policy of the Wilopo Cabinet. 
BTl was by far the most militant peasant organization in East 
Sumatra in 1950, leaving nothing untried to encourage and to 
organize further squatting. RTl in East Sumatra was considered, 
by some at least, more moderate than BTI. The following sum-
mary of a report presented by the secretariat to the first RTl 
congress in Bandung clearly shows, however, that RTl was also a 
militant movement. The report starts out with the observation 
that: 
"the Revolution of 1945 failed since it did not succeed in the 
overthrow of imperialism and in the establishment of a Demo-
cratie Peoples' Republic. This meant the return of foreign capital, 
the establishment of negara, and the creation of the Republic of 
the United States of Indonesia - a product of the Round Table 
Conference in the Hague. The United States of Indonesia is a tooI 
serving the restoration of the old order in a new form. Foreign 
capital still controls Indonesia's mines, plantations, factories, 
land-, sea- and air-transport facilities. 
The revolution failed because laborers, peasants and other 
oppressed segments of the population who are anti-capitalistic 
and anti-feudal in outlook did not clearly understand the nature 
and aims of the August 1945 Revolution. This revolution was not 
carried on by genuinely anti-imperalistic and anti-feudal groups, 
i.e. by peasants and laborers, since these were not organized and 
thus could not guide the revolution. 
The current struggle of the peasants has economie, social and 
political aspects. The war program of the peasants calls for a 
weakening of the political and economie institutions of foreign 
capital and their ultimate elimination from Indonesia. In the 
political sphere the peasants aim at the eradication of autocracy 
in government, from the central government down to the village 
government, because an autocratie government is a tooI serving 
the interests of foreign capital. The central government serves 
foreign interests rather than those of the people, especially 
peasants and laborers, by recognizing agricultural concessions and 
long leases. 
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The old agrarian policy must be terminated. The economic 
aims of the peasants are: nationalization of land; land distribu-
tion among the landless; eradication of feudalism; nationalization 
of all foreign enterprises; increase in peasant production; rapid 
modernization of village economy; cheap rural credit, and the 
like. The political aims of the peasants are: guarantee of demo-
cratic rights of freedom of speech, assembly, press and the right 
to strike; creation of a democratic governmental system.,,13 
In order to strengthen their position in negotiations with govern-
ment authorities and planters' associations, BTI, RTl, Se kata, 
and Gabungan Buruh Tani Tionghoa formed a joint organization 
called Peasant Front of East Sumatra (Front Tam· Sumatera 
Timur) in the second half of 1950. 
The newly established secretariat of Petani in Medan issued a 
policy statement outlining a position on the land problem very 
similar to th at of Communist-dominated peasant organizations, 
i.e. Petani was a nationalist peasant organization which was anti-
capitalistic and anti-imperialistic, dedicated to the liquidation of 
foreign and strengthening of national capital in Indonesia. As to 
concession lands, Petani maintained that the people, the legal 
owners, had been robbed of these lands by Dutch capitalists with 
the support of Dutch imperialism and that the former sultans and 
rajas, who had leased these lands to foreign entrepreneurs al-
though they had no right to do so according to adat, had acted as 
satellites and tools of Dutch imperialism. The planters' offer to 
make certain lands available for peasant agriculture was an insult 
to the farming population of East Sumatra. In the opinion of the 
Petani leadership, the government should view the occupation of 
concession lands by peasants as an expression of their growing 
consciousness of their rights and should strengthen government 
ties with the people by guiding this effort to restore rights to the 
land. 14 
The decrees of 28 June and 28 September 1951, though re-
garded as reasonable by such moderate organizations as STIl and 
BPRP, stirred a new wave of opposition among the more radical 
peasant organizations and newspapers. The fact th at the decrees 
did not alter the legal foundation on which the plantation com-
panies based their rights and operations, i.e. the planters con-
tinued on the basis ei ther of unexpired concessions or of permis-
sion to hold expired concessions pending new agrarian legisla-
tion, 15 was of little consequence if the final arrangement would 
involve new agrarian rights. So long as the proposed law was not 
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yet passed by parliament, the radicals intended to continue pres-
sing their attacks against the decrees_ 
In this the PKI and PNI and their respective peasant organiza-
tions worked closely together. About three weeks af ter the 
publication of Governor Hakim's decree the Communist Section 
Committee of North Sumatra issued a statement accusing pro-
vincial officials of intimidation, provocation, and terror in their 
arbitrary arrest of squatters and destruction by tractors of squat-
ters' homes and crops_ Provincial officials were described as 
"bourgeois compradors" siding with foreign capitalists at the 
expense of laborers and peasants, who had sacrificed so much 
during the struggle for independence. Although, according to 
calculations of the Deli Planters' Association, only about 15,000 
of the 125,000 hectares to be left to the exclusive use of tobacco 
companies we re occupied by squatters, it was flatly claimed that 
these 125,000 hectares were the source of livelihood of peasan ts 
who would suffer greatly, should the decree be implemented. 
Under the slogan "Land is the property of the peasant who tiUs 
it", all peasant organizations of East Sumatra we re urged to work 
closely together in order to defend the squatters and to fight 
against the governor's program. Labor uni ons we re called on to 
support the peasants in their struggle against "petit bourgeoisie, 
national bourgeoisie and inteUectuals".16 
In response to this appeal several organizationslÎ joined in the 
United Peasant Front (Front Bersama, also known as Front 
Persatuan Tam· Komisariat Sumatera Utara) and on 1 November 
1951 published astrong policy statement condemning the 
proposed division of old tobacco concessions between the 
government and the companies. Despite this opposition, 
Governor Hakim and the staff of KPPT went ahead with the 
surveying and marking of the new boundaries of the tobacco 
estates as weU as the resettIement of all squatters found on the 
newly designated tobacco lands, moving as quickly as possible in 
order to restore law and order. 
The technica! execution of the land division and its distribution 
among resettled squatters was the responsibility of the KPPT, 
which could calIon the Bureau of Land Planning and on the 
technicians - such as agronomists, soil scientists, and foresters -
in the Department of Agriculture for advice or assistance. As 
stipulated in the governor's order of 15 August 1951,18 each 
kewedanaan had two commissions: the first consisting of the 
assistant wedana, technica! personnel from the Departments of 
Agriculture and of Public Works assigned to the kewedanaan, and 
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the heads of the various kampongs involved in the agrarian issue; 
the second of the assistant wedana plus two representatives of 
the specific kampong which claimed land. These two com-
missions discussed with a representative of the estate or estates 
concerned the exact boundaries separating the lands of the 
tobacco industry from those of the Indonesian peasants. The 
following assumptions and procedures, incorporated in a detailed 
guide with the approval of the governor on 29 December 1951 
and amended on 11 February 1952, guided KPPT negotiations: 
1. All Indonesians occupying estate lands we re to be considered 
illegal squatters - even those whose occupation went back to 
the time of the J apanese occupation or the immediate postwar 
period19 - and therefore, in principle, any squatter, on any 
land being resurveyed whether for return to the government or 
for retention by the estates, was subject to resettlement. 
2. All squatters were to be screened and classified as full-time 
peasants, laborer-peasants (buruh-tani) , or laborer-traders 
(buruh-saudagar ). 
3. Land suitable for peasant farming was to be surveyed and 
divided into lots of either two hectares of unirrigable land or 
one hectare of irrigable land for full-time peasants or two-
tenths of a hectare for supplemental use by the buruh-tani 
(laborer-peasant) and buruh-saudagar (laborer-trader) groups. 
4. To ensure complete impartiality, the lots were to be dis-
tributed by means of a lottery.20 
All squatters in the tobacco region were required to submit to 
the screening and classification process and to the vagary of a 
lottery. 
From the squatter's point of view, the first critical feature was 
whether the KPPT classified him as a full-time peasant or a part-
time cultivator (drawing more than Rp. 500 annual income from 
another occupation). The second great uncertainty was the loca-
tion of his new lot. He might over the years have developed a 
small plot near a good road not too far from town, whereas the 
farmland he drew in the lottery might be located miles away in a 
relatively inaccessible corner. It might even be very swampy or 
subject to unpredictable deep flooding, or it might be located in 
the southern upland belt, again many miles away from good 
roads, from a market, and from a school for his children. There 
was also the financial imposition; the KPPT itself conceded that 
the monetary allowance of Rp. 300 was not enough to cover the 
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cost of dismantling a house and of moving timber and other 
materiais, household goods, tools, and miscellaneous belongings 
to the newly assigned farmstead. In addition, a squatter faccd the 
great risk that the lottery would assign a farmlot already 
occupied by another person who might refuse to vacate the land. 
The first lottery was held in kecamatan Kwala of kabupaten 
Langkat on 15 March 1952. 
KPPT was greatly handicapped by insufficient funds. The 
central government had originally budgeted Rp. 25,000,000, but 
the allocation was reduced to Rp.7,000,000 and only 
Rp. 3,000,000 of this reduced allocation were ever provided to 
the provincial government. Governor Hakim, in line with Ar-
ticle IV of the Urgency Program, obtained a pledge of 
Rp. 2,000,000 from the Planters' Association to be used for the 
construction of village centers, churches, mosques, and other 
projects not financed out of governmental funds; Rp. 600,000 
were paid with the promise to transfer additional funds should 
the central government make additional funds available. 
All of these uncertainties caused resentment and opposition; 
however, with the firm backing of the governor, the KPPT 
proceeded with its work program, which had been forwarded to 
the Ministry of Interior in Jakarta and orally approved by 
Sarimin Reksodihardjo, the former chairman of PPNKST, now 
head of the Agrarian Service. KPPT completed the screening and 
registration by 1 January 1953. As Table 8 shows, 52,000 full-
time peasant cultivators we re registered, together with 17,900 
laborer-peasants and laborer-traders, who, according to calcula-
tions, needed altogether some 80,000 hectares of land. The 
leaders of the peasant unions maintained that a high percentage 
of the 130,000 hectares of released lands was completely un-
suited for smallholder agriculture on account of steep gradients 
or swampy nature and that the tobacco companies had selected 
for their own use the best soils of East Sumatra, from the point 
of view of fertility as weIl as topography. 
All during the screening and registration process, the opposi-
tion - BTI and RTl in particular - had busily encouraged new 
squatting. No sooner had an estate been surveyed than new illegal 
squatting took place. For payment of a fee, village heads would 
certify long-time residence dating back to the war years. Newly 
arrived squatters could also, again for a fee, obtain a KPPT 
registration card. The result was that the KPPT census was out of 
date even before its completion. 
On the propaganda front, the peasants were being exhorted to 
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Table 8 
Land applicants registered by KPPT by 1 January 1953 
Peasant Peasant Laborer-
Applicants Applicants Peasant 
for Sawah for Dry Applicants 
Land for Dry 
District Land Total 
Lower Deli 8,242 3,056 11,544 22,842 
Upper Deli 8,429 3,921 1,011 13,361 
Lower Serdang 6,278 8,451 1,720 16,449 
Upper Serdang 1,385 1,385 
Lower Langkat 3,473 ll3 138 3,724 
Upper Langkat 2,006 7,199 3,486 12,691 
Total Tobacco 28,428 24,125 17,899 70,452 
Amount of Land Required in Hectares 
Total Tobacco 
Region 28,428 48,250 3,580 80,258 
Source: Unpublished data obtained from files of Tata Bumi, Medan. 
complain that the government, instead of resettling squatters to 
accommodate the tobacco industry, should make the tobacco 
companies return all squatter-occupied land. In another line of 
attack, BTI leaders argued that a land lottery amounted to 
gambling and was therefore immoral, but supporters of KPPT 
cited the Koran in defense of the system of land assignment by 
means of drawing 10ts.2l The BTI and RTl we re also stirring the 
resentmcnt of Javanese plantation laborers over their classifica-
tion as buruh-tani with a right therefore to only 0.2 hectares. 
Such "discrimination" meant an end to any hope of climbing the 
agricultural ladder to the enviable status of independent farmer 
and in effect forced their continuation as plantation workers. 22 
The only answer the KPPT could make to these complaints was 
that the classification and resettlement had to be judged against 
the government's basic objective, i.e. facilitating plantation 
operations so as to create foreign exchange, which had been 
determined for the best interests of the national economy. 
Somewhat less determination guided matters in the local judici-
ary. In March and April 1952, several groups of squatters belong-
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ing to BTI were tried in Medan court because of illegal occupa-
tion of estate land assigned to the Deli Company by decree No. 
36/K/Agr. of 28 September 1951. The prosecutor asked for and 
the judge pronounced a very mild sentence of Rp. 10 or two days 
arrest. An appeal by the tani was rejected out of hand because of 
the lightness of the sentence.23 The planters we re dismayed by 
this abandonment of Article I's provision for a jail sentence of up 
to three months or a fine of up to Rp. 500. 
The fact that the govemor was a Masyumi member only com-
pounded the politieal dilemma of the provincial authorities 
charged with expeIIing Indonesians from the land of foreign com-
panies for the Masyumi Party, by its support of the RTC agree-
ment, had become the major target of the radicals. The leftist 
labor and peasant unions organized public demonstrations against 
the provincial govemment's activities, directed resolutions and 
motions to the President, his cabinet officers, and Parliament, 
and recruited new squatters in Tapanuli, Simelungun, and Karo 
for the invasion of lands from which KPPT had just moved co-
operative squatters. 
The Wilopo Cabinet took office on 3 April 1952 with a 
program calling for the restoration of estate production to pre-
war levels and a settlement of the agrarian conflict without 
detriment to the economie interests of the state. 24 Wilopo 
insisted that the central govemment was allowing the provincial 
govemment ample discretion for the settlement of the agrarian 
conflict, but I.J. Kasimo, member of the Partai Katalik and also 
Chief of the Jawatan Perkebunan (Estates Service in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture) explained that Govemor Hakim and the 
KPPT we re being frustrated less by any restriction of discretion-
ary powers than by irresolute central govemment support of 
their actions in the face of serious political pressures.25 
Followers of Petani refused to participate in lotteries organized 
by KPPT in May 1952, citing statements by two high officials of 
the Agrarian Service of the Ministry of Interior, who were also on 
the central board of Petani, at Petani conferences in Medan in 
March and May 1952. 26 Objections we re raised by provincial 
officials that these two Interior officers had, by their very 
presence at Petani conferences in Medan as weIl as by their state-
ments, endorsed opposition to provincial authorities and encour-
aged Petani members to sabotage the efforts of KPPT to carry 
out the govemor's instructions. The amended guide lines which 
were followed by KPPT had been forwarded to the Agrarian 
Service at Jakarta on 11 February 1952. 
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Governor Hakim learned from a Medan paper on 30 May 1952 
that the Ministry of Interior had suggested certain modifications 
of his 11 February 1952 set of instructions to KPPT. 27 Not until 
4 J une 1952 did a letter and directive from the Ministry, both 
dated 28 May 1952, arrive. 28 These modifications, forwarded 
when, according to the governor and KPPT, about 90 percent of 
the assignment had already been completed with the ready co-
operation of the majority of the squatters, included: a limitation 
on resettlement to the most urgent cases; provision that in such 
cases the new sites be as close as possible to the old ones; assign-
ment of swampy or forested sites only af ter these had been 
readied for occupancy; and, most controversial, an end to the 
category buruh-tani, since an applicant should be judged on the 
basis of his present activity rather than his past occupation. 
Mohammad Said, chief editor of Waspada, who was close to the 
PNI and Petani leadership, attacked Governor Hakim and his 
subordinates of KPPT in a series of six articles. 29 To Said, the 
contention of KPPT and top officials of North Sumatra that, by 
and large, the squatters we re complying with their orders except 
in places where they we re being misled by agitators and mischief-
makers was simply another reminder of the colonial period when 
Dutch officials claimed that the Indonesian people had no 
demands except where misled by "so-called leaders who are real-
ly troublemakers". Said then told his readers: "In reality these 
leaders, who are being accused, succeeded in winning freedom 
and independence for the people and in giving high positions to 
those officials, who could never have even dreamed that they 
should ever occupy such high positions".30 At the same time the 
newspaper Suara Rakjat stepped up its attacks on Governor 
Hakim and KPPT officials, and BTI as weIl as Petani urged their 
members to resist all further resettlement efforts and encouraged 
those who had already been resettled to return to their former 
places of abode. Meanwhile, the conservative Mestika printed a 
series of four apparently inspired articles in support of the 
provincial authorities, arguing that the suggestions in Agr. 
12/4/16 of 28 May 1952 were completely impractical and hint-
ing that PNI and Petani were af ter East Sumatran votes in the 
forthcoming elections.31 
The barrage of accusations directed against officials willing to 
enforce the law tended to intimidate some local officials, so that 
the governor and the chief of KPPT had to admonish subordinate 
officials to show firmness in the pursuit of the resettlement 
program. This became especially necessary af ter Waspada 
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prematurely published the letter of 28 May 1952. The chief of 
KPPT wrote on 31 May to all bupati of East Sumatra: 
" ... we should like to make it clear that the land distribution 
program must go on. 
lf a person refuses to draw lots, that is his own business, but if 
a pers on refuses to move to another place, I regret to say that we 
must enforce the law by using police force. In practice, we find 
that if we place two or three leading pers ons of the organization 
involved under arrest, their followers will obey regulations. 
Taking the agricultural season into consideration, the squatters 
- in case of necessity - should be allowed to harvest their crop 
on their present land, but only this season's crop. 
In cases where police assistance is needed it is desirabIe th at 
you as bupati and head of the area take the case in your own 
hands; but should you not be able to solve the problem, the 
provincial government will take the case over. "32 
June, July, and August - the critical months just before the 
rainy season, when land must be prepared for rice planting-
always brought the sharpest clashes on the agrarian front and 
1952 was no exception. Tensions had been building for months 
until on 28 August the situation came to a head with an incident 
on Cinta Raja Estate in the Kabupaten Langkat th at became the 
year's most controversial case. 
According to an official KPPT report, Cinta Raja Estate, 
belonging to a Swiss company, had been assigned land which a 
BTI group of squatters, under the leadership of a leader named 
Senan, had been farming. Government records show that this 
group had been given time to harvest their last crop but had been 
warned not to plant a new one as the land was to be turned over 
to the Cinta Raja Estate. On 1 August, 5 August, and 12 August, 
authorities notified Senan and his followers that the land would 
be tractored on 28 August and warned against further cultivation 
of estate land, but Senan told his followers to go ahead with 
cultivation and planting. On 27 August, the wedana of Langkat 
Hilir and the assistant wedana of Secanggang (in whose adminis-
trative territory the land under dispute was located) inspected 
the area to be tractored the following day and discovered part of 
the land freshly planted. Hoping to avert a direct confrontation, 
the bupati of Langkat, in letter No. 1957/6fU.T. of 28 August, 
thereupon informed Cinta Raja Estate that land already planted 
could not be tractored but that unplanted land could be plowed 
with the help of tractors. 
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Police from Secanggang and Tanjungpura, as well as the assist-
ant wedana of the kecamatan Secanggang and the kepala 
kampung, arrived on the land under dispute on 28 August in 
order to supervise the work of the tractors and to prevent any 
incidents. Already there were Senan and an estimated 200 BTI 
members busily engaged in farm work, determined to prevent the 
"tractoring" of "their land". The assistant wedana decided to 
remove Senan from the scene by taking him to his immediate 
superiors, the wedana and bupati in Tanjungpura, for further 
investigation and discussion. Before being taken away, however, 
Senan is reported to have admonished his followers: "Take care 
of your land so that it is not tractor-plowed and caU for help 
from the BTI members of kampong Teluk Sukaramai and other 
kampongs". Told that the tractors would go ahead, Senan cried 
out: "Let us become dust, let us die now". For this incitement to 
violence Senan was then formally arrested, af ter which the 
tractors moved in and finished their work despite the arrival of 
BTI members from neighboring kampongs armed with sickles and 
parangs, the long heavy blade with which Indonesian farmers cut 
brush and clear paths through the jungle. 
The assistant wedana inspected the tractor-plowed land the 
following day and found th at some 21 banana corms had been 
planted on it and that about 40 persons were busily digging holes 
for additional planting of banana corms. Two days later, on 31 
August, the BTI Branch Kampung Baru notified the assistant 
wedana of Secanggang by letter that Senan 's friends and 
foUowers would come to Tanjungpura on 1 September to inquire 
about their leader, but the large crowd of BTI demonstrators that 
showed up to demand the release of Senan was finally dispersed 
without further incident by the police. Except for the quiet up-
rooting of the banana corms by Cinta Raja Estate employees 
under the supervision of the assistant wedana and several police-
men on 19 September, nothing else happened until Senan's case 
was tried in court at Tanjungpura in November. The defense 
lawyer, Suhunan Hamzah, who over the years had defended 
many BTI members in the courts of East Sumatra, turned his 
plea into a political speech, which was reported fully in Pen-
dorong of 28 and 29 November. Citing a speech by Dr. Soepomo 
at Gadjah Mada University on 17 February 1947 on the need for a 
new agrarian law which would ensure the rights of the Indonesian 
people, Hamzah referred to Senan as a pioneer of the Indonesian 
revolution: "It is true that only the accused is brought into 
court, but this case involves not only the accused but also all the 
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other peasants who need a new law which will fit all the new 
needs of Indonesian society". Sentenced to eighteen months in 
jail, Senan appealed and the case was soon forgotten, so far as the 
public of East Sumatra was concerned. Practically every court in 
East Sumatra had had similar cases, each exploited by the BTI 
and other peasant unions, by their lawyers, and by that part of 
the press which sided with them. 
The next major link in the chain of events leading to the 
Tanjungmorawa incident of 16 March 1953 and the ensuing 
resignation of the Wilopo Cabinet was the Great Peasant Congress 
(Konperensi Besar Kaum Tam) of 10 to 13 January 1953, 
organized by the Joint Secretariat of Peasant Unions (Sekretariat 
Bersama Organisasi Tani Untuk Memperjuangkan Tanah 
Sumatera Timur), the former United Peasant Front, and attended 
by delegations from BTI, RTl, Sakti, Se kata, Gaperta, and 
Gabungan Tani Tionghoa Sumatera Timur. 33 The chairman of the 
congress was S.M. Tarigan, the leader of BTI, Sumatera Timur. 
The highlight of the proceedings was a fiery speech by the Com-
munist Medan lawyer, Suhunan Hamzah. His long survey of East 
Sumatra's agrarian history was interspersed with virulent attacks 
on the cabinets of Mohammad Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo for 
their willingness to implement the Round Table Agreement and 
their unwillingness to nationalize all foreign plantations. Hamzah 
urged the peasants to resist all efforts of the planters to take back 
those lands which they, the peasants, had occupied under orders 
of the Japanese military authorities and under the 1947 author-
ization of the Republican Resident of East Sumatra. 
Of the large number of resolutions passed by the congress, 
those addressed to national issues called for: speedy passage of a 
democratie constitution; abrogation of the Netherlands-Indo-
nesian Union and the Round Table Agreement; the immediate 
return of West lrian; and cancellation of the colonial criminal 
code and the writing of a national criminal code which would 
guarantee human rights and the democratie rights enumerated in 
the Provisional Constitution. With regard to the East Sumatran 
agrarian problems the resolutions demanded: an end to the KPPT 
program of land distribution; and to the use of tractors to expel 
and intimidate peasants; an increase in the land allotment to a 
minimum of two hectares for every applicant; granting of the 
right of possession (hak miNk) over land presently occupied by 
squatters; return to the government of all agricultural concessions 
that could be of benefit to the people; abolition of "feudal 
rights"; prosecution of planters who had by the "illegaI" use of 
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tractors damaged the squatters' dwellings and crops; compensa-
cion of peasants for losses due to the agrarian struggle; the early 
dispatch of a parliamentary commission to investigate the land 
issues; appointment of a state commission for settlement of the 
land division problem which would include representatives of 
peasant unions; and, finally, early dispatch of a delegation to 
Jakarta to press for the acceptance and implementation of these 
resolutions. A final special resolution expressed the congress' lack 
of confidence in Governor Hakim and his handling of the 
agrarian problem. 
The congress was dominated by PKI and its front organizations 
BTI, SOBSI, and Pemuda Rakyat, whose spokesmen accused the 
leadership or organizations refusing to support the Sekretariat 
Bersama of betraying peasant interests. The list of "traitors" in-
cluded the leaders of Geraktani, KTI, RTl (Deli-Serdang only; 
other RTl groups of North Sumatra supported the Sekretariat 
Bersama), Sakti (Simelungun), STIl, and BPRP. It was insinuated 
that provincial authorities and planters had bribed these peasant 
leaders to oppose the Sekretariat Bersama. Petani was not 
officially represented in the Sekretariat Bersama at the time of 
the congress, although Petani leaders attended as individuals 
because its affiliation with PNI precluded support for the politi-
cal aims of the Communists. Vet it shared to a considerable 
ex tent the views of BTI in agrarian matters and opposed the 
procedures of KPPT. Shortly af ter the congress Petani joined the 
Sekretan:at Bersama. 
About two weeks af ter the congress, a split occurred in the BTI 
organization in Langkat. Purnama Siregar, the leader of some 
5,000 BTI refused any longer to follow directives issued by BTI 
headquarters in Medan and Binjai. Instead, he accepted KPPT 
proposals calling for a shift of Purnama's group from the estates 
of Padang Cermin, Padang Brahrang, and Tanjong J atti to land 
released by the Deli Company from its concession Sakuda. 
Purnama and his followers founded a large kampong called Aman 
Damai (Secure Peace), to which KPPT conducted visitors with 
pride since they regarded it as a clear refutation of the charges 
made by Sekretariat Bersama. 
It became apparent in February 1953 that the congress had 
caused further stiffening of squatter resistance against KPPT 
efforts in many parts of the tobacco region. One indication was 
the outcry over the suicide of Kasan, whom the Medan papers 
referred to as a victim of the land distribution policy. Tani 
Kasan, a Javanese squatter, had come to East Sumatra as a 
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plantation laborer in 1924 and be co me a self-supporting peasant 
during the war, and, most recently, as an obedient me mb er of 
RTl, had refused to draw a lot in the KPPT-organized lottery. 
The land he claimed to have cultivated sin ce 1942 had, however, 
been surveyed by KPPT and included in the lottery. When some-
one else drew his land, Kasan took his own life in despair. 34 
Public reactions ranged from the interpellation of l.B. Manuaba, 
PNI-Petani member of parliament, linking the suicide of Kasan 
with the policy of Governor Hakim to the warning in Waspada 
that the governor change his policy before it was too late. 35 
At a Petani conference held in Medan on 8 March 1953, 
speakers protested against the use of the "iron monsters" which 
were terrifying the poor squatters into abandoning land they had 
cultivated for years. 36 The terms pentraktoran (bulIdozing or 
tractoring) and traktor maut (tractor of death) appeared again 
and again in reports of the events in East Sumatra in 1952 and 
1953. Planters cautiously avoided the use of tractors on land 
occupied by squatters without an explicit authorization by local 
government authorities and preferred to have officials present 
during the operation. The chief of KPPT was, for example, 
present when Padang Brahrang Estate used a bulldozer to fill in a 
mile-long irrigation canal which a group of forty-five RTl squat-
ters had dug across plantation land already scheduled to be re-
turned to the tobacco company. The squatters had been trying to 
establish a fait accompli in the hope that they would be able to 
hold this land on ce it had been brought under irrigation. A 
Medan newspaper supporting the squatters described at great 
length the demonstrations which occurred and involved, among 
other things, the wee ping wives of the squatters, who were said 
to have thrown themselves on the ground. 37 
KPPT tried to complete the resettlement program as speedily as 
possible but found itself confronted by a hard core of squatters 
organized by Petani, BTI, and RTl, who refused to be resettled 
by claiming that, in the absence of a new law regulating agrarian 
affairs in East Sumatra, KPPT had no authority to insist on 
resettlement of squatters in order to accommodate "colonial 
capitalists". 
The Tanjungmorawa Incident 
A common misconception among both Indonesians and foreign 
observers is that the incident at Tanjungmorawa took place 
between Indonesian peasants and Western planters. 38 The quite 
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different fact is that it revolved around a handful of Chinese 
squatters and was a show-down between the peasant uni ons and 
lndonesian authorities. At issue was the refusal of ten Chinese 
squatters on an area of six hectares in the kecamatan Tanjung-
morawa to accept resettlement as offered by provincial author-
ities. The land had belonged to the Senembah Company until its 
release to the government in September 1951 and was part of the 
site chosen in April 1952 by the Agricultural Service for a small 
agricultural and fresh-water fisheries station. The whole 
immediate area, located some 24 kilometers southeast of Medan 
on the main highway to Lubukpakam and Tebingtinggi, had been 
taken over during the war by former Senembah plantation 
workers, mostly Chinese. 
These squatters were notified in July 1952 th at land near the 
coastal village of Pantai Cermin had been set aside for their 
resettlement af ter the December rice harvest, and on 17 
December the assistant wedana of Tanjungmorawa, on one of 
several visits to their kampong Perdamaian (Peace), announced 
that each family would receive a half-hectare allotment at the 
new location. The planting of a new crop at Tanjungmorawa was 
expressly forbidden. 
A more or less routine resettlement seemed likely until the 
assistant wedana unexpectedly received a month later a letter 
from the chairman of the Tanjungmorawa branch of the Chinese 
peasant union setting forth in behalf of the squatters their con-
di ti ons for agreeing to the move. The letter, consonant with the 
new militancy of a peasant uni on congress in J anuary in Medan 
and almost certainly drafted by Tarigan, Suhunan Hamzah, and 
other Sekretariat Bersama leaders, began by outlining the history 
of the squatters, from their importation by Senembah just before 
the end of the penal sanction in 1931 to their loyalty to the 
Republicans during the revolution. Along with the other 204 
families on the Senembah property, these squatters had been 
cultivating their fields there ever sin ce the war and, though 
willing to comply with the government's request, felt justified in 
demanding that: 
1. their new land be suitable for wet-rice and vegetable cultiva-
tion; 
2. the land be within five kilometers of a market town; 
3. the land be ready for immediate planting; 
4. each family be assigned a minimum of one hectare of irrigable 
land; 
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5. shelters and a school be providcd by the government; 
6. time be allowed for harvesting any crops from Tanjung-
morawa; 
7. the government pay all resettlement costs; and 
8. food rations be distributed to each family for the first three 
months af ter resettlement. 
However reasonable the conditions on humane and to some 
degree purcly objective grounds, KPPT officials rejected the 
proposition in the reaW~ation that the precedents set would 
wreck the resettlement program. Not only did their demands go 
far beyond the central government's guidelines as to cost but 
these particular squatters we re not even lndonesian citizens. To 
ease the situation if possible, the assistant wedana met with the 
secretary and the local spokesman of the peasant union on 4 
February and offered the Chinese squatters alternate land near 
the kampong of Tajukanraga. Three days later the squatters were 
notified that the provincial Agricultural Service would take 
possession of the Tanjungmorawa site on 15 February. The 
Chinese squatters waited unperturbed until 18 February to go 
inspect the Tajukanraga land, which was thereupon refused for 
being unfertile and too far from a market town (seven kilometers 
from Tanjungmorawa). With mounting exasperation the assistant 
wedana took the chief of police to the site on 5 March and tried 
once more to persuade the ten Chinese families to move. It was 
useless. The natural tenacity of these squatters was being con-
stantly and powerfully bolstered by the leaders of Sekretariat 
Bersama, who had finally found the perfect instruments for their 
political war with Hakim. 
Word spread quickly and by the time the poli ce arrived with a 
tractor on Saturday 14 March ready to clear the site for the 
Agricultural Service a sizable crowd of squatters and agitators 
from the peasant union and BTI had assembied there. Out-
numbered, and sensing the crowd's defiant mood, police and 
lndonesian authorities decided to postpone the operation for two 
days until a larger police force could be called and, hopefully, the 
crowd would have thinned. The tractor was left by the road 
under 24-hour guard. But, far from dispersing, the crowd grew as 
union leaders maintained an air of crisis and kept the people 
together by feeding everybody from a field kitchen. There were 
nearly 1,500 milling demonstrators on hand to greet the 60 
policemen who came on Monday 16 March with the wedana of 
Lower Serdang, the assistant wedana of Tanjungmorawa, and the 
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Tanjungmorawa chief of police. It was no time for retreat and 
officials resolutely ordered the tractor moved to the site, at 
which point the crowd rushed forward. 39 Accounts of the ensu-
ing mêlée were never fully reconciled but the police reported that 
demonstrators, undeterred by warning shots fired into the air, 
pulled one policeman to the ground and began grappling for his 
automatic rifle. Either accidentally or by a defense reflex of the 
policeman (no one is certain) the trigger was touched and some 
forty bullets sprayed into the crowd killing four Chinese and one 
Indonesian and wounding seventeen others.40 
The Sekretariat Bersama had its cause célèbre. Medan news-
papers seized the opportunity to step up their campaign against 
Governor Hakim and the KPPT program, playing down the fact 
that the incident was caused by aliens who had refused to obey 
government orders and had thereby blocked the work of the 
provincial agricultural service. Left-wing elements in PNI and the 
Communists, in particular, used the Tanjungmorawa incident as 
an excuse to attack the whole agrarian policy of the central 
government. On 17 Mareh, the Communist Party of North 
Sumatra sent out the battle cry "Peasants Uni te for the Defense 
of Your Land" (Bersatu Mempertahankan Tanah Kaum Tam'). A 
few days later the Ministry of Interior dispatched a group of 
investigators to Medan, and the embassy of the Chinese People's 
Republic sent one of its consular officers. In Parliament, Sidik 
Kertapati, who was also chairman of Sakti, S. Sardjono of BTI, 
and Munaba of Petani formally interpellated the Minister of the 
Department of Interior about his agrarian policy and about the 
activities of the "autocratie" provincial governor.41 To stir up 
popular support, a total of twenty-two organizations participated 
in a Medan meeting on 23 March at which it was decided to push 
for an end to all use of tractors to force squatters off their land, 
the establishment of a state committee with peasant union re-
presentation for the study of the agrarian problem, and release of 
all those arrested at Tanjungmorawa. 
Bowing to these pressures, Parliament appointed a five-member 
committee, the Committee for the Investigation of the Tanjung-
morawa Affair and Land Distribution in East Sumatra (Panitya 
Peninjau Persoalan Peristiwa Tanjung Morawa dan Pembagian 
Tanah di Sumatera Timur) ,42 which began its work in late Mareh. 
The questioning of officials directly involved in the incident as 
weU as officials in Medan, examination of the procedures of 
KPPT, and visits to Perdamaian, Tanjungmorawa, Secanggang, 
and other sites of agrarian clashes to talk with local peasants, 
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continued through April. The peasant organizations, especially 
BTI, instructed their members in advance of the committee's 
visits as to the line they were to follow. Police authorities seized 
documents in Tanjungmorawa which showed that the head-
quarters of the Communist party for Deli-Serdang urged party 
workers to prepare posters and banners publicizing the demands 
of the peasant unions, e.g. "The Tractoring of Land on which 
Peasants Depend to Be Stopped" (Pentraktoran Atas Tanah 
Garapan Tani Minta Diberhentikan). 43 
The Communists tried to create the impression among 
members of the investigating committee that the peasants of East 
Sumatra were overwhelmingly against the policy of Govemor 
Hakim and the work of KPPT, but in this they failed. There was 
no disguising the fact that at committee hearings held on 31 
March for the spokesmen of all peasant organizations of East 
Sumatra the Sekretariat Bersama did not even speak for all BTI 
and RTl groups. BTl of Langkat Hulu under Pumama Siregar and 
RTl of Deli-Serdang under the leadership of Mohammad Rasjid 
had openly broken away from their respective parent organiza-
tions. Worse still, a group representing Geraktani, STIl, KTI, BTI 
of Langkat Hulu, anq RTl of Deli-Serdang appeared to express 
their confidence in Govemor Hakim and their support of the 
KPPT program in direct contradiction of the Sekretariat Bersama 
position. The same group submitted ajoint statement to Minister 
Roem reiterating its support of the KPPT program and requesting 
the central govemment to approve the continuation of the KPPT 
land distribution program, to leave the land problem to pro-
vincial authorities, to provide rural credit, and to replace the 
colonial agrarian law as speedily as possible with a new national 
agrarian law in keeping with the constitution and favoring the 
common people. 44 
From the govemor, but particularly from the officials in KPPT, 
the parliamentary committee received a great deal of information 
regarding the partition of land between estates and govemment, 
the distribution of land among squatters, and the resettlement of 
squatters who found themselves on land assigned to the tobacco 
estates. It became quite clear to the committee that the partition 
into estate and govemment land had been left to the technical 
services of the tobacco companies, except for the inclusion of 
land along the main highway and along rivers, on which the 
govemor had insisted. The bulk of the area which the tobacco 
companies had made available for peasant agriculture was in the 
upland region weIl to the south of the line Binjai-Medan-Tanjung-
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morawa and involved land which had suffered badly from cros ion 
during the few times that it had been uscd for tobacco cultiva-
tion. Most of the southem concession lands had not been used 
for twenty-five to thirty years and would not be used for tobacco 
cultivation again even if the companies were to be permitted to 
retain all concessions. A non-continuous belt of land near the 
coast had been relcased because of drainage problems. 
Officials of the Department of Agriculture informed the com-
mittee that, according to their estimates, no less than 45,000 
hectares or about 35 percent of the released land were unsuited 
for peasant agriculture on account of the land's gradient. Of the 
other 85,000 hectares, 45,000 were suited for farming, but since 
this land was either forest-covered or swampy, it needed con-
siderable improvement in the form of land clearing, drainage, 
dyking, and irrigation. This would require several years of in-
tensive work under the guidance of qualified technicians and, 
above all, a far larger budget than was available to KPPT. The 
remaining 40,000 hectares were good agriculturalland ready for 
use, but 20,000 we re needed for the expansion of existing 
settlements, i.e. towns and villages, so that only 20,000 hectares 
remained which could be assigned to squatters for agricul tural 
use. 
A much higher percentage of the land which the tobacco 
companies had selected for their own use was weIl suited for the 
tobacco industry than of the land released for peasant agri-
culture. This was indeed not denied by the planters who, how-
ever, maintained that it was plainly impossible to keep the 
wrapper tobacco industry alive and at the same time give all 
people crowded into the tobacco region an opportunity to 
become independent farmers by giving them one or much less 
two hectares of land within the greatly contracted tobacco belt. 
They stressed further that it would harm the economy of 
Indonesia if soils especially weIl suited for the production of 
high-quality wrapper tobacco we re to be tumed over to the 
production of subsistence crops by peasants who could eam 
more by working as estate workers in the tobacco industry than 
by cultivating their own small plots, not to mention the financial 
benefits which the state derived from the plantations in contrast 
to subsistence peasant agriculture. The planters also did not agree 
with the pessimistic views of provincial agricultural officials on 
the low value of the upland soiIs, pointing out that in fact exten-
sive are as were weIl suited for such perennial crops as rubber, 
oilpalm, and fruit trees, provided proper soiI conservation 
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measures we re taken. The coastal belt, furthermore, contained 
thousands of hectares of potential rice land requiring only dyking 
and the construction of automatic tidal sluices. The funds needed 
for this kind of land reclamation could come out of the taxes 
collected from the tobacco companies over a period of a few 
years. Such coastal lowlands had in several instances been 
successfully reclaimed, although one or two of these projects had 
been so badly neglected during the war and immediate postwar 
years as to necessitate their abandonment. Wherever feasible, 
these prewar projects, which would not require a new time-
consuming survey, should be rehabilitated before any other 
projects we re initiated. 
Mohamad Roem, Minister of Interior, strongly defended the 
governor for his implementation of the agrarian policy developed 
by the two previous cabinets and adopted by the Wilopo Cabinet 
as its own policy. In a lengthy explanation of the provincial 
government's efforts to create a self-reliant peasantry in East 
Sumatra, he admitted that lack of funds had prevented the 
central government from furnishing adequate financial support. 
By April 1953 not even one·third of the Rp. 25,000,000 origin-
ally budgeted had been transferred to the province; the tobacco 
companies, in turn, had made only about one-third of their 
promised contribution available. Although according to Medan 
the KPPT had claimed completion of 90 percent of the program, 
the figures given by the minister told a different story. A total of 
66,500 families were screened and declared eligible for land allot· 
ment, of which roughly 39,000 families had to be resettled. By 
the end of April 1953 a total of 35,054 heads of households had 
been summoned to participate in a land drawing, with all but 
7,326 persons having done so. Only 16,322 families had actually 
been resettled, however, leaving 11,406 reassigned families still to 
be moved. Table 9 gives a further breakdown of the data by 
major political subdivisions. It turned out that the KPPT claim of 
90 percent completion applied only to the first ph ase of the 
distribution program, i.e. the calling up of eligible land applicants 
to participate in lotteries. 
Despite the fact that three members of the investigating com· 
mittee defended Governor Hakim and the policy of the Wilopo 
Cabinet, and despite the firm stand taken by Minister of Interior 
Roem, Sidik Kertapati, one of the original interpcllants, on 22 
May presentcd a motion of ccnsurc which was co·signed by 
Sardjono of BTI and Ahem Erningpradja of Petani, both of 
whom had been members of the investigating committee, and 
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Table 9 
Land distribution program of KPPT in Serdang, Deli and Langkat, 
May 1953 
Category Total Deli Deli Ser- Ser- Lang- Lang-
Hilir Hulu dang dang kat kat 
Hilir Hulu Hilir Hulu 
Number of families screen-
ed for land allocation: 
Indonesians 64,253 1 21,373 8,530 15,842 2,211 3,606 12,691 
Chinese 2,337 1 1,469 62 806 
Number of heads of house-
holds summoned to land 
allotment lotteries 35,054 12,608 2,959 6,176 2,211 3,606 7,494 
Number who accepted 
summons 27,728 10,702 2,746 4,225 1,835 3,001 5,219 
Number who rejected 
summons 7,326 1,906 213 1,951 376 605 2,275 
Number of households 
resettled prior to 
April 1953 12,520 4,014 1,176 701 976 1,747 3,906 
Number of households 
resettled in April 1953 3,802 386 219 2,108 69 1,020 
Number of households 
to move in May 1953 2,369 692 132 690 562 293 
Number of households 
which indicated readiness 
to move 5,318 2,077 1,219 726 790 506 
Number of households 
which have not yet 
indicated readiness to move 3,719 3,533 186 
1 Of the total of 66,590 families about 39,000 were to be resettled since they were 
squatting on land to be kept by tobacco companies_ Unpublished data prepared by 
the KPPT, 11 May 1953_ 
other members of parliament. The signers asked parliament to 
vote in favor of a motion requiring the Minister of Interior: 
1. to suspend the distribution of concession lands in East 
Sumatra; 
2_ to cancel the KPPT instructions regarding land distribution; 
3. to revise the mapping of concession lands undertaken by the 
Deli Planters' Association; 
4. to appoint a committee, including representatives of the 
various peasant organizations, for the drafting of a new land-
distribution program; and 
5. to release as saon as possible all pers ons under arrest in con-
nection with agrarian problems and to avoid future arrests. 
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PNI, which had the same number of cabinet posts as did Masyumi, 
came under great pressure when its North Sumatra branch 
threatened to leave the party should the parliamentary group fail 
to support the Sidik Kertapati motion. The PNI executive com-
mittee attempted a compromise by suggesting that Mohamad 
Roem leave the Wilopo Cabinet in return for continued PNI 
support of the cabinet. This was rejected by Masyumi so that 
finally, on 2 June 1953, Premier Wilopo handed in the resigna-
tion of his cabinet rather than reply to the debate which had 
preceded the motion and to face the final vote on the Sidik 
Kertapati motion. In his letter to the chairman of parliament 
Wilopo stated pointedly that the cabinet might have been able to 
continue working together but that the cabinet could no longer 
count on sufficient support from the parties in the coalition. This 
was directed against those PNI members who clearly sided with 
the Communists and Communist-directed peasant and labor 
umons. 
As Feith had shown in his study of the Wilopo Cabinet, the 
Masyumi-PNI coalition was subjected to many serious strains in 
the course of the fourteen months of its duration.45 Masyumi was 
not able to win PNI support of its plan to return the North 
Sumatran oil fields to the Shell Oil Company, nor did it succeed 
in obtaining PNI support for an agrarian program developed by a 
Masyumi minister. By June 1953 it was apparent that Masyumi 
and PNI we re so far apart th at it was impossible for them again 
to form a coalition cabinet. It took almost two months and five 
attempts to put together a new cabinet, headed by Ali Sastro-
amidjojo of PNI. Masyumi did not enter this cabinet but joined 
the opposition. 
East Sumatran Reaction to the Fall of the Wilopo Cabinet 
Following the resignation of the Wilopo Cabinet, the great de bate 
round the agrarian problem continued in East Sumatra as weIl as 
in Java. The demissionary minister still adhered to his stand and 
supported the provincial authorities in their reasoning th at since 
the program was based on valid decrees of 28 June and 28 
September 1951 it had to be continued so long as the decrees 
were not withdrawn. The Sidik Kertapati motion, not having 
been put to avote, thus did not alter the situation. 
A steady flow of spontaneously drafted or officially inspired 
resolutions reached the desks of President Sukamo during J une, 
July, and August 1953, of the chairman of parliament, of the 
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parliamentary groups of parties concemed, and of the interested 
ministers of the demissionary cabinet urging a continuation of 
the land-distribution program, protesting the Sidik Kertapati 
motion, and expressing the satisfaction of peasant groups with 
the land issued to them and their hope that they would not be 
resettled on ce more. Such communications came from peasant 
organizations, from inhabitants of newly established villages, and 
from the opposition too. Adding to the uproar, the Sekretariat 
Bersama organized demonstrations to protest continuation of the 
resettlement program. 1t was no coincidence that, just at the time 
when the newly formed cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo presented 
its program to parliament, there was a demonstration at the 
bupati office in Binjai, Langkat against the KPPT by several 
hundred peasants. Their protest, over an attempt to resettle 
twenty-eight families, became so violent that poli ce had to use 
fire arms and killed one demonstrator. This incident again was 
used by PKl, SOBS1, BTI, and other peasant unions following 
Communist leadership to press their drive against Govemor 
Hakim. 
The 25 August 1953 policy statement of the Ali Cabinet called 
for the appointment of a state commission in which planters and 
peasant organizations were to be equally represented. lts task was 
to investigate the possibility of developing a better land division 
program while guarding both peoples' - and the state's - in-
terests. The following recommendations were proposed for 
study: 
1. that land forming a part of tobacco concessions but on which 
kampongs had been built in a planned manner before 1950, or 
on which sawah had been laid out, should be taken out of the 
respective concessions ; 
2. that some way be found to improve desa-development work; 
3. that dates of resettlement be fixed only aft er a harvest was 
completed; 
4. that resettled squatters whose previous land is not immediately 
utilized by the tobacco industry be given the opportunity to 
harvest crops left behind on the vacated land; 
5. that no swampy or raviney land be assigned to land applicants; 
6. th at within the financial ability of the state the squatters 
should be given: agricultural implements in addition to 
Rp. 300; improved transport and moving facilities; and land in 
a better state of preparation; 
7. that all who previously were classified as buruh-tani be in-
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cluded in the category of tani; 
8. that land be given only to Indonesian citizens; and 
9. that mapping and division of land be reinvestigated with the 
proviso that the si ze of the area to be released by the conces-
sionaries wiII not be changed or, if th is is impossible, that the 
government be empowered to enter into a new agreement 
regarding the total amount of land to be returned. 
As to resettIement of squatters, the cabinet ordered the transfer 
of only those who had voluntarily agreed to accept the land 
offered to them and who had not yet been moved because of 
unharvested crops on their squatted land. Squatters not wiIIing to 
accept new land were to be left undisturbed until the government 
had come to a final decision on the basis of the state com-
mission's recommendations. This latter provision in effect gave 
squatters the privilege of challenging a government decree and 
put a stamp of approval on the antigovernment actions of radical 
peasant unions. The degree to which the cabinet was prepared to 
meet the demands of the parties and mass organizations behind 
the Sidik Kertapati motion in return for political support was 
also evident in the fact that the cabinet, rather than simply in-
dicating the problems to be investigated by the commis sion, 
suggested certain solutions. Then on 28 August 1953 - possibly 
in response to the Binjai incident 25 August 1953 - the new 
Minister of Interior issued a ban on the use of tractors for the 
demolition of squatter huts and the plowing of land under agrar-
ian dispute, thereby handing the leftist organizations a complete 
victory. A further concession to the radical peasant unions came 
with the separation of the Agrarian Service from the Ministry of 
Interior and the creation of a separate Ministry of Agrarian 
Affairs inasmuch as high officials of the Agrarian Service were on 
the board of directors of Petani, the organization which, despite 
its affiliation with PNI, worked closely with PKI, BTI, and other 
groups pursuing a Communist-inspired agrarian program. Nothing 
could suit peasant organizations and their supporters better than 
the establishment of a separate department handling agrarian 
matters exclusively. 
During a visit of the new minister of the Department of 
Interior to Sumatera Timur at the end of August 1953, the 
battle for and against Governor Hakim and the KPPT program 
reached new heights. Minister Hazairin, a member of Partai 
lndonesia Raya - one of the coalition parties in the Ali Sastro-
amidjojo Cabinet - on several occasions expressed his strong dis-
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approval of the attacks on thc governor, and thus on govcrnmcnt, 
and his great distrust of thc radicals' motives - he spo kc of 
slander, prejudice, lack of undcrstanding, and dcliberatc exaggcr-
ation - and stressed that the rescttlement program was nevcrthc-
less nearing completion. Vet despite this central governmcnt 
backing and the renewed rally of peasant unions who supportcd 
the provincial program - they had by now formed a coordinating 
body, Badan Kerja Sama Organisasi Tani Sumatera Timur or 
BKOTSU - Governor Hakim was replaced by Governor Amin in 
October 1953. By their skillful political exploitation of the agrar-
ian struggle, overtly manifested in the Secanggang, Binjai, and 
Tanjungmorawa incidents, the radical groups opposing the 
economic and political implications of the Round Table Agree-
ment of 1949 had nullified decrees of 28 J une and 28 September 
1951 and robbed the tobacco in dus try of any provisional 
security pending a new agrarian law. Although the KPPT had 
succeeded in removing many squatters from the target areas of 
the tobacco industry, Petani, BTI, and other peasant groups 
organized new invasions of tobacco estates in late 1953 and 1954 
either by leading resettled squatters back onto estate lands or by 
recruiting new squatters in Sumatera Timur as weIl as in 
Tapanuli, thus undoing a great deal of the work of KPPT during 
Abdul Hakim's governorship. This greatly reduced the confidence 
of the planters in promises by the Indonesian government and led 
the managements of companies controlling estates devoted to the 
cultivation of perennial crops to see in the experience of the 
tobacco industry an excuse for not going ahead with a program 
of officially releasing a part of their concessions. Little or 
nothing could be done to stabilize and guide the development of 
peasant agriculture among people who were occupying land 
claimed by perennial-crop estates; tobacco estates had to be 
closed and laborers dismissed because squatting reached such 
proportions that it was no longer possible to maintain the rota-
rion system. Declining tobacco production meant a concomitant 
reduction in the earning of foreign exchange so badly needed by 
Indonesia. 
All of this was realized by many government officials and the 
political leaders of such parties as Masyumi, PSI, and others of 
similar orientation and moderation, but they we re unable to 
oppose the political agitation created by the PNI. The fate of 
Governor Hakim, who was completely sidetracked, served as 
warning to other officials not to expo se themselves to the charge 
of being "colonial-minded" and serving the interests of foreign 
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capital, even when the orders of the central government were to 
call for firm action. 
The planters looked with apprehension toward the future 
knowing that the forthcoming state commission would include 
certain officials of the former Agrarian Service now raised to the 
status of a separate department of Agrarian Affairs as weIl as 
representatives of peasant unions. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FIRST ALl SASTROAMIDjOjO CABINET AND THE 
STATE COMMISSION FOR THE DIVISION OF ESTATE 
LANDS IN EAST SUMATRA (1953-1954) 
In presenting his program to Parliament on 25 August 1953, 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo promised to have a new state 
commission investigate the critical East Sumatra agrarian 
problem which had brought down the Wilopo Cabinet and to 
report its recommendations to the cabinet within two months; 
questions raised by Masyumi member M. Yunan Nasution as to 
whether the government needed another investigation so soon or 
had in fact studied the Ministry of Interior's report of the Djanu 
Ismadi team 's survey in Medan in March 1953 were brushed 
aside. On 27 August Sastroamidjojo issued a new standfast on 
squatting and banned the further use of tractors to raze squatter 
huts or plow squatter-occupied land. 
Despite the air of urgency in Sastroamidjojo's promise of 
recommendations within two months, it was over a month before 
the cabinet, at its meeting on 6 October 1953, approved the 
appointment of the State Commission for the Division of Estate 
Lands in East Sumatra (Panitya Negara Urusan Pembagian Tanah 
Perkebunan Sumatera Timur). As authorized by presidential 
decree No. 195/1953, the commission was to have fifteen 
members and to be divided into two sections. Three government 
officials (a representative of the Department of Interior, to serve 
as chairman; a representative of the newly created Department of 
Agrarian Affairs, as vice-chairman; and a representative of the 
Department of Agriculture, as mem ber-at-large) we re to sit in 
both sections. The other twelve members we re to be divided 
equally between the two sections, so th at functionally each 
section had nine members. Section I's six non-government 
representatives were drawn three each from the peasant unions 
and estate management; Section lI's exclusively from the peasant 
unions. Another five months passed before the actual appoint-
ments of these fifteen members and two secretaries were made 
by presidential decree (No. 63/1954, dated 9 March 1954, and 
No. 84/1954, dated 27 March 1954).1 On 10 March 1954 the 
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Minister of Agrarian Affairs formally installed the state commis-
sion in Medan and furnished it with his directives dated 5 March 
1954. Thus the first meeting of the commission that was to have 
completed its report on the agrarian crisis in East Sumatra within 
two months did not take place until six months af ter Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo promised its formation. 
The Mz'nz'sterz'al Directive 
Far from being allowed a free hand, the state commISSIOn was 
bound by the Minister of Agrarian Affairs' detailed instructions 
for the handling of the land problem and for the treatment of the 
squatters. In these instructions it was taken for granted that the 
tobacco industry was to remain in control of 125,000 hectares, 
as agreed upon in 1951 and sanctioned by ministerial decree No. 
Agr. 12/5/14 of 28 June 1951 as weIl as by Governor Hakim's 
decree No. 36/K/Agr. of 28 September 1951, but a reexamina-
tion of the land partition was ordered. This review was in 
response to demands by peasant leaders, who maintained that the 
bulk of the land the companies designated for return to the 
government was highly marginal and no longer of any interest for 
their operations, that the company surveyors alone had prepared 
the original map of partition of the concessions, and that the 
companies we re reserving all the good land for themselves. In 
fact, the peasant leaders complained, most of the land being 
offered was on estates which had been closed in the 1920s and 
1930s, so that the fields had reverted to jungle, estate roads we re 
covered by second-growth forest, bridges had collapsed, and 
estate buildings had been demolished. Such land could be made 
cultivable again only by a long process of reclearing. 
It is an irrefutable geographic fact that the choice tobacco 
lands are located in the intermediate zone between the coastal 
lowlands and the foothills of the hilly zones to the south. The 
urban centers of Medan and Binjai lie in the midst of the coveted 
belt containing all the "target areas" (wensarealen) of the 
tobacco planters. The major roads traverse the same belt. And it 
was precisely here, not in the forested lands of tobacco estates 
which had been abandoned twenty or thirty years ago, that the 
squatters wanted to be. The closer to Medan and the closer to a 
major highway - especially the highway running parallel to the 
coast through Langkat, Deli, and Serdang - the stronger the 
attraction. 
As to perennial-crop estates, the ministerial directive indicated 
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that the government expected a return of one third of the land, 
but no further guidelines could be given because no map had 
been submitted. Although AVROS (Algemeene Vereeniging van 
Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra, or General Association 
of Rubberplanters on Sumatra's East Coast) had confidential 
maps from all its members showing proposed partitions, the 
directors were withholding the information from the government 
in view of the sad experience of the tobacco plantation 
compames. 
The Minister of Agrarian Affairs went ahead nevertheless to 
stress the principles the state commission should follow in 
making recommendations on any land partition. First, all land 
clearly being utilized by the estates should, in the absence of an 
overriding public interest, remain with the estates. Even the con-
sideration of public interest was to be dropped wherever the 
estates had erected offices, factories, sheds (the fermentation, 
sorting, and packing sheds of the tobacco industry), company 
villages for estate laborers, and the like. But the estates should in 
principle be asked to relinquish land along major public highways 
not being permanently used by the estates as well as land on 
which the local people had constructed permanent dwellings. 
Land converted into sawah before 1950 was also to be excised 
fr om the estates. On the salient matter of future peasant needs, 
however, there was only a vague suggestion th at in the process of 
the land partition the population growth of the next fifty years 
be taken into account and adequate reserves set aside. The 
Minister avoided giving any hint as to whether this meant reserves 
for a normal population growth or for a highly accelerated one 
caused by the heavy influx of land seekers being directed to East 
Sumatra by political parties and their affiliated peasant unions. 
The planters objected especially to the reference to a shortening 
of the eight-year rotation and to the Minister's suggestion that 
the tobacco industry be required to conduct research to this end. 
Part Il of the ministerial directives dealt with land distribution 
to the autochthonous (rakyat penunggu) as well as the immigrant 
population and was therefore of special concern for the peasant 
uni on representatives of Section Il. Here, distribution of either 
swampy of deeply dissected steep terrain was ruled out, though 
the Minister also called for a study of the possibility of future 
land reclamation and development. Appeasement of the militant 
peasant leaders was even more pronounced in such ins truc ti ons as 
that resettlement of squatters should be kept to a minimum and 
orde red only when necessary; that, if relocation was unavoidable, 
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squatters should be sent only to places not too far from their 
present place of abode; and that no relocation should be under-
taken before the new sites we re prepared so that crops could be 
planted and huts erected without great expenditure of time and 
effort. Responding to the demands of the hard core of squatters 
who refused even to participate in a land lottery, the Minister 
authorized the postponement of any relocation of these people 
until af ter the cabinet would have acted on the state commis-
sion's findings and recommendations. All this understandably 
distressed the planters, but the most alarming instruction 
proposed an inquiry into possible financial contributions by the 
planters to resettlement projects.2 
The State Commzssz·on 's Procedure 
Basic elements of the working procedure adopted we re formal 
meetings (both plenary and sectional), informal exploratory dis-
cussions among individual members, visits to plantations or other 
relevant places to familiarize members with actual conditions, 
consultations wi th the governor and the heads of technical 
services involved in the agrarian problem, and, finally, the collec-
tion of such data as statistics and maps from plantations as weIl 
as from government offices. There was of course some modifica-
tion of procedure as work got underway. For example, emphasis 
shifted from the formal plenary and sectional meetings to the 
informal discussions variously arranged among planters' represen-
tatives, government officials, and peasant uni on spokesmen as it 
became apparent th at all substantive negotiation was taking place 
in the latter. A technical difficulty arose over preparation of a 
map to show the entire tobacco region between the Wampu and 
UIar rivers. One made for the state commission proved too small 
in scale to permit the discriminating delimitation of relatively 
sm all parcels of sawah or of kampong grounds and by the time 
large-scale maps on the scale of 1: 5000 or 1: 10000 could be 
completed most of the information on the fluid squatter situa-
tion had become outdated. Another modification was made 
when to its surprise the state commission, authorized only to 
make recommendations for subsequent governmental actions, 
found itself flooded with requests for specific action from the 
public (about 250 letters in the first two months alone). For the 
sake of good public relations, a subcommittee consisting of S.M. 
Tarigan of Section I and Kongsi Sembiring Depari of Section 11 
was appointed to handle this correspondence. 
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In terms of special interests, the nine members of Section I, 
which had been assigned the crucial problem of how to partition 
the concession lands between estates and local population, feU 
into three groups. The first consisted of the three govemment 
officials: chairman Subakti; vice-chairman Singgih; and Radja-
min, head of the Bureau of Land Use Planning in Medan. The 
second included the three spokesmen for plantation interests: R. 
Nolen, Chairman of AVROS, on behalf of the perennial-crop 
estates; E.M. Vorstman for the tobacco estates; and Abdul Djafar 
for the Govemment Estates Administration, or PPN. The third 
was made up of representatives of peasant organizations: S.M. 
Tarigan of the Sekretariat Bersama; Sjamsul Bahri of the STIl; 
and Abdul Kadir of the BPRP. Only the planters' spokesmen 
managed consistently to present a united front. Of the peasant 
organization representatives, Sjamsul Bahri of the anything but 
militant STIl defended the agrarian program of the Wilopo 
Cabinet, the Masyumi Party, and former Govemor Hakim, while 
S.M. Tarigan, leader of the Communist-aligned BTI and chief 
spokesman for the Sekretariat Bersama, strongly opposed the 
Masyumi policy, refused to accept any previous agreements, and 
would have welcomed nothing more than the total defeat of the 
planters. Knowing the latter was too much to hope for, Tarigan 
concentrated on wresting from the planters and govemment 
officials as many concessions as possible for the squatters. The 
autochthonous people's representative, Abdul Kadir, found him-
self between two fronts, the planters on one side and the 
immigrant groups organized by the militant BTI, Petani, and 
other peasant factions on the other. 
Disunity among the peasant organizations' leaders, which 
should have benefited the planters, was offset, however, by the 
open partisanship of vice-chairman Singgih. To the consternation 
of chairman Subakti, the vice-chairman acted the dual role of an 
official of the Department of Agrarian Affairs and first vice-
president of Petani in a way so biased and conspicuously on the 
side of Tarigan and the Sekretariat Bersama as to provoke 
Subakti to register a protest with Minister Hanafiah in Jakarta. 3 
The political affiliations of the members of the state com-
mission also proved of considerable significance. Five members 
(chairman Subakti, the three planters' representatives, and Radja-
min of the Ministry of Agriculture) professed no political party 
affiliation. Seven members belonged to parties backing the 
cabinet (the four representatives of the Sekretariat Bersama, the 
two representatives of the BPRP who belonged to the PRN, or 
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National People's Party, and Singgih, a member of PetanifPNI). 
Of the three remaining members all belonging to opposition 
parties, two were from STIIfMasyumi. Those backing the cabinet 
could afford neither the complete failure of the state commission 
nor a set of recommendations that would constitute a vindication 
of the previous cabinet's program, and the opposition saw that its 
interests lay in the confirmation of previous agreements rather 
than any drastic changes. The planters could, therefore, count on 
some opposition support in the defense of previously achieved 
agreements, making their position in Section I stronger than 
might otherwise have been expected, but theirs was a minority 
voice in plenary sessions on account of the composition of the 
membership of Section 11. 
Position Papers Submitted to the State Commission 
In the course of the four months that the state commission con-
ducted its meetings, important memoranda were submitted by 
the planters as weIl as by several peasant unions and by Radja-
min, the head of the Bureau of Land Use Planning in Medan. 
Quite understandably, the position papers reveal a great gap 
between the views held by the chief protagonists in the agrarian 
struggle. Whereas the planters used economic and legal arguments 
and avoided political reasoning, the spokesmen for the peasant 
uni ons of ten engaged in political arguments, but they we re by no 
means unanimous and thus did not present a solid front. Instead 
they were divided into three cam ps. The spokesmen for the 
autochthonous rural population were in a minority and found 
themselves strongly opposed by the other peasant leaders 
representing the immigrant element. The uni ons speaking for the 
non-autochthonous groups we re again divided into a moderate 
group defending Masyumi 's agrarian policy and Governor 
Hakim's program and the militant-radical group led by the 
spokesmen for the BTI and Petani. 
Plantation In dus try Statement 
Two weeks af ter the formal installation of the state commis-
sion, the two representatives of the plantation industry presented 
a statement of the industry's position built around a meticulous 
summary of the drawn-out negotiations with Indonesian author-
ities, statistics on the plantation industry's economic contribu-
tions to the commonweal, and a shrewdly argued brief for the 
continuation of its operations in the interest not only of its 
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stockholders but also of the Indonesian nation. 4 
Addressing the heart of the agrarian issue, a viabIe allocation of 
cultivable land between peasants and plantations, the statement 
courageously challenged the anti-planter members of the state 
commission with the declaration that na estate lands we re actual-
ly needed for peasant agriculture since other parts of North 
Sumatra possessed an adequate supply of idle soils. The planters 
nevertheless stood ready to partition their estates according to 
the 1951 industry-government agreement in exchange for the 
promised new legislation ensuring a legal status for the planta-
tions. Coupled with the reaffirmation of the agreement was a dire 
warning of the irreparable economic damage any attempt at 
separate implementation of the two parts of the agreement 
would incur. 
Points made in the statement were accompanied by careful 
statistical support. Thus it was noted that since the province of 
North Sumatra con tained 12.5 million hectares and the industry 
controlled only 0.9 million hectares, counting both agricultural 
concessions and long leases, the industry held only 7 percent of 
the land. It was obviously a sly use of statistics to present estate 
holdings as a percentage of the total area of Tapanuli, Aceh, and 
East Sumatra. The figure for East Sumatra alone would have 
shown that the plantations accounted for 26 percent of the 
area - and made a much less persuasive argument for removal of 
the squatters. 
There were also statistics, given in relation to the mesmeric 7 
percent computation, to demonstrate the proportionately high 
contribution of the plantations to Indonesia's economy. Of the 
total North Sumatran population of 4.5 million, 12 percent or 
550,000 (laborers and their families) owed their livelihood 
directly to the plantations, and even more did indirectIy through 
such related business activity as trade, transportation to and from 
portside, and stevedoring. Estate agriculture, clearly, supported 
at least one-fourth of the North Sumatran population. To this 
must be added the benefit to the whole country of the plantation 
industry's foreign exchange earnings, which in 1952 amounted to 
approximately Rp. 1.94 billion or 18.6 percent of Indonesia's 
total Rp. 10.4 billion. Moreover , the industry paid in wages per 
year about Rp. 600 million excluding the costs of social services. 
In view of all these facts, the statement concluded, it was to 
everyone's advantage that the estates of North Sumatra, occupy-
ing so small a proportion of the total land area, be left intact as 
far as practicable. A true settlement of the agrarian issue meant 
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finding an integral solution to the problem of security for both 
peasant and plantation agriculture. Though concemed for the 
trampling of some individuals' rights, which even the most care-
fully conducted separation of estate and peasant land would 
entail, the directors of the plantation companies felt the state 
commission should look for a balance between the needs of the 
two sectors with allowance for the fact that the companies had 
already agreed (in the case of tobacco estates) or were prepared 
to agree (in the case of perennial-crop estates) to give up a large 
portion of their lands. Rational operations required, however, 
that every effort be made to move squatters located deep inside 
the remaining are as of the estates, at least to the fringe if not 
outside. 
The planters' statement contained a summary of the 1951 
govemment-industry agreement based on the report of I.J. 
Kasimo and Jusuf Muda Dalam to Parliament in which it was 
asserted that the planters could relinquish about 300,000 hec-
tares without jeopardizing their operations. Reference was then 
made to the draft "Act for the Reorganization of Land Use in 
East Sumatra" originally prepared by Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, 
Minister of Interior in the Sukiman Cabinet, but revised four 
times up to 1954 because of either cabinet changes or parliamen-
tary objections. This draft act called for (1) a reduction of the 
tobacco area from 255,000 to 125,000 hectares; (2) a reduction 
of the other crop areas by one-third, or about 180,000 hectares; 
(3) the granting of new agrarian rights for estates; and (4) protec-
tion of the planter by the penal code against violations of his new 
agrarian rights. As the statement noted, opposition to the draft 
law plus chaotic conditions in East Sumatra had led Minister 
Iskaq to issue his well-known decree of 28 June 1951, which was 
followed by the North Sumatran governor's decree of 28 Septem-
ber 1951. Meanwhile Governor Hakim, dissatisfied with the orig-
inal land division proposed by the planters had insisted on a re-
vision based on the principle that the planters let go: land along 
the major highways to a depth of 250 meters on each side; land 
already converted into sawah; and land already used or needed 
for an expansion of villages and towns. Commissions consisting 
of representatives of the civil service (pamong praja) , the 
planters, and the Office for the Execution of Land Distribution 
(KPPT) thereupon examined each plantation, taking cognizance 
not only of the governor's ruling but also of the existing squatter 
settlements and the future needs and interests of both local 
peoples and estates. The planters claimed that during these nego-
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tiations, on request of the pamong praja, 13,000 hectares of land 
in excess of the amount shown on the approved land division 
map had been relinquished where such land was especially weIl 
suited for future conversion into sawah, so that the tobacco in-
dustry no longer had 125,000 hectares but only 112,000 hectares 
for its operations. In return for this additional release the 
planters asked only for speedy resettlement of those squatters 
occupying any of the remaining 112,000 hectares. 
As to perennial-crop estates, the representatives recalIed th at in 
July 1952 AVROS had informed the government of its readiness 
to give up 180,000 hectares provided it would receive guarantees 
permitting a rational operation of the estates. The governor in a 
letter of 23 May 1953 had accepted this "land offer" of A VROS 
and since then preparations for the division had been going 
forward. 
Turning to the question of soil quality, the statement pointed 
out that some are as especially suited to tobacco cultivation had 
already been sacrificed in the interest of speeding a final agree-
ment and that further reduction of the tobacco area would 
seriously impair future operations. The planters took the stand 
that, except for minor adjustments for practical reasons, the 
tobacco land boundaries had been settled and the matter should 
be considered closed. The statement ended with a promise of 
loyal cooperation with the state commission in the search for a 
final solution of the long-standing agrarian issue. 
On 17 June 1954 the representative of A VROS submitted a 
second memorandum to the state commission. 5 It was pointed 
out that, besides such economic consequences of squatter-caused 
estate closings as a decline in production, a weakened market 
position, and the reduction of employment opportunities for the 
people, there were the less obvious but nevertheless damaging 
effects of illegal squatting on soils and drainage systems. Land 
occupied during the war and postwar periods had of ten been 
abandoned by the squatters because the soil had become com-
pletely exhausted. Only heavy applications of fertilizer and the 
repeated plowing under of green manure crops could restore 
these soils to use for the raising of tobacco. Estates forced to 
plant insufficiently regenerated soils found both yield and 
quality of their tobacco disappointing. Furthermore, the con-
tinua! cultivation of maize had caused heavyerosion, with 
resultant damage to the drainage ditches, so essentia! for the 
cultivation of tobacco and constructed at great expense by the 
companies. In other instances the construction of improperly 
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designed lrngation had caused serious damage to standing crops 
and interfered with estate operations. Still another impediment 
to efficient estate management was the scattered location of 
squatter holdings, which broke up the large crop areas needed for 
optimum use of men and equipment. This was particularly true 
in the sisal industry, where production had declined from an 
annual prewar total of 60,000 tons to about 18,000 tons and lcft 
factory capacity only partially utilized. 
The memorandum went on to analyze the differing types of 
squatters - estate laborers, native villagers, and recent im-
migrants. The estate laborers had originally acquired temporary 
rights to garden plots during the wartime food shortage and af ter-
ward refused to return, and even expanded, these holdings. To 
cIassify estate laborers as farmers was to confuse their primary 
occupation as laborers with their private cultivation of iIlegaIly 
held estate land. For practical reasons it was undesirable that 
laborers engage in private farming for this meant divided energy 
and therefore lowered efficiency on the estate. 
Not until the evil of ilIegal occupation of estate land by 
laborers and immigrants had assumed great dimensions did the 
local villagers begin to fear a land shortage and to grab es ta te 
lands adjacent to their kampongs. The local villagers were also 
guilty of abandoning their own exhausted soil for estate lands, 
repeating there the process of soil exploitation. 
As to the third group of squatters, the memorandum directed 
attention to the ever growing hordes of migrants streaming from 
the Karo highlands and Tapanuli to East Sumatra. Their 
"nomadic wasteful land exploitation" exhausted dry land in a 
short time and "seriously disturbed the agro-social structure of 
East Sumatra". The implication stood out cIearly that, whereas 
Javanese estate laborers and local villagers were integral parts of 
the social order of East Sumatra, the Batak immigrants were 
intruders. 
Statement of the Joint Secretariat of Peasant Organizations 
To supply their own perspective to their position, the peasant 
organizations opened their statement with a lengthy review of 
the agrarian issue from before the war through the immediate 
postwar period. 6 The common people of East Sumatra, it 
observed, had had to struggle with agrarian difficul ties ever since 
the opening of the estates. They had lost a great deal of their 
land and had been pushed to the banks of the rivers, to the coast 
and up into the foothills. This had led to a decline in the 
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productivity of smallholder agriculture, The difficulties which 
confronted East Sumatra were a heritage of the colonial period. 
Now th at Indonesia had become a free country, the planters, as 
guests of that country, must bring their point of view into line 
with the changing times. 
There followed some specific proposals. First, the tobacco 
industry should release additional land both because shortening 
of the rotation period from eight to five years, as scientific 
research had shown was possible, would decrease the area needed 
and because the 130,000 hectares of land released under the 
1951 agreement were unsuitable: 45,000 hectares lay in swampy 
or deeply dissected areas, another 45,000 would require ex-
tensive and costly preparation for smallholder use, 20,000 
belonged to decades-old kampongs, and the remaining 20,000 
were by and large already occupied by farmers. Nor was the 
perennial-crop estates' offer of 180,000 hectares acceptable. The 
Sekretariat Bersama considered the area actually cultivated by 
these estates before World War 11 more than enough for their 
continued operation and all other holdings should be released. 
Several proposals in the concluding section went considerably 
beyond previous arrangements, notably, that every farmer receive 
either 2 hectares of dry land or 1 hectare of irrigated plus half a 
hectare of dry land and that the classification "Buruh Tani 
Ladang" be dropped; that there be no relocations outside the 
kecamatan; that the estates transfer to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Works Department the land on both sides of public roads 
to a total depth of 1,000 meters, including the road itself and, 
outside the tobacco region, old, no longer productive stands of 
perennial crops; and that the people be granted permission to 
construct irrigation canals across planted estate lands. 
These and the remaining proposals on the type and magnitude 
of the government's financial and other support to farmers who 
had to accept resettlement were possibly negotiable, but the 
planters immediately challenged the contention that the tobacco 
rota ti on could be safely reduced and demanded scientific proof. 
Their own research station, staffed with highly qualified 
scientists, had spent large sums of money on the problem and so 
far had found no evidence th at the rotation could be reduced 
without significant losses in yield and quality. 
The planters conceded that the rota ti on could be shortened 
from eight to seven years if the jaluran system we re abolished, 
but Tarigan, the peasant organizations' spokesman, rejected such 
a step. Though neither Tarigan nor any other member of Section 
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I could disprove the defense argument of the tobacco planters, a 
political solution was reached in a compromise formula, a proviso 
calling for automatic additional reduction of the area reserved for 
the tobacco industry should future research prove the safety of a 
shortening of the tobacco rotation despite the continuation of 
the jaluran system. Section I debated with similar tenacity the 
pending reduction of the area held by perennial-crop estates. 
Unsatisfied with their offer to release 180,000 hectares, Tarigan 
demanded that an upper limit of 345,000 hectares of planted 
area plus the necessary "tara" lands needed for roads, settle-
ments, and the like be set for the perennial-crop estates. This the 
planters rejected, maintaining firmly that the decision as to what 
was needed for rational economic operations belonged to the 
estates. It was not a matter for bargaining and was unaffected by 
Tarigan 's argument that one-third of the estate area amounted to 
220,000 hectares rather than 180,000. Once more an impasse, 
followed by informal discussions leading to the following com-
promise formulation: 
"The state commission starts with the assumption that one-third 
of the estate area is to be returned, but it accepts the planters' 
voluntary offer of 180,000 hectares. However, should this offer 
of 180,000 hectares not provide a solution, then ... the area to 
be returned shall be increased to one-third of the present estate 
area with the proviso that the entrepreneurs receive public 
domain land of the same size as compensation. "7 
Statement of the Autochthonous People 
The Council for the Struggle of the Autochthonous People 
(BPRP), represented by Abdul Kadir and Kongsi Sembiring 
Depari, spiritedly defended the special interests and claims of the 
autochthonous people, whose ancestors had been virtually the 
only population element in East Sumatra at the time of the 
arrival of the planters. The descendants argued, understandably, 
that their agrarian rights, based on adat law, should take 
precedence over the "purely politically inspired" claims of im-
migrants and their descendants (whether from other parts of 
Sumatra, from Java or Borneo, or from China or India) who had 
come to East Sumatra in search of employment offered by the 
planters. The Council then proceeded to issue a so-called Public 
Declaration (Keterangan Umum) which tlatly stated their 
opposition to a policy of demanding the return of estate lands to 
the populace so long as Indonesia stood in need of foreign 
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capital, pointing out that a drastic reduction in estate-operated 
lands would cause heavy losses for plantation companies and, in 
turn, for the state treasury.8 There was, for example, the tes-
timony of agricultural experts that the tobacco soils of East 
Sumatra were the best in the world, capable of producing far 
greater per-hectare returns of foreign exchange than land in any 
other part of Indonesia. The Council expressed the further fear 
that the compulsory return of plantation land would actually 
aggravate the land shortage for the local peasantry because of the 
resultant in flux into the tobacco region of villagers coming from 
outside the region (i.e. from Tapanuli). 
The current agrarian debate, the statement argued, was simply 
a continuation of the conversion debate, interrupted by World 
War 11 and the japanese invasion, which sought a change of the 
agrarian base from that of an agricultural concession to a long 
lease for the land remaining in the possession of the plantation 
entrepreneurs. The latter justifiably felt conversion offered the 
only practical safeguard against an accelerating shrinkage of 
their holdings due to their obligations to the local population. 
These obligations, accepted by the planters under the old con-
tracts, called for the release every five years of enough additional 
parcels of land, i.e. 4 bouw or 4 hectares, to meet the increase in 
the number of households with legitimate agrarian claims. 
Admittedly the prewar conversion negotiations had bogged down 
because the planters offered the former mIers only land in 
remote locations or of poor quality, but to settle now for an 
over-all handling of the agrarian issue might result in violation of 
the autochthonous population's customary rights. The Council 
therefore insisted on the fulfillment of the legal obligations of 
the planters to the local population prior to a partition of the 
land between planter and government and prior to the issuance 
of any new agrarian rights by the government to the planters. 
As to the objection by the radical peasant and labor leaders 
that this amounted to preferential treatment, the statement 
noted that the various regions of Indonesia all had their custom-
ary agrarian laws and that East Sumatra did not differ in this 
respect from Tapanuli or the Minangkabau region. Furthermore, 
there was no better proof of the existence of a long-standing and 
time-honored adat concerning land than the provisions of the 
model contracts of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s. It would indeed 
have been unnecessary to include restrictions in these contracts 
for the protection of the rights of the autochthonous population 
had there not existed a set of customary laws pertaining to land. 
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With the deposition of the sultans, the government had become 
arbiter of the legitimate righ ts of the planters as weIl as of the 
local population and so had the obligation to see that, whatever 
action was taken in view of the changing times and the new social 
order, "the local people who have agrarian rights testified tq by 
the model contracts were not harmed". 
In addition to the Public Declaration, the Council for the 
Struggle of the Autochthonous People on 24 June submitted a 
set of specific demands divided into two groups, one applicable 
to the tobacco estates and the other to the perennial-crop estates, 
as summarized here: 
l. Claims Applying to Tobacco Estates 
l. kampong areas must be at least three times the size of the 
land actually occupied by the kampong proper; 
2. each family must be given its four bouw of land; 
3. jaluran rights must be in force in the future; 
4. kampongs of the autochthonous people may not be trans-
ferred to new si tes; wherever possible the land to be given to 
the villagers will be adjacent to the kampongs and will form 
belts connecting adjacent kampongs with each other; 
5. the land to be assigned to the autochthonous population 
must be located on a road; 
6. no differentiation must be made between autochthonous 
people living within or outside the plantation to whose land 
they have claims; 
7. the autochthonous population is to receive material and 
financial aid in order to be able to practice modern agri-
culture; a special cooperative is to be established for the 
autochthonous population; 
8. the autochthonous population refuses to accept cancellation 
of its customary agrarian rights unless the same principle 
applies to all parts of Indonesia; 
9. should autochthonous elements of the population have to be 
relocated they must receive the same treatment as all other 
peoples subject to resettlement; 
10. in districts which lack jaluran parcels and in which the four 
bouw have not yet been allocated, the autochthonous people 
must be given potential swidden land (tanah rabz"an) for the 
production of rice and other crops. 
II. Claz"ms Applying to Perennial-Crop Estates 
Before returning land to the government, entrepreneurs must 
first satisfy the claims of the autochthonous population; in par-
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ticular, they must provide adequate amounts of land for 
kampongs together with 4 bouw per claimant family. The 
autochthonous people also demanded: 
1. that their kampongs not be transferred to new sites; 
2. that the location of the kampongs be taken into consideration 
in the choice of the land to be returned; 
3. th at the 4 bouw claimed per family must be adjacent and 
contiguous to the kampong so that the latter is not separated 
from the crop land; 
4. th at this land be well-suited for smallholder agriculture and be 
located on an all-weather road; 
5. that the planters pay compensation for fruit trees belonging to 
the villages but located on estate land. 
The views and demands of the autochthonous population were 
strongly opposed by the militant labor and squatter elements in 
the state commission, who accused the spokesmen of being 
"feudal" in their outlook and of betraying the spirit of the revo-
lutionary struggle. Af ter lengthy debate on their demands, the 
plenary session of 7 May passed the following resolution: 
"The autochthonous population will receive the same treatment 
as the rest of the population in accordance with Article 6 of the 
Ministerial Guidelines, which reads as follows: 'In the selection of 
land to be set aside for plantation agriculture one must always 
reckon with land reserves capable of: 
a. absorbing the population growth of about 50 years, i.e., the 
maximum duration of agrarian rights grantable to a plantation; 
b. satisfying the agrarian rights of the autochthonous and other 
Indonesian people with equal claims.' The discussion regarding 
the agrarian problem of the autochthonous population will not 
be continued sin ce this issue will be turned over to the central 
government. "9 
Statement of the Bureau of Land Planning 
The state commission benefited greatly from the memorandum 
prepared by Radjamin, the head of the Bureau of Land Planning 
and a member of the commission. 10 In a rather detached 
academic manner Radjamin examined the historical background 
of the agrarian problem, which he called "a burning issue" on 
account of its implications for security, state finances, and public 
welfare. The present situation, he reminded his colleagues, could 
be understood only if one knew the past. Here is an abridgment 
of his remarks: 
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At the time of the arrival of the first planters East Sumatra was 
mostly virgin forest land with a very small population, so that 
concessions could be granted everywhere once it had been 
recognized that the soils we re very fertile. Quickly East Sumatra 
developed into a plantation region of great repute both within 
and beyond the boundaries of Indonesia. Applications for agri-
cultural concessions and hereditary leases came in so fast that 
within a few decades East Sumatra was turned into one great 
continuous plantation belt. lts plantations bordered on each 
other so that the agricultural land of the local peasantry was 
squeezed between estates or was located within estates. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century the land not belong-
ing to plantations consisted of coastal swamps - which could not 
be brought under cultivation by the peasant population although 
the soils were known to be fertile - and mountain slopes. The 
population increased due to the importation of hundreds of 
thousands of laborers; a network of good roads and railroads 
criss-crossed the plantation region; harbors were developed; 
offices and hospitals we re constructed; and in a few places towns 
and cities arose. All of this brought East Sumatra in as sharp a 
contrast with other neighboring regions as that between night 
and day. lt is, therefore, not at all surprising that the population 
of the neighboring regions began to migrate to East Sumatra in 
search of employment on the estates. 
The local population was incapable of producing adequate 
quantities of rice, so that it became necessary to import rice from 
abroad, especially from Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, and in 
small quantities from Aceh and Tapanuli. 
During World War 11 the estates did not operate; and many 
people lost their source of income. The links with foreign 
countries were interrupted; communications with Aceh and 
Tapanuli became difficult. All of this meant a critical food 
shortage which could be met only by an increase in local food 
production for which estate lands we re used. Not a single author-
ity attempted to stop this, and many who had never engaged in 
food production now raised their own foodstuff in order to 
SUTVlVe. 
Af ter the transfer of sovereignty the migration to East Sumatra 
increased greatly and led to large-scale squatting on estate lands, 
since the bulk of the immigrants had no special skills and thus 
could only en gage in farming. 
The situation can be summed up: 
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1. the plantation region represents the best developed part of 
East Sumatra; 
2. the majority of the population of East Sumatra lives within 
the plantation region; 
3. employment opportunities and social services are better in 
the plantation region than in surrounding areas; 
4. the plantation region therefore greatly attracts people from 
the outside, most of whom are only able to make their living 
as small peasants; 
5. the prosperity within the plantation region is to be attrib-
uted to the estates; the plantation region represents an im-
portant source of in co me for the government; 
6. the plantations have the best geographic location and are the 
largest agricultural enterprises, but not all of their land is 
actually under cultivation - they are holding large reserve 
areas; 
7. the holdings of the peasants are very small and are located 
between the plantations and have no possibilities for ex-
pansion; the reserve lands of the smallholders are far distant 
from the villages and cannot be developed by these pro-
ducers without aid; 
8. although the plantation region is prosperous in many 
respects, it suffers from a food shortage and depends upon 
foreign sources as weIl as South Aceh and North Tapanuli; 
9. since plantations cannot operate in peace and their laborers 
too become squatters in order to gain their livelihood, the 
squatter problem grows in magnitude and harms the state 
severely; 
10. on the whole the people prefer to be smallholder peasants 
and part-time wage laborers rather than full-time laborers. 
All these points must be taken into consideration in the search 
for a solution of the agrarian problem of East Sumatra. Obvious-
ly the interests of the peasantry cannot be ignored and pushed 
aside; instead the peasants must be given adequate amounts of 
agricultural land. This is possible if the plantations are reduced in 
size without endangering their economic future and the un-
utilized lands of the public domain are developed. In the neigh-
borhood of the plantation belt are extensive cultivable areas of 
public land provided the land can be drained. Some 20,000 hec-
tares of swamp land can be converted into irrigated rice fields. 
Provided that these lands are opened up by good roads they will 
be in great demand since the soils are as fertile as those of the 
plantations. Once the new lands are properly opened up and 
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easily accessible the land-hungry peasants wiIl not object to 
resettlement. All of this requires large expenditures which, how-
ever, would seem weIl justified. 
This procedure can be applied to the squatters already on 
plantation land, but this probably will not solve the problem, 
since the land thus freed of squatters will promptly be occupied 
illegally by new immigrants. This highly irregular migration must 
be brought to a halt - not by means of a law or a set of regula-
tions but through the development of new agriculturallands in 
the districts from which the migrants come. 
Only large-scale opening of potential agriculturalland in and on 
the fringe of the plantation region could lead to a satisfactory 
solution of the agrarian problem regarding the future of the plan-
tation lands. 
There are then two aspects of a successful program: 
1. Open up new agricultural projects (both irrigated and un-
irrigated land) on land either retumed by planters or, coming 
from the public domain, provide them with roads, and 
reserve them for peasants who are squatting on plantation 
lands which are to remain under the control of the planters. 
2. Simultaneously open up agricultural projects, involving both 
irrigated and unirrigated land, in the areas surrounding the 
plantation region so as to prevent a new influx of migrants. 
Only the simultaneous execution of these two measures will 
solve the squatter problem, create economie peace and order in 
the highly disturbed plantation region, and at the same time 
balance the well-developed sec ti ons of East Sumatra with the 
presently Ie ss developed distriets within and on the borders of 
the residency. 
This memorandum and recommendations of Radjamin 's, which 
of course delighted the planters, received full discussion in the 
plenary session of 26 July and his specific two-point program was 
adopted with the proviso, insisted on by the representatives of 
laborers and squatters, th at the development projects start on 
lands to be retumed by the planters. 
Statement of the Sarikat Tani Islam Indonesia (STIl) 
The Masyumi peasant organization, STIl, predictably followed 
the policy laid down by the Wilopo Cabinet and implemented by 
Govemor Hakim. lts position paper accepted all previous agree-
ments and arrangements and made no new demands, thus placing 
the STIl in opposition not only to most other peasant organiza-
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tions of East Sumatra but also of course to the agrarian policy of 
the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. 11 
Van der Molen 's Report on the Squatter Situation in the 
Tobacco Area 
In response to a request in April from Abdul Djafar, K. van der 
Molen, head of the agrarian section in the United Deli Company, 
submitted a memorandum dated 3 May 1954 on the extent of 
squatting in the tobacco region, particularly changes in the situa-
tion between mid-1953 and 20 April 1954. Such a report, Van 
der Molen began, was made extremely difficult by the fluidity of 
the squatter situation, which changed so rapidly as to out date 
statistical data even as these we re being collected. 12 Furthermore, 
though plantation personnel could count dwellings, the number 
of squatters remained unascertainable since several families might 
share a dwelling and the uncooperative or even openly hostile 
attitude of most squatters toward being counted made actual 
entry to check nearly always inadvisable. Even where circum-
stances did allow a determination of the true number of squat-
ters, the count was still likely to be unreliable because squatters 
quite of ten occupied several parcels of land under different 
names. 
Van der Molen reasoned, moreover, that the actual number of 
squatters reflected neither the magnitude of the agrarian problem 
nor the bona fide land requirements of the squatters. Many 
squatters did not support themselves and their families exclus-
ively as cultivators but were working either full time or part time 
in such capacities as estate laborers, dock workers in Belawan 
harbor, clerks for private companies, employees of government 
agencies, and small traders. Such squatters gravitated to estates 
ne ar major urban centers, the good roads there permitting daily 
commutation to their place of employment. One might re gard 
them as "part-time squatters". Registration of squatters without 
careful probing into their background and economic activities 
therefore could not possibly provide an accurate picture of their 
land needs. (While the Sekretariat Bersama wanted equal treat-
ment for all squatters, the planters defended the early practice of 
classification of squatters into true farmers and those who 
depended upon farming only as a supplementary source of in-
come.) 
Van der Molen pointed out that large portions of the tobacco 
lands released in 1951, including are as suited for the develop-
ment of sawah projects, remained unused or only partly used, 
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while estate lands continued to be held by squatters. Land that 
had been lying fallow for many years and was therefore covered 
by second-growth forest held far less appeal than land on estates 
still in operation, with their well-maintained roads and bridges. 
Above all, the estates themselves offered opportuni ties for 
occasional employment - such as the setting up of market stalIs 
for the sale of snacks, coffee, soft drinks, and cigarettes. The 
estate labor force, furthermore, provided a market for farm 
products. In short, the squatters preferred to live on a plantation 
in full operation rather than on one which had been closed for 
years, and this eXplained why for the United Deli Company alone 
tbe squatter area had increased about 10 percent between 28 
August 1953 and 1 May 1954. 
Report of the State Commz·ssz·on 
Several times as the weeks passed the fate of the state commis-
sion hung by a thread, but because no one wanted to bear 
responsibility for failure of the discussions, deadlock was assidu-
ously avoided. The resultant prolongation of the sessions ruled 
out completion of the agenda by 10 May 1954, necessitating an 
extension of the state commission 's authority for th ree months 
- one month being the fasting month (puasa) during which by 
common consent there would be no meetings. Thus the state 
commission did not complete its work until 10 August, almost a 
year af ter its establishment, but there had been an impressive 
total of twelve plenary sessions, twenty-six Section I sessions, 
and fourteen Sec ti on 11 sessions, plus the many informal 
meetings. Vice-Chairman Singgih left for Jakarta soon thereafter 
to dra ft the final report while the other members, with varying 
degrees of apprehension, sat back to await the result. 13 
Copies of the draft report reached members on Saturday 2 
October together with a memorandum calling for a plenary 
session the following Monday to give Singgih forma! approval of 
the draft before his return to Jakarta on Tuesday 5 October. This 
attempt to rush the report through brought vigorous protests 
from all quarters and forced Singgih to accept a compromise 
whereby members were given a week to draft and forward to 
Singgih in Jakarta their comments, a delay subsequently 
stretched to cover two additional plenary sessions on 20 October 
and 12 November. 
Singgih's first chapter, a long historica! essay, drew protests 
from the planters' representatives on grounds of both pertinence 
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and accuracy. Arguing that agrarian history had not been an 
important subject of the discussions and had not been called for 
by the cabinet, the planters' representatives suggested the chapter 
be made a part of the appended material and clearly attributed to 
its author, so that the commission did not have to share in the 
responsibility. Agreeing to a few revisions, Singgih was neverthe-
less unwilling to transfer the essay to the appendix, his only 
concession being the addition of a preface in which inclusion of 
this material in the body of the report was defended and the 
admission made that the decision had not been unanimously 
approved by the members. 
The second, third, and fourth chapters drew few objections, 
being more or less routine reviews of, respectively, the agrarian 
situation as of 27 August 1953, the formal establishment of the 
commission, and its procedure and accomplishments (the latter 
with special reference to concurrent standfast changes, see 
below). 
There was considerable debate, however, over the last two 
chapters, "Results of the Commission" and "Short Summary of 
the Recommendations and Suggestions of the State Commis sion 
for the Partition of the Estate Lands of East Sumatra". First of 
all, the planters were startled to find in the draft report some 
recommendations by Section 11 which, though clearly bearing on 
estate interests, had never been brought before Section I. Two of 
these stirred particularly strong protests, viz. one that squatter 
resettlement be limited to only 2,000 families the first year and 
the other that the estates assume half the resettlement costs. 
Abdul Djafar pointed out that, taking the common estimate of 
86,000 squatter families, the proposed annual limit on resettle-
ments would put off for decades any final solution of the 
supposedly urgent land problem and could therefore only be 
interpreted as an irresponsible delay tactic. As for the estates 
paying half of all costs, estimated at about 8 million rupiah per 
one thousand families, Abdul Djafar expressed shock that so 
momentous a recommendation for the planters had not been 
discussed or even mentioned in any Section I or plenary session. 
Nolen and Vorstman voiced similar objections to the two recom-
mendations in their strongly worded formal protest, which was 
submitted to Singgih with the request that it be included in the 
final report. The planters' statement was buried in the appendix. 
Little else in the draft report could be considered a surprise. 
Below is a summary of the recommendations made byeach of 
the two sections: 
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Section I. Since the principal task of this section was the land 
division, for which there already existed a basis for agreement, its 
recommendations were fewer in number than those of Section Il. 
Succeeding only in part in their tenacious defense of previously 
reached agreements, the planters finally acceded to a formulation 
that additional land would be released by the plantations if sub-
sequent practical implementation of the partition and resettle-
ment program proved that squatters qualifying for land could not 
be taken care of within the limits of the land area originally 
released by the planters. Such an eventuality was made accept-
able to the planters by the promise of compensation in the form 
of new lands to be taken from the public domain. 
The remaining recommendations related to such matters as a 
new registration of the squatter population with classification 
into genuine farmers and non·farmers; formation of strong 
farming communities; concentration of the squatter population 
wherever possible in compact villages; and proper coordination of 
population transfers with adequate land preparation and other 
support programs to be suggested by Section Il. 
Section Il. Except for the very troublesome issue of the special 
demand of the autochthonous population (disposed of, as noted 
earlier, by formally referring responsibility to the Jakarta govern-
ment), there was little disagreement among the representatives of 
the peasant organizations who made up this section. Their only 
concern was the coordination of their demands for more land 
and generous government support of squatters subject to resettle-
ment. The most important of the Section Il recommendations 
were: limitation of first-year resettiement to 2,000 families; a 
careful selection of land for resettlement projects; adequate com-
pensation for the loss of immovables; payment of all costs re sult-
ing from the resettlement; granting of a moving subsidy of 
Rp. 1,500 per family; clearing and other preparation of the land 
prior to the arrival of displaced families; speedy issuance of 
agrarian rights to land assigned to former squatters; construction 
of roads and bridges to make the new settlement sites accessible; 
provision of agricultural implements, seed fertilizer, and credit; 
provision of such social services as schools; and construction of 
mosques and village community centers. Section Il also recom-
mended the development of irrigation projects on former estate 
lands as weIl as on public domain lands both within and outside 
East Sumatra in the neighboring parts of the province of North 
Sumatra so as to forestall further migration to East Sumatra. 
In concluding the report, Singgih claimed that the state com-
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mission in the five months of its work had calmed the growing 
unrest among the squatters of East Sumatra, provided a welcome 
opportunity for joint consultations between planters and 
peasants, and fostered mutual contacts and a better understand-
ing among peasant organizations. Not everyone agreed as 
approval of the draft was forwarded reluctantly to Jakarta and 
the report finally presented to the cabinet in December 1954. 14 
The planters, for example, felt that the generous support 
program would only lead to additional invasions by new squat-
ters acting in the hope that they too would be granted the same 
benefits. This pessimism was based above all on developments 
since 27 August 1953 and on the vacillating handling of standfast 
orders in East Sumatra. 
Standfasts and Their Enforcement 
Theoretically, all instances of unauthorized occupation of estate 
lands should have led to legal prosecution according to Ordinance 
No. 110 of 1948, an ordinanee which had been reaffirmed in the 
Joint Statement of the Wali Negara of East Sumatra and the 
Military Commander on 22 May 1950 and which the government 
had not yet been able to replace with a parliamentary law to the 
same effect. By 1953, however, civil authorities, police officials, 
public prosecutors, and judges had become most reluctant to 
enforce a "coloniallaw". 
The agrarian issue took a different political direction, however, 
with the creation of the state commission and on 27 August 
1953 the central government declared a standfast, applicable to 
both planters and peasants, to stabilize the situation until its 
recommendations were in. It soon became apparent th at the 
militant wing of the peasant organizations intended to ignore the 
new standfast. As the organized invasions of estate lands 
followed one af ter another in late 1953 and early 1954, AVROS 
sent repeated letters of protest with lists of standfast violations 
to the district and provincial authorities, including the governor, 
as weIl as to the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. 15 The squatters 
obviously no longer feared prosecution and in fact regularly com-
mitted illegal acts under the very eyes of the police and the civil 
service officials. The planters we re not only losing their land but 
their confidence in the government's ability to solve the land 
problem fairly. As Nolen kept stressing in his letters to govern-
ment officials, the unprohibited and unpunished violation of the 
rights of third parties was causing general demoralization, was 
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daily compounding the difficulty of finding a quick solution to 
the land problem, and, certainly not to be overlooked, was 
endangering an important sector of the economy. 
On 1 March 1954 Nolen appealed to the Attorney General for 
help, explaining that the provincial authorities had claimed to be 
unable to act. 16 Possibly in response to this and other letters of 
this nature, or because of ins truc ti ons from Jakarta, the governor 
issued a proclamation on 19 March 1954 17 which reconfirmed 
the standfast of 27 August 1953 and ordered squatters who had 
violated this standfast to vacate the estate lands by 26 March 
1954 or face arrest and legal prosecution, while squatters whose 
illegal entry of estate grounds predated 27 August 1953 received 
permission to remain awaiting the outcome of the deliberations 
of the state commission just installed on 10 March 1954. As 
could have been predicted, the proclamation reconfirming the 
standfast of 27 August 1953 brought a storm of protests from 
BTI and from Petani as weIl as from the Sekretariat Bersama. 
Under the impact of these protests the governor weakened and 
issued another proclamation on 6 April 195418 th at gave the 
standfast violators until 20 April 1954 to vacate estate land. 
Apparently nothing happened during the following two weeks, 
but on 20 April a delegation of the Sekretariat Bersama 
presented the governor with new demands, to which the governor 
again acceded by extending the evacuation date by one month 
for all those squatters who had violated the standfast before 31 
December 1953 to all ow the harvest of their crops. The governor 
also agreed to order the release of all those who had been ar-
rested because of violation of the standfast but not yet tried in 
court and to provide government aid in the form of land, use of 
tractors, and transport as weIl as financial support up to 
Rp. 150,000. To cap its triumph, the Sekretariat Bersama was 
th en given the right to name half the members of a special com-
mittee set up under the chairmanship of Bupati Tengku Hanafiah 
to supervise the resettlements. Governor Amin's capitulation to 
the militant wing of the peasant movement provoked highly 
critical editorials in such Medan newspapers as Lembaga, Mimbar 
Umum, Mestika, and Tangkas. 
Before Tengku Hanafiah's committee had had a chance to 
make much progress with its assignment, the cabinet issued 
Emergency Law No. 8/1954, effective 12June 1954, in an effort 
to stabilize the situation and put the search for a "solution of the 
problem of use of estate lands by the people" on a national 
rather than local level. The new law, signed by the Ministers of 
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Agrarian Affairs, Agriculture, Economic Affairs, Intemal Affairs, 
and Justice, authorized the Minister of Agrarian Affairs to 
appoint negotiators - govemors, other officials, or commissions 
as dictated by circumstances - to arrange agreements between 
estate owners and squatters in all land conflicts existing as of 12 
June 1954. The planters noted a welcome firmness in the stipula-
tions that unauthorized use of estate land occurring af ter 12 June 
1954 would not qualify for negotiation and any new squatter 
would be subject to a prison term of up to three months or a 
maximum fine of Rp. 500. It was also reassuring to read that 
agreements reached by negotiation would be legalized by a joint 
decree of the five ministers with the same penalties set for the 
violation of any provision of such a decree. Furthermore, both 
new squatters and violators of a decree were to have 14 days 
from the time of sentencing to vacate land before being evicted 
"by the strong arm". But the law also provided that, in cases 
where a party refused to enter negotiations or where negotiations 
ended in deadlock, the official or the commission concerned was 
to propose an independent solution to the five ministers for 
legalization by decree, an imposed solution being treated the 
same as a negotiated agreement. 
One question left unanswered by the new law was how viol-
ators of the East Sumatra standfast of 27 August 1953 should be 
handled. Should the committee of Tengku Hanafiah resettle 
them? On 5 July 1954 the representative of A VROS requested 
the Minister of Agrarian Affairs to uphold for East Sumatra the 
standfast of 27 August 1953, because the directors of A VROS 
feared that otherwise the prosecutors and judges of East Sumatra 
would refuse to handle squatter cases dating prior to 12 June 
1954. Minister Hanafiah, according to Nolen, agreed that viol-
ators of the 27 August 1953 standfast must be ejected and 
rejected Singgih's suggestion that the standfast for East Sumatra 
be changed to 12 June 1954. But Singgih is supposed to have 
persuaded Covernor Amin to issue a proclamation on 12 J uly 
195419 that set as the new standfast date 12 June 1954. Point 4 
of the proclamation stated th at resettlement actually in process, 
or resettlement of squatters who had agreed to move but had not 
yet begun, could be completed, provided the squatters concerned 
did not object. 
The proclamation of the governor came unexpectedly and 
meant a further setback for the planters and victory for the 
followers of BTI and Petani. Nolen protested in Medan as weIl as 
in Jakarta. The Minister of Agrarian Affairs was unwilling to 
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suggest a cancelling of the govemor's proclamation, particularly 
in view of the above mentioned point 4. Nolen's letter of protest 
to the govemor outlined the reasons why an enforcement of the 
standfast of 27 August 1953 was so important in the opinion of 
the planters: 20 
"According to my firm convlctlOn all areas illegally occupied 
between 27 August 1953 and 12June 1954 should be vacated in 
the interest of a satisfactory solution of the agrarian problem for 
the following reasons: 
1. The squatters involved are punishable, since they acted deliber-
ately and knowingly against expressed prohibitive enactments 
of the govemment which constitutes a serious violation of 
govemment authority; 
2. The authority of the central government and especially of the 
provincial govemment would be seriously harmed if those 
persons who did not obey the specific orders to vacate the 
squatted lands would be treated in the same way as law-obey-
ing ci tizens; 
3. The granting of protection to those who deliberately violate 
govemmental orders will have a demoralizing influence on 
govemment officials as weIl as on the population, so th at 
respect for Emergency Law No. 8 also cannot be expected; 
4. The confidence of the planters in a fair solution of the agrarian 
problem of East Sumatra will be seriously harmed inasmuch as 
they can point to explicit promises of the govemment and to 
loss of alllegal security because of a break of the promises; 
5. The work of the 'State Commission for the Division of the 
Estate Lands of East Sumatra' is based entirely on the situa-
tion as it existed on 27 August 1953 and should lose all mean-
ing should the date be altered. " 
Nolen referred also to his discussions of 5 July 1954 with 
Minister Hanafiah and repeated his argument th at Emergency 
Law No. 8 did for all of Indonesia what the cabinet's standfast 
order of 27 August 1953 did for East Sumatra alone: call a halt 
to continued illegal occupation pending the outcome of the work 
of the state commission. Nolen further pointed out that, accord-
ing to a high official of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, Or-
dinance No. 110 of 1948 had not been revoked. 
This letter was answered in the name of the govemor by Bupati 
Abdul Wahid Er, who outlined the reasons why the govemor had 
to reject the arguments against the change of the standfast date. 21 
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The bupati remarked that indeed Ordinance No. 110/1948 had 
not been revoked, but that it was now applicable only tO,land of 
the public domain, while estate lands were covered by Emer-
gency Law No. 8 of 1954 - an interpretation which gave addi-
tional food for pessimistic thought to the planters. 
By the end of 1954 the future looked rather dark for all sectors 
of the plantation industry of East Sumatra. The planters no 
longer had confidence in Governor Amin and we re apprehensive 
about further activities of Singgih, who in their opinion was con-
stantly playing into the hands of the Communist-linked BTI and 
their allies, the Petani. Above all the planters noticed with great 
concern th at the provincial authorities failed to enforce even the 
standfast of 12 June 1954, while that of 27 August 1953 was 
completely forgotten. This fact was not altered by another 
governor's proclamation of 2 December 195422, which specific-
ally warned squatters against the construction of permanent or 
semipermanent buildings, the planting of trees, and the conver-
sion of dry land into sawah and warned the planters against the 
cultivation of land which was still under dispute. The governor 
declared that such illegal acts would not be taken into consider-
ation in the final settlement of the dispute and would thus fail to 
strengthen the claims of the parties concerned. 
CHAPTER VI 
YEARS OF MOUNTING FRUSTRATION FOR THE PLANTER 
(1955-1956) 
The hopes for speedyaction by the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet 
on the recommendation of the state commission were not 
realized - in part due to a change in the cabinet. On 19 Novem-
ber 1954, shortly before the report of the commission was sub-
mitted to the cabinet, Minister for Agrarian Affairs Mohammad 
Hanafiah had been replaced by Gusti Gde Rake. Now a new 
minister had to familiarize himself with the thomy East Sumatra 
problem. 
In early February, Minister Gusti Gde Rake visited East 
Sumatra for a firsthand look at the squatter situation only to stir 
a controversy by forthrightly defending the agrarian claims of the 
indigenous population and then, in effect, expressing his dis-
approval of the state commission's rejection of demands by the 
rakyat penunggu for special consideration on the basis of their 
customary law. It was an open invitation to political attack for, 
with the notabIe exception of the National People's Party (PRN), 
there was near unanimity among political parties on the principle 
of equal treatment for all Indonesian citizens. Most vocal of 
course in assailing the new Minister's position were the immigrant 
groups, especially the javanese, the Toba Batak, and other ethnic 
groups which had moved to the East Coast of Sumatra, but 
editorials and letters to the editor in the Medan press sometimes 
reached a shrill partisan pitch too as the pros and cons of the 
issue were aired. The following summaries offer highlights of the 
debate: 
Lembaga (4 February 1955), a Masyumi-oriented paper which 
had supported Govemor Hakim in 1952 and 1953, used Gusti 
Gde Rake's statements as a welcome opportunity for a long 
editorial in defense of the special agrarian rights of the autoch-
thonous population. Certain groups known to be jealous guard-
ians of their own adat-based agrarian rights in their home terri-
tory did not care to take into consideration the status of the land 
in someone else's territory, the Lembaga editorial charged, 
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adding that "dark political agitation" was hampering all attempts 
to find a fair settlement of the issues. It further complained that 
autochthonous people presenting their legitimate claims were un-
fairly labeled provincialists and separatists. 
Pendorong (3 February 1955), speaking for the PKI and Com-
munist-oriented peasant unions, took the Minister severely to 
task for having come out in defense of the autochthonous 
population. The distinction between autochthonous and non-
autochthonous population was branded as a technique of the old 
colonial policy of divide and mIe - a distinction as alien to the 
farmers themselves as one based on religion or political convic-
tion. To argue historical right on the part of the rakyat penunggu 
was neither objective nor convincing and could lead only to 
greater discord. "It would be more tactical were the minister to 
draft a democratic national agrarian law which would be favor-
able to the farmers and would strengthen the position of our 
State than to rake up old questions which no longer represent a 
problem for our people." 
Mz'mbar Umum (4 February 1955), a paper speaking for the 
autochthonous population, interviewed Chief Justice Mahadi of 
the provincial court about his reaction to the Minister's remark. 
Mahadi, a native son of East Sumatra, was delighted with the 
Minister's statement and fully shared his view that the agrarian 
problem in general and the jaluran issue in East Sumatra were not 
to be handled casually and locally but required an integral exami-
nation for the whole of Indonesia. 
R. Tampubolon, chairman of Parkindo for the Kabupatan Deli-
Serdang, wrote a letter to the editor of Mimbar Umum (7 
February 1955) protesting Minister Gusti Gde Rake's criticism of 
the state commission for its failure to acknowledge the special 
agrarian rights of the local population. Tampubolon, a Toba 
Batak, defended his party's letter of 10 April 1954 asking the 
state commission to treat all elements of the population alike and 
called attention to the fact that not only had the jaluran system 
been abolished by the agreements of 1951 but the abolishment 
of the jaluran system had been confirmed specifically by the 
Govemor of North Sumatra in a letter dated 23 May 1952. 
Nolen called on the Minister during the latter's visit to Medan 
but was hardly given a chance to express his views. Instead, the 
Minister elaborated extensively on his own ideas, which Nolen 
found utopian: establishing compact village communities with 
good access roads to the main highways, beautiful houses, well-
stocked shops, barber shops, and the like. 1 The Minister became 
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lyrical in his description of the harmonious relationship there 
would be between lndonesian peasant and foreign planters. 
Nolen tried to bring the conversation "back to earth" by advert-
ing to the notoriously poor use of land by the practically 
"nomadic" East Sumatran farmer. Gusti Gde Rake paused just 
long enough to admit Nolen had touched on a possibly trouble-
some characteristic of the people and to instruct his secretary to 
forward a request for an increase in agricultural extension work 
to the Minister of Agriculture. 
The first real opportunity Nolen got to present the A VROS 
position was a question as to whether the planters were willing to 
make sacrifices in order to create adequate living conditions for 
the peasant population. Nolen forthwith recalled the planters' 
many cooperative actions - the return of over half of the former 
tobacco concessions, the local arrangements made by specific 
plantations, the financial assistance which the tobacco companies 
had given to the provincial government when Governor Abdul 
Hakim was in office - all representing sacrifices the planters 
willingly undertook on the government's pro mise of a permanent 
solution of the land issue. So far nothing had been done for the 
planters and even the proposed concentration of widely scattered 
squatters could provide a solution, Nolen explained, only if at 
the same time all new attempts at illegal squatting we re stopped 
energetically. The planters stood ready to cooperate with the 
government by making land available or, short of financial con-
tributions, byany other means consonant with their interests. 
Nolen was somewhat surprised to find, as the discussion shifted 
to the "jaluran issue", that Gusti Gde Rake appeared to re gard 
the jaluran rights as still valid on the basis of the concession 
agreements, though, as Nolen pointed out, the jaluran system had 
been discontinued with the partition of the tobacco lands in 
1951 - an interpretation accepted by the government in prin-
ciple despite annual ad hoc extensions at the request of pro-
vincial authorities. Nolen then brought up the matter of thc 
frequent violent clashes between the autochthonous population 
and groups of laborers and squatters, but Gusti Gdc Rake's only 
reaction was to remark that all th is would end if thc harvcstcd 
tobacco fields could bc distributcd quickly and without much 
fuss. Nolcn countcred that thc govcrnmcnt had usurpcd from thc 
planters thcir right of disposition over thc harvcstcd tobacco 
fields and compoundcd the abusc by distributing thc fields 
among pcoplc who, in thc cycs of thc planters, had no claims on 
this land. The planters would prcfcr that thc cxccutivc organs of 
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the govemment recognize their agrarian rights and let the validity 
of any claims be examined in court. To this the Minister retorted 
that it was the planters' duty to contribute to the solution of the 
postwar problems, adding that "many latent sentiments" were 
alive among the people. The thinly veiled anti-planter reference 
was not lost on Nolen, whose report reads: "In an angry mood I 
dropped this topic af ter I had called the Minister's attention to 
the fierce press reaction to his remarks about the superior land 
rights of the autochthonous population of East Sumatra".2 
The Minister then tumed to the Report of the State Commis-
sion, commenting that very little had been achieved for a year's 
work but the recommendations of Section I were good and 
should be carried out without delay. For his part, Nolen con-
cluded with one last reminder of the urgent need for a forceful 
stand against illegal squatters. 
An AVROS memorandum which Nolen had handed to Minister 
Gusti Gde Rake detailed incidents of destruction of plantation 
property between November 1954 and 4 February 1955 and 
cited as the reasons for persistenee of the squatter problem the 
time lag between a police report of illegal squatting and trial, the 
practice of allowing squatters to keep illegally occupied land 
pending trial, and the authorities' hesitant policy in dealing with 
organized mass invasions of estates by squatters. That the spread-
ing squatter problem had a demoralizing influence leading to 
serious cases of sabotage was substantiated with several recent 
examples of loss: on the Estate Bekalla of the United Deli Com-
pany no less than 40,000 newly planted rubber trees had been 
destroyed; on Estate Sungei Mangkei 1,500 newly planted oil 
palms and on Estate Tanjung Garbus no Ie ss than 8,000 young 
rubber trees had been uprooted from seed gardens; and elsewhere 
teak stands had been cut down and drainage systems, ruined by the 
construction of dams, had flooded out of con trol over estate lands. 
Nolen's report to AVROS characterized as "really disappointing" 
the Minister's vague promise of "a thorough investigation". 
Ever since the completion of the Report of the State Commis-
sion in November 1954 and its formal submission to the cabinet 
in December, the planters of East Sumatra had been on the look-
out for reactions and actions on the part of the govemment but 
so far, even from the visit of Minister Gusti Gde Rake in early 
February, it had proved impossible to find out anything. On 6 
April, J .E. Demper, the AVROS representative in Jakarta, had 
occasion during a visit in the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs to 
question Singgih about news on the agrarian issue. As his letter of 
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7 April to Medan reported, Demper could get Singgih to say only 
that the cabinet would probably accept the recommendations of 
the State Commission, and that the KPPT in Medan might be 
replaced by an agrarian office coming directly under the Ministry 
of Agrarian Affairs in Jakarta rather than under the Governor of 
North Sumatra. There was nothing in Singgih's remarks to in-
dicate early action. At the annual meeting of A VROS on 29 
April, Nolen gave his opinion that the general reticence of 
Singgih and other officials augured no important action until 
af ter the September elections and thereupon announced his 
departure for the Netherlands 30 April for consultations with the 
directors of the leading plantation companies. Nolen expected to 
be back in Sumatra by 20 May. 
Whether by coincidence or by design, the Ministry of Agrarian 
Affairs sprang its great surprise, a draft of a decree for redistribu-
tion of estate lands in East Sumatra, within days of Nolen's 
departure and set as the deadline for a final answer 20 May, the 
scheduled date of his return. It turned out th at Singgih had 
earlier been instructed by Minister Gusti Gde Rake to draft this 
decree for the solution of the agrarian problem on the basis of 
Emergency Law No. 8 inasmuch as without legal machinery all 
negotiations had failed. Singgih's draft incorporated most recom-
mendations of the State Commission. 
The just finished draft in hand, the Minister of Agrarian Affairs 
on May 3 appointed Singgih the representative of the government 
for the important assignment of presenting and securing approval 
of the decree draft in Medan by the 20 May deadline. At this 
point Singgih developed an intriguing strategy of timing and 
secrecy. Despite the early deadline he stayed in Jakarta until 9 
May, delayed the setting of a first meeting with peasants and 
planters until 11 May, but kept the agenda a deep secret. 
Demper, the AVROS representative in Jakarta, could not find 
out why Singgih was visiting Medan, nor could the acting chair-
man of A VROS elicit any information even in response to a 
direct questioning of Singgih upon the latter's arrival at the 
Medan airport. Not until Singgih opened the meeting did the 
participants learn why they had been called together. In a some-
what brusque manner Singgih distributed copies of the draft 
dec ree among the members of the State Commission, with 
Rozendaal and Van der Molen substituting for Nolen and Vorst-
man, also in Europe, with the announcement th at approval or 
disapproval must be in his hands within one week sa that their 
reply could be brought to the attention of the Minister by 20 
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May. In case both parties, planters and peasant unions, should 
approve the draft, the Minister intended to have it co-signed by 
the ministers of Agriculture, Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs, 
and Justice, and have it issued as a joint decree. In case of rejec-
tion the Minister would make use of Article 6 of the Emergency 
Law No. 8 and recommend issuance of the draft as a joint decree 
of the five ministers. It was obvious that the purpose of timing 
and secrecy was to give the planters as little time as possible to 
organize opposition. Singgih did not expect any difficulties from 
the si de of the peasant unions. 
What the startled participants at the 11 May meeting found 
before them was a decree draft which called for a drastic policy 
change. Minister Gusti Gde Rake and Singgih had developed a 
new strategy of sub-dividing estate lands piecemeal - estate by 
estate and district by district - being fully aware that this would 
greatly strengthen their position and give them an opportunity to 
excise larger porti ons of estates under supporting pressure from 
the peasant uni ons involved. In all previous negotiations the 
tobacco industry and the other industries had formed solid fronts 
and had insisted on an integral or overall, industry-wide settle-
ment of the land issue, realizing full weIl that this procedure was 
to their advantage. The decree draft called for the establishment 
of an Office for the Reorganization of Land Use, or Kantor 
Reorganisasi Pemakaz'an Tanah (KRPT) working directly under 
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. This office 
was to investigate the agrarian situation in a given area and to 
decide which lands were to return to the state and which were to 
remain at the disposal of the estate. Categories definitely to be 
returned to the government embraced: land on both sides of 
roads maintained by local or provincial authorities, to a depth of 
250 meters measured from the middle of the road; land which 
had been occupied by permanent settlements prior to 1950; and 
land which had served as permanent wet rice fields prior to 1950. 
Some exceptions were anticipated but only where it could be 
proved that an estate needed certain parcels of land falling into 
these categories for its rational operation. 
By way of indemnity the planters were to receive 30-year leases 
for the land remaining in their possession, with ex ten si ons up to 
20 years possible under special circumstances. These long leases 
were to be replaced by new agrarian rights if and when a new 
agrarian law was issued. A discordant note for the planters, how-
ever, was the provision for evacuation of reassigned land which 
gave planters two months to vacate land returning to public 
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domain but set no time limit for squatters on land remaining in 
estates. 
Widely dispersed squatters were to be brought together in new 
compact settlements and squatters were to be divided into three 
categories with the following land allowances : (1) those who 
preferred to make their living as farmers, 2 hectares; (2) those 
who preferred to move to land within the beIts along the main 
roads, 0.5 hectare; and (3) those who wished to move to the 
towns, 0.4 hectare. The remaining provisions ensured for the 
squatters free transportation, Rp. 1500 per family in assistance 
for the construction of new homes, indemnity for loss of plants 
at the old site up to Rp. 500 per family, an advance of Rp. 250 
per month for five months to cover living expenses, and a single 
advance of Rp. 450 for the purchase of seed, fertilizer, and agri-
cuItural implements. The only significant deviation in the draft 
from the recommendation of the State Commission was the 
allowance of two hectares to the rakyat penunggu who had 
agrarian rights on the basis of the old concession agreements. 
Though Singgih's surprise move had caught both sides un-
prepared to give quick approval, the planters' representatives 
made the more anguished requests for further time to study the 
decree draft, and the next few days saw heightened activities in 
the offices of AVROS. Cables and letters went off to The Nether-
lands, various memoranda we re sent to the members of the 
executive committee as weIl as to all members, and the executive 
committee held daily meetings in order to work out a strategy 
for discussions with Singgih and for A VROS' formal reply that 
would stave off a final decision until Nolen's return from Europe. 
On 13 May the executive committee of AVROS met to develop 
lines to be followed in the second meeting, later the same day, 
with Singgih. To avoid discussion of the draft decree itself, which 
all agreed was unacceptable on every point important for the 
planters, it was decided to ask for clarification of the judicial and 
factual guarantees as a necessary step before the planters would 
be able to give Singgih their answer. At the meeting Singgih left 
no doubt that the Minister of Agrarian Affairs intended to pursue 
a new policy and did not re gard as binding either the previous 
agreements reached between government and planters or the sub-
sequent arrangements and decrees of 1951. This alarmed the 
planters and made them still more reluctant to give any answer to 
Minister Gusti Gde Rake, and requests were made for an exten-
sion of the deadline to permit further discussions and for an 
appointment for the A VROS chairman immediately following his 
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return from The Netherlands. Since the representatives of the 
peasant organizations had meanwhile accepted the draft decree, 
tbe planters found it politically wise to approve a pilot project of 
squatter resettIement as a constructive starting point for the ulti-
mate settlement of the agrarian issue. 
At a meeting the following day Singgih became extremely 
blunt, charging that the planters had so far registered nothing but 
objections and complaints and remarking that the government 
would appreciate a constructive contribution which would meet 
the expectations of the farming population. In their defense the 
planters cited again their voluntary return of about half the 
former tobacco soils and their willingness to return one-third of 
the perennial-crop lands. The 14 May meeting ended with a 
request that AVROS be permitted to submit a written statement 
before Singgih's departure for Jakarta and another appeal to 
Singgih to arrange an early appointment between the A VROS 
chairman and Minister Gusti Gde Rake. 
The written statement from A VROS, prepared by the execu-
tive committee and addressed to Singgih as representative of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, deftly skirted the question of 
acceptance or rejection of the plan by saying the meetings of 11, 
13 and 14 May had raised several points whose ramifications for 
current and future capital investments would have to be ex-
plored. There followed a brief defense of the legal status of the 
1951 agreements from their incorporation in the decrees of 28 
June 1951 3 and 28 September 1951 4 to their confirmation in the 
Government Declaration of 25 August 1953 as binding for the 
deliberations of the State Commission. (The planters had noticed 
that the decree draft lacked any reference to the decrees of 
1951.) The AVROS statement concluded with the suggestion 
that a trial resettlement of squatters be undertaken before adop-
tion of a final plan since such a project might furnish valuable 
practical data. This was handed to Singgih just prior to his 
departure from Medan on 16 May. 5 
One day later copies we re sent to the representative of A VROS 
in Jakarta with the request that he call on the secretary-general 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Gunung Iskander, and two other 
high officials in the Ministry, Kasimo and Amien, as weIl as the 
Gavernor of the Bank Indonesia. His instructions were to let 
these selected officials read the A VROS statement, being careful 
not to leave a copy with anyone or allude in any way to the 
planters' probable answer to the Minister of Agrarian Affairs 
regarding acceptance or rejection, to sound out potential support 
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elsewhere in the government for modification of Singgih 's plan. 
On 19 May 1955, to meet the deadline, A VROS sent a letter6 
to the Minister of Agrarian Affairs explaining that the planters 
would be in a position to give their answer only af ter clarification 
by the Minister of the status of the 1951 agreements and of the 
duration of the long leases proposed as exchange for the old 
concession agreements. On 26 May Singgih replied in the name of 
the Minister of Agrarian Affairs 7 with a repetition of familiar 
responses: that the decree dra ft reflected the cabinet's decision 
to solve the problem of the use of estate lands by the population 
of Sumatera Timur on the basis of Emergency Law No. 8/1954, 
that previous agreements remained valid in principle but would 
be superseded if necessary for the greater good, and that the long 
leases would normally be written for 30 years with extensions to 
40 or 50 possible under special circumstances. 
Nolen, back from his consultations with plantation company 
directors in The Netherlands, answered Singgih in a letter 
(No. 803) dated 31 May which, in addition to stressing the 
planters' dependence for security of operations on government 
faithfulness to the existing agreements and their concomitant 
objection to new demands for the return of unstated amounts of 
land, took up a number of other objectionable points in the 
decree draft. These included the provision giving planters two 
months to vacate reassigned land versus no time limit for squat-
ters and the provision that all squatters could claim land. Nolen 
summed up the attitude of the planters as dissatisfaction over the 
omission of a number of basic guidelines agreed upon in the past 
and the inclusion of several points which in their present form 
were unacceptable but, still postponing an answer, ended his 
letter by saying the plan required further study and discussion 
since it dealt with topics which had far-reaching consequences for 
the future. 
In the course of a conversation with Nolen on 2 June, Singgih 
mentioned Minister Gusti Gde Rake's recollection that Nolen had 
not only expressed approval of the Minister's plans during their 
February conference but had assured material support from the 
planters. Backing up his immediate oral denial, Nolen next day 
wrote to the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs emphatically denying 
any promise that planters would be willing to undertake mechan-
ized land clearing prior to the transfer of squatters, though he 
recalied having considered it possible that companies might make 
transport equipment available for squatter transfer. As to the 
squatter problem in general, Nolen added, squatters by the 
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thousands continued to occupy estate lands, despite the 
existence in East Sumatra of extensive areas of public domain, 
because of the ineffectiveness of police and provincial authorities 
and because of the promise of compensation and credit as weIl as 
free preparation of land. 8 
An appointment with Minister Gusti Gde Rake on 7 June 1955 
started off poorly when Nolen was made to wait over an hour 
while the Minister concluded a conference with Singgih. Even 
then as Nolen reported to the executive committee of AVROS, 
Gusti Gde Rake for the first half hour cut short with stiff and 
unreasonable answers talk on every topic Nolen brought up, not 
"changing his tune" until the conversation veered to the fact th at 
the cabinet would fall without positive results on the agrarian 
front. For this reason Gusti Gde Rake insisted it was very much 
to be regretted that the planters were not willing to cooperate in 
the clearing of land to be assigned to squatters. With the com-
ment that it had been the mistake of previous cabinets to 
attempt resettlement of squatters without preparation of sites, 
the Minister insinuated th at the more the planters cooperated 
with the government the more consideration their interests 
would receive. Nolen in turn tried to explain why the planters 
could not cooperate in the way Minister Gusti Gde Rake ex-
pected and why the government, by pampering the squatters, 
itself encouraged their refusal to move. Past experiences with 
squatters, Nolen said, indicated that Gusti Gde R<l.ke's new plan 
could only result in further land losses for the planters without 
any improvement of the squatter problem. 
Although aware that his arguments had failed to alter Minister 
Gusti Gde Rake's position and that Singgih was proceeding with 
the draft of a decree, Nolen submitted still another letter9 to the 
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. This one, far longer than those of 
19 and 31 May was not limited to strategic arguments on a few 
points but ranged over the whole draft decree, summarizing reac-
tions to practically every provision. The letter stated the planters' 
conclusion that a joint decree based on Article 6 of the Emerg-
ency Law No. 8/1954 could never pro duce a solution of the land 
issue in East Sumatra. The problem could never be solved so long 
as one approached it only by shifting squatters within the planta-
tion region and did not develop free public domain. Since the 
dra ft stated specifically which lands were to be surrendered by 
the estates it was unjust not to specify which lands were to 
remain under con trol of the planters. Nolen, therefore, asked for 
a clear policy statement that the estates would retain: (1) to-
120 Planters against Peasants 
bacco lands which had been assigned to the estates on the basis 
of the partition of 28 September 1951 and which by 27 August 
1953 had not yet been taken over by squatters; (2) tobacco land 
which could be regained through transfer of squatters; and (3) 
perennial-crop lands essential to the rational operation of the 
estates, these estates having agreed to return a maximum of 
220,000 hectares with the understanding that compensation 
from the public domain of economically exploitable land would 
be made for any amount in excess of 180,000 hectares. 
Referring to the draft 'sstipulation that land along both sides of 
all public roads be surrendered, Nolen predicted new unchecked 
waves of illegal squatting. Assuming that the plantation belt had 
approximately 4,300 kilometers of publicly maintained roads 
with an estimated 60 percent of the land on either side of the 
road under cultivation, this stipulation would lead to an addition-
al loss to the estates of 86,000 hectares of cultivable soil, enough 
to take care of 172,000 families (since the lots next to the roads 
were to measure only 0.5 hectares) or several times more than 
the total number of squatters having an interest in such lots. In 
this connection Nolen called again for a registration of all squat-
ters on the basis of their right to a land assignment and exclusion 
therefrom of estate laborers, land speculators, tenants on squat-
ted land, new squatters who had violated the 27 August 1953 
standfast, and those who we re not Indonesian citizens. (This last 
was directed against alien Chinese squatters.) 
Nolen maintained that promises of support of squatters would 
make the agrarian problem very difficult and would postpone a 
solution for years. So long as squatters occupied a preferred 
position, there would be no end to new iIIegal land occupation. 
In a final paragraph Nolen expressed the hope that the Minister 
of Agrarian Affairs would not invoke the provision under Emerg-
ency Law No. 8/1954 (Article 6) for an imposed settlement by 
ministerial decree because only "an integral and voluntary settle-
ment could in the opinion of the entrepreneurs produce a solu-
tion" . 
Minister Gusti Gde Rake did not interrupt Singgih's work on 
the joint decree. Demper, the AVROS representative in Jakarta, 
redoubled his lobbying efforts and took copies of the letter to 
key officials in the Ministry of Agriculture who might be per-
suaded to keep the Minister of Agriculture from signing the 
decree. It was to no avail. On 30 June 1955 the ministers of 
Agrarian Affairs, Agriculture, Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs, 
and Justice signed Joint Decree No. 1/1955, which differed only 
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in some minor details from the draft plan of May 1955 although 
the AVROS objections had been taken into account at least 
partially, notably the demand for references to previous agree-
ments and decrees of 1951 (with the proviso, however, that the 
government felt not bound by them). 
The decree itself was prefaced by a justification for its enact-
ment, with references to Minister Gusti Gde Rake's actions in 
May and to the futile efforts of Singgih to obtain acceptance of 
the draft plan by the representative of the plantation industry 
whereas those of the peasant unions had accepted all its major 
provlSlons. The government, therefore, feit compelled to 
establish the main guidelines for a concrete and permanent settle-
ment of the question regarding the use of estate land in East 
Sumatra. Specifically, the agrarian problem would be solved 
gradually, i.e. estate byestate and district by district, taking into 
consideration the interests of the population and of the estates as 
weIl as the practical possibilities of settling the issue. To handle 
this and to take the place of the former KPPT, which had been in 
operation since the days of Governor Abdul Hakim, a new 
agency, to be known as the Office for the Reorganization of 
Land Use in East Sumatra, or Kantor Reorganisasi Pemakaian 
Tanah Sumatera Tz"mur (KRPT), assisted by a Council of Assist-
ance, or Badan Pembantu, would be established with achairman 
plus representatives of six government agencies and six peasant 
unions. Previous agreements regarding the tobacco estates and 
the perennial-crop estates would be used as the "starting point" 
for the determination of the new boundaries between estates and 
public domain but, should it prove necessary, more plantation 
area would be designated public domain and the respective 
estates given other land as compensation. The provisions identify-
ing the lands to be returned to the government, authorizing a 
registration of the squatters, and stipulating the amounts of land 
and types of support squatters being resettled would receive were 
identical with those in the earlier draft. 
There were th ree implemental decrees issued by the Minister of 
Agrarian Affairs simultaneously with the Joint Decree: Decree 
No. Sk. 102/Ka/1955 creating the KRPT, which was to have its 
seat in Medan but was to come under the direct supervision of 
the Minister of Agrarian Affairs; Decree No. Sk. 1G3/Ka/1955 
furnishing technical guidelines and instructions for the partition 
of the land and the resettlement of the population; and Decree 
No. Sk 104/Ka/1955 establishing thc Council of Assistance 
(Badan Pembantu Pemakaian Tanah Sumatera Timur). 
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On 24 July 1955 the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet resigned, 
though remaining as a caretaker cabinet until the installation of 
the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet on 12 August. During this 
political lull neither the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs nor AVROS 
took any significant action. But on 1 August the Govemor of 
North Sumatra presided over the official discharge of the State 
Commission and the dissolution of the KPPT, following which 
the Secretary General of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs formal-
ly created the new KRPT with Imam Supangat as head of a staff 
largely taken over from the old KPPT. Several Medan newspapers 
criticized the appointment of Imam Supangat because of his lack 
of familiarity with the problems of East Sumatra and also ex-
pressed considerable pessimism about the new agency's prospects 
for solving a problem involving an estimated 120,000 squatter 
families by means of the proposed annual resettlement of only 
1,000. 
Thus the planters, especially AVROS, were faced with new 
ministers and advisers to be evaluated and approached. In a 
memorandum addressed to the AVROS executive committee, 
Nolen assessed the changes, noting that Gunawan, the new 
Minister of Agrarian Affairs, who like his predecessor belonged to 
the PRN, was of higher caliber than his predecessor and th at two 
other new ministers, Kasimo and Hakim, had an excellent insight 
into the woes of East Sumatra. I.J. Kasimo, the new Minister of 
Economic Affairs, had authored a perceptive report on East 
Sumatra in 1950 and more recently had been head of the Service 
on Plantation Agriculture (Jawatan Perkebunan) in the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Abdul Hakim, serving in the new cabinet as 
Minister of State without portfolio, had of course been Govemor 
of North Sumatra. Nolen felt that both I.J. Kasimo and Abdul 
Hakim could be counted on for advice and even expressed a faint 
hope that the new cabinet, sin ce several members were known to 
be criticalof the agrarian policy of the previous cabinet, might 
revoke the Joint Decree. 10 Nolen therefore proposed continued 
strong opposition to Emergency Law No. 8/1954 and to the 
Joint Decree. The executive committee concurred and approved 
the submission of a new A VROS memorandum detailing the legal 
objections to the Joint Decree. ll The memorandum declared, 
following a minute examination of the five ministers' action 
against the provisions of Emergency Law No. 8, that the Joint 
Decree was illegal because: 
1. the conditions which would have justified such a joint decree 
on the basis of Article 6 had not been present; 
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2. the specific instructions of Article 2, Section 3 had not been 
carried out as equitably; 
3. the decree did not carry out instructions stipulated in Article 
7; and 
4. the decree included land not covered by Emergency Law 
No. 8. 
A conversation with Minister Gunawan in early September gave 
Nolen the impression that the new minister did not approve the 
agrarian policy of the previous cabinet, further strengthening 
Nolen's hope in the possibility of a withdrawal of the Joint 
Decree. Taking advantage of the opportunity, Nolen promised 
Minister Gunawan at least two background memoranda - one 
analyzing the application of Emergency Law No. 8 of 195412 and 
one summarizing the changes in government agrarian policy from 
1950 to 1955. 13 The first memorandum became an extensive 
charge, with documentary support, of the lax enforcement of the 
12 June 1954 standfast set by Emergency Law No. 8 and an 
explanation of how this affected plantation operations and the 
agrarian sÏtuation. As to enforcement, a clear example was the 
time lag between the preparation of an official police report and 
the completion of the trial and pronouncement of sentence. The 
memorandum cited the case of a group of squatters from the 
village of Tanjong Balei Sidomuljo near the estate of Bekiun. 
Although these men were accused on 14 September 1954 of 
having violated the standfast, the first court hearing did not take 
place until almost seven months later, on 4 April 1955, in Binjai. 
This had been followed by hearings on 17 and 18 May, 18 and 23 
June, 9, 13, and 25 July and 22 August with the next, and 
predictably as inconclusive, hearing scheduled for 3 October. All 
the while the squatters continued to hold portions of the Bekiun 
Estate illegally, reinforcing the conviction of squatters every-
where th at the courts would be lenient. Very few judges, in fact, 
had handed out the maximum penalty permitted by the law (see 
Table 10). Furthermore, nine out of ten accused would appeal 
even a light sentence and thus still further postpone their depart-
ure from squatted land. The planters noticed that most author-
ities were even less disposed to enforce the law against mass 
invasions by organized groups. 
On the subject of plantation operations, the memorandum 
stated that rejuvenation of estates by new planting had been 
precluded in many cases because the necessary land was occupied 
by squatters. Table 11 lists several estates in the kabupaten of 
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Table 10 
Senten ces issued by the courts of East Sumatra (1955) 
Court Date No. of Penalty 
Squatters 
Medan 12 July 11 
Medan 12July 7 
Medan 25 Oct 72 




Medan 22 Nov 155 
One month of conditional 
jail sentence with six 
months probation 
One week of conditional 
jail sentence with six 
months probation 
Five days imprisonment 
served by five days spent 
in custody 
Fine of Rp. 10.-
Ten days conditional 
jail senten ce with three 
months probation 
Six days imprisonment 
served by the fact that 













Souree: AVROS, Memorandum inzake de berechting van onwettige occupa· 
tie op grond van de Noodwet No. 8/1954 (Medan, 26 November 1955). Also 
issued as an appendix to letter No. 229/Bl. (Medan, 30 November 1955). 
Deli-Serdang and Simelungun and shows the magnitude which 
squatting had reached there. In every instanee more than one-
third and in one almost 60 percent of the land could not be 
utilized by the estate company. A number of tobacco estates no 
longer had enough land to maintain a rotation of the desirabie 
length, just as rubber and sisal estates of ten were unable to bring 
their erop area up on ce more to the capacity of the factories. The 
resuIting financial losses were feIt not only by the management 
but also by the public treasury. The planters were convineed, the 
memorandum noted in conclusion, th at the situation could only 
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Table 11 
Estates in the kabupaten Deli-Serdang and Simelungun and the 
extent of illegal occupation 
Total Area Squatted Area 
Name of Estate Crop (hectares) (hectares) (pereen t) 
Bah Lias Rubber 6,749 2,316 34_3 
Laras Sisal 8,461 3,351 39.6 
Rambutan Rubber 13,330 6,344 47.6 
Mata Pao Oil palm 3,636 1,680 46.2 
Bekalla Rubber 9,164 4,094 44.7 
Medan Tobacco 1,529 727 47.5 
Bandar Chalipah Tobacco 3,642 1,369 37.6 
Kwala Namu Tobacco 4,282 2,502 58.4 
Pagar Marbau Tobacco 5,032 1,872 37.2 
Souree: Memorandum inzake de Uitvoering van de Noodwet No. 8/1954 
(Medan, 6 September 1955). 
be corrected provided: that steps be taken not only against in-
dividuals who violated the law but also against large organized 
bands of squatters; that the police authorities not limit them-
selves to the drafting of reports to the public prosecutors but also 
take the necessary steps to expel the squatters from the land; 
and, finaIly, that illegal occupants quickly be brought into court 
and given sentences more in line with the law. 
The second memorandum to Minister Gunawan, tracing the 
agrarian policy of the various cabinets between 1950 and 1955, 
described the Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo Cabinets as having 
aimed to create a flourishing smallholder atiriculture without 
harming plantation agriculture through a return of all those 
estate lands not truly needed for the operation of the estates in 
exchange for new agrarian rights which would proteet the in-
terests ofboth planters and small farmers. Successive cabinets had 
accepted the principle th at an integral rather than partialor 
fractional solution of the land problem be sought and that 
neither the problem of the return of land nor the squatter 
problem should be approached by individual estates. There fol-
lowed a lengthy summary of the negotiations leading to the 1951 
agreements as weIl as a repetition of the planters' complaint th at 
the government had defaulted on the agreements by its failure to 
issue new rights or otherwise honor its commitment. Then the 
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Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, af ter having initially acknowledged 
the earlier agreements as at least a starting point, had reversed 
itself in mid-1954 and with the promulgation of Emergency Law 
No. 8 abandoned entirely the principle of an integral settlement 
in favor of a peasant-oriented settlement estate byestate and 
district by district. The "illegal" Joint Decree of 30 June 1955 
merely confirmed this arbitrary dismissal of the earlier agree-
ments with the planters. The unexpressed hope of the memoran-
dum was th at the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet would reject the 
policy of its predecessor. 
While presenting to Minister Gunawan yet another memoran-
dum on 19 October 1955, AVROS delegate Demper got the first 
indication of areaction to the A VROS memorandum of 29 
August with his discovery that the cabinet had flatly rejected the 
AVROS arguments and fully intended to continue the policy 
initiated by the preceding cabinet. Any lingering hope of a policy 
revers al was finally dashed by the installation on 23 November of 
the Council of Assistance (Badan Pembantu) to KRPT called for 
by Minister Gusti Gde Rake's decree No. Sk. 103/Ka/1955. 
Minister Gunawan did make one minor concession in the decree 
by requiring the Council of Assistance to call on A VROS for 
advice in matters of concern to the planters, but the utter failure 
of A VROS efforts to win his support was manifest in his endorse-
ment of the demands of the autochthonous population for a 
continued issuance of jaluran at the end of the tobacco harvest. 
Minister Gunawan instructed the KRPT to speed up the re-
gistration of the squatters, to survey the squatted areas, and to be 
ready for the resettlement of the first one thousand families 
immediately af ter the elections in mid-December. A KRPT 
directive in late November notified A VROS that thirteen field 
teams would be dispatched to various parts of East Sumatra to 
conduct another registration of the squatters and asked for the 
cooperation of the plantations. 
In a review of developments during 1955 at an extraordinary 
AVROS membership meeting on 28 December, Nolen described 
the agrarian situation as extremely confused and spoke of an 
impasse on the agrarian front. He noted that the Burhanuddin 
Harahap government had demonstrated its inability to protect 
unoccupied land against new invasions and, possibly because it 
felt its days were numbered, had showed no initiative in the 
handling of the agrarian problem. Nolen estimated that the to-
bacco companies had lost 3,000 hectares since the latest stand-
fast of 12 June 1954. While some poli ce authorities were willing 
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tooppose new invasions by civilians, nowhere were police 
prepared to investigate cases of illegal land grabbing by Indo-
nesian soldiers and veterans. Nolen also reported a growing "sale" 
of estate lands for building purposes by squatters in the neighbor-
hood of Medan and other urban centers to nonfarmers, busi-
nessmen, and even govemment officials. These lands were too 
exhausted to be any longer of agricultural use to the squatters but 
their value had risen sharply because of a shortage of residential 
sites. Squatters negotiating the sale of "their" land already had 
their eyes on other parcels of estate lands. 
Nolen urged the members of A VROS to maintain a united 
front and above all to avoid the temptation of making local 
arrangements for the transfer of squatters from critically located 
parcels to land on the fringe of a plantation that the management 
was ready to release anyway. The reason for his warning was that 
under prevailing conditions th ere was no way of protecting the 
vacated land against renewed invasion by a new group of squat-
ters. 
Nolen concluded with some remarks on the Dutch-Indonesian 
negotiations just opened in the Hague on 10 December at the 
request of the Indonesian cabinet and transferred to Geneva on 
16 December so th at the negotiations would be conducted in 
neutral territory . The agenda of the conference included dissolu-
tion of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, cancellation of the 
financial and economic agreements concluded at the Round 
Table Conference in 1949, a decision on the future of West lrian, 
and any other matter either side wanted to introduce in further-
ance of better relations between the two countries. The planters 
feared that their future would be jeopardized by the unwilling-
ness of the Dutch govemment to meet the Indonesian demands 
regarding West Irian and by late December, as I know from 
personal observations, their pessimism dominated their conversa-
tion everywhere in East Sumatra. It was of course precisely an 
impasse on financial and economic matters and the West lrian 
issue that brought the conference to a premature end on 11 
February 1956. On 21 February Indonesia withdrew from the 
Netherlands-Indonesian Union and canceled all financial and 
economic agreements attached to the Union Statute. 
The Agrarian Struggle in 1956: Old and New Problems 
The AVROS agrarian committee met in J anuary 1956 to re-
ex amine AVROS strategy vis-a-vis Emergency Law No. 8/1954. 
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Loopholes for squatters had become evident: in the law's im-
precise statement of estate rights to land, which could be con-
strued as preventing planters from using land not actually under 
cultivation by squatters on 12 June 1954; and in the definition 
of illegal occupation as not only "actual occupation, cultivation 
and/or control of a piece of estate land" but additionally as 
"maintenance of crops or structures on the land, irrespective of 
whether the pers on involved actually lives on the land or uses the 
structures", which had opened the door to a new kind of claim. 
Several court tests had been made in which squatters claimed 
three or more times their area of actual cultivation, contending 
that the additional land, though lying fallow on 12 June 1954, 
had been cultivated by them prior to the standfast and was there-
fore under their con trol in the spirit of the law. Some judges had 
accepted th is argument. Furthermore, squatters who possessed 
registration cards proving occupance on 12 June 1954 were 
claiming the right to plant trees, to convert the land into sawah, 
to replace temporary shacks by permanent buildings, and even to 
sell the land. 
The planters maintained th at the squatter had the legal right 
only to cultivate annual crops until the land dispute should be 
settled. 1t was agreed that A VROS should urgently press the 
government to close the loopholes in the law, especially sin ce the 
squatters would certainly demand compensation for their im-
movables and improvements, whatever their legality, in the event 
of resettlement. 14 
Meanwhile, however, delays in the replacement of several key 
officials who had been transferred had created a "vacuum in 
authority" (gezagsvacuüm) which gave lower ranking officials the 
convenient excuse for inaction of having to wait for further in-
structions. IS Then in early March the Burhanuddin Harahap 
Cabinet resigned and was succeeded on 26 March 1956 by the 
second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, a PN1-Masyumi coalition. 
Governor Amin was transferred to Jakarta in April and Sutan 
Kumala Pontas was named acting governor of Sumatra in his 
place. These changes meant that the AVROS staff had to spend a 
great deal of time presenting the planters' case all over again to a 
new governor and a new minister. 
Also slowing progress toward a solution, as the planters would 
soon discover, was the surge of nationalist feeling following 
abrogation of the Netherlands-1ndonesian Union and of the 
financial and economic agreements of 1949. The labor and 
peasant uni ons we re quick to take advantage of the change in 
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attitude toward Dutch enterprises in Indonesia, passing resolu-
tions to urge that the government's new freedom of action be 
used for a sweeping revision of agrarian policy that would at last 
answer the peasants' need for land and end their struggle with 
poverty.16 They demanded that no concessions be renewed and 
that instead those estates whose concessions had expired be 
thrown open to land-hungry peasants. By March the BTI and 
other peasant organizations were organizing mass invasions, 
specifically of those tobacco estates having lapsed consessions. 
By now estates with expired concessions had a tenuous legal 
status. Under the terms of the tobacco-Iand parti ti on of 1951, 
planters had been granted ad hoc thirty-year extensions of ex-
piring concessions subject to subsequent legalization. But five 
years had now gone by without the promised new agrarian law, 
and the planters still had no better recourse in court than to 
present expired contracts and refer to the minister's and gov-
ernor's decrees of 28 June and 28 September 1951 as their 
authorization for continued use of and con trol over these estate 
lands. The lawyers maintained th at the companies had at the 
proper time asked for extensions of the concessions and th at the 
government had not refused these requests, in fact had continued 
to collect the annual hasil tanah in anticipation of the new legal 
formulation of agrarian rights. Although some East Sumatran 
judges accepted this line of reasoning, others refused to sentence 
squatters on the basis of Emergency Law No. 8/1954 in cases 
where the concession had expired. A VROS lawyers for their part 
were reluctant to suggest prosecution on the basis of Ordinance 
No. 110 of 1948 which protected free public domain under con-
trol of the central government or self-governing lands, because to 
have done so would have implied that the expired concessions 
had reverted to the public domain - which they clearly had 
not - thereby providing their opponents with such possibilities 
as presenting the planters themselves as squatters. Obviously the 
legal position of an estate with a valid concession agreement was 
stronger than one with an expired contract. This the BTI lawyers 
had recognized and were using in their defense arguments. 17 
Their prospect of judicial victory smalI, and diminished daily 
by rising political tensions between Indonesia and The Nether-
lands, A VROS planters and their lawyers decided to shift from 
legal to economic lines of reasoning. Now they concentrated on 
the important economic contribution plantations were making to 
both the national and the local economies in foreign exchange, 
taxes, and direct and indirect employment. They stressed the grave 
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danger to a continuation of this contribution to the people's 
general welfafe unless the tobacco lands between the Wampu and 
Ular rivers were restored to plantation operations. The United 
Deli Company and the Senembah Company both announced that 
it would be necessary to close several of their tobacco estates by 
the end of 1956 or at the latest 1957 unIe ss all squatters who had 
entered those estates since June 1954 were promptly removed. 
Soon laborers began to show concern for their jobs and anti-
Communist Medan newspapers came out with statements by anti-
Communist labor leaders accusing BTI organizers of purposely 
directing their followers to tobacco estates whose laborers 
belonged to socialist or religiously oriented labor unions. Tangkas 
(5 April 1956) quoted a charge by M.J. Rangkuty, the secretary 
of OBSI - a socialist labor union affiliated with the Indonesian 
Socialist Party (PSI) - that the BTI was deliberately concentrat-
ing on such estates as Timbang Langkat, Sungai Mencirim, 
Tandem, and Klumpang where the laborers were not affiliated 
with Communist unions and, furthermore, that the squatters 
were being recruited in North Tapanuli with payments of 
Rp. 200 per person and brought in two or three hundred at a 
time for mass invasions of target estates. Rangkuty's charge was 
vehemently denied by L. Darman, first secretary of BTI for 
North Sumatra, who accused Rangkuty of acting more like an 
AVROS mouthpiece than a labor leader. Darman maintained that 
a desperate land hunger, not BTI instigation, was driving the 
North Tapanuli squatters into East Sumatra and that their land 
needs could be met by government redistribution of unused 
porti ons of the estates. Such action, Darman asserted, would 
have the further recommendation of greatly reducing the need 
for rice imports into East Sumatra, perhaps even making possible 
exports of rice to other parts of Indonesia, and thereby helping 
to implement the new cabinet's program for improvement of the 
life of the Indonesian farmer through expansion of the produc-
tion area for foodstuffs and other commodities, especially out-
side Java. Quite clearly this agricultural program deserved the 
support of all Indonesian farmers, Darman concluded, and the 
government must act energetically to effect the return of all 
plantations held under lapsed concession agreements, turning 
management of these plantations over to the Government Estates 
Administration (PPN) or Indonesian entrepreneurs and parceling 
idle land to landless farmers. 18 
The next day Mimbar Umum (6 April 1956) carried an edi-
torial charging Communist and Communist-oriented organiza-
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tions with having used the agrarian problem for their political 
purposes sin ce before the elections of 1955, when the PKI had 
promised land to the voters in return for their political support. 
There foIlowed aprediction that the ra te of new squatter in-
vasions would soon rise as the Communists worked to create 
tensions between PNI and Masyumi members in the new cabinet 
(the Masyumi Party had five ministers in the cabinet) in repeti-
tion of the strategy that had brought down the Wilopo Cabinet in 
1953. 
Other moderate editorials appeared warning of the con-
sequences the closing of estates would entail. 19 Mestz"ka reasoned 
that every right-minded Indonesian would welcome the departure 
of the foreign planters and the continuation of their estates by 
Indonesians but that successful management of such large enter-
prises required time, capital, technical knowiedge, and managerial 
experience. One must recognize, the editorial continued, th at the 
effect of squatter damages was not restricted to the foreign entre-
preneurs but that also the interests of Indonesian government, 
and therefore the people as weIl, would suffer. Af ter stressing the 
taxes and foreign exchange the country gained from the foreign 
plantations, the Mestika editorial admonished: "So long as we 
Indonesians are not yet able to manage these foreign estates our-
selves, it harms our people if the planters lose the possibility of 
continuing their operations". As the editorial writer put it, unless 
the government took a firm stand the so-caIled dollarland of East 
Sumatra would soon become bankrupt and lose its importance. 20 
If the planters were not too happy to have the moderates 
emphasize the economic value of the plantations and plead for 
their protection only to urge better preparation for an eventual 
takeover by Indonesians, BTI leaders had their own objections. 
S.M. Tarigan, secretary-general of the BTI board of directors for 
North Sumatra, answered the editorial writers of Tjerdas, 
Tangkas, Lembaga, Mestika, and other anti-Communist news-
papers early in May 1956. Although conceding that large areas of 
former (expired) concession lands had been used by East 
Sumatran farmers for their own agricultural purposes, Tarigan 
denied th at these farmers had harmed the estates and insisted 
that their activities were confined to land intentionally left in 
unused, neglected condition by the plantations. Any accusation 
to the contrary was provocative, unjustified, and, as was weIl 
known, attributable to foreign capitalists and their collaborators, 
who sought to cause discord. The renewed great activity of 
squatters for the expansion of their land Tarigan linked with 
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cancellation of the RTC agreements, which in the past had en-
abled Dutch capital to monopolize hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of fertile land while hundreds of thousands of peasants 
could find no land whatsoever. The BTI insisted that expansion 
of the squatter-cultivated area was dictated by the threat of 
hunger and should be encouraged by the governmen t as part of 
the second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabine t's comprehensive new 
program for improving the standard of living of the Indonesian 
peasant. In fact, the recent arrests of peasants on the basis of 
accusations by Dutch planters were, as BTI saw it, in direct con-
flict with this new program. Tarigan offered the opinion that a 
solution to the agrarian problems of East Sumatra, now that 
Indonesia had gained freedom of action with the scrapping of the 
RTC agreements, could easily be agreed on if only all parties 
would show an understanding for the cabinet's program. Asked 
about the attitude of the BTI toward a strict enforcement of 
extant laws in order to solve the problems, Tarigan replied that 
measures such as those used by Governor Hakim not only were 
thoroughly damned by peasants and dangerous to implement but 
were in conflict with the cabinet's new program. Instead of 
arrests which, Tarigan argued, were no solution the BTI proposed 
a conference of the peasant organizations to discuss the matter of 
arrests, with all arrested farmers to be released pen ding new in-
structions from the central government. In the meantime, all 
parties should understand that "the farmers who cultivate estate 
soils are soldiers in the war against hunger". Tarigan then 
repeated the BTI demand, enunciated earlier by L. Darman, th at 
the government take over all unused and intentionally neglected 
land as weIl as all estates with lapsed concessions, notably Bandar 
Chalipah, Binjai Estate, Bukit Melintang, Gedong Johor, Mabar, 
and Sungai Mencirim, arranging Indonesian management for the 
cultivated estate lands and distributing all uncultivated or reserve 
lands to the peasant farmers. 21 
During a visit to Jakarta in May 1956 Nolen discovered th at the 
secretaries-general of the Ministries of Agrarian Affairs, Agri-
culture, and Justice as weIl as the director and assistant director 
of the Service for Estate Agriculture (Jawatan Perkebunan) in the 
Ministry of Agriculture were drafting an interministerial 
memorandum for the prime minister proposing a new statement 
by his office regarding the enforcement of Emergency Law No. 
8/1954. The memorandum also recommended the addition of a 
note to all expired concession contracts of tobacco estates cer-
tifying their temporary extension. Stressing the urgency of 
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immediate firm action, Nolen gave the Jakarta authorities these 
new squatter statistics: the tobacco estates alone had lost 2,500 
hectares between 12 June 1954 and 31 December 1955 and no 
less than 6,210 hectares during the first five months of 1956. 
Threat of a New Standfast 
But on 29 June the Medan newspaper Mimbar Umum made the 
alarming disclosure that discussions between the Resident of 
Sumatera Timur, A.M. Djalaluddin, and representatives of BTI, 
Petani, STIl, and Badan Perjuangan Rakyat Penunggu had just 
been concluded with an agreement to recommend to the central 
government the declaration of a new standfast so long as the 
government had not yet reached concrete decisions regarding the 
agrarian problem of East Sumatra and the squashing of all court 
charges made against peasants involved in recent illegal occupa-
tions in return for which the peasants accepted a ban on any 
further expansion of the illegally occupied soils. Similar reports 
were published a few days later in Mestika (7 July) and other 
papers. 
It is indicative of the strained relations between A VROS and 
Resident Djalaluddin th at A VROS could not obtain an official 
explanation and had to draft its letter of protest on the basis of 
press reports. The main arguments which AVROS summoned 
against the idea of a new standfast were: 
1. A post factum practical legalization of illegal occupations 
would only encourage squatters to ignore future bans. Above all, 
where the ban on illegal occupations was being violated systemat-
ically by large groups of squatters belonging to a certain peasant 
organization (BTI) the belief would arise th at the government 
was powerless vis-à-vis organized opposition. 
2. The past had shown that peasant organizations did not 
observe standfasts. Earlier standfast regulations had merely 
served to give violators impunity and to consolidate their gains in 
land so that every standfast had added to the size of the problem. 
3. A new standfast would demonstrate again, as earlier ones 
had, that those who violated legal orders would be better off 
than those who obeyed the law. 
4. Issuance of a new standfast would be interpreted as a clear 
recognition of the power of the peasant leaders over govern-
mental authority. 
5. Every new standfast meant in effect the withdrawal for an 
indefinite period of land needed by the plantations. 
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6. The confidence of the entrepreneurs would be seriously 
shaken. The tobacco companies of East Sumatra had already 
been seriously hurt and yet another standfast would be very 
detrimental to the entrepreneurs' trust in legal protection by the 
government for their estates in Indonesia. 22 
This strong letter received wide distribution in both Medan and 
Jakarta, while a number of high officials, including Resident 
Djalaluddin, and delegations of peasant leaders lobbied in 
Jakarta, as did A VROS. 
A visit by Minister of Agrarian Affairs, Professor Suhardi, a 
member of the Catholic Party, to Medan and tobacco estates July 
20-22 for consultation with representatives of the tobacco in-
dustry and with Resident Djalaluddin gave the planters a valuable 
opportunity to stress the seriousness of the situation. Suhardi, 
though refusing to make a promise, assured the planters that he 
would do what he could, hinting th at there would be no new 
standfast. At a 23 July meeting of the AVROS board of direc-
tors, Nolen reported a catastrophic new development on the 
tobacco estates. Whereas in the past there seemed to have existed 
a kind of coordination between BTI and the Communist labor 
union SOBSI, which had led the BTI to avoid squatting on land 
already prepared for the next tobacco erop, now for the first 
time squatters had planted rice stealthily at night in 360 hectares 
of United Deli Company fields which had been cleared, plowed, 
and harrowed for December 1956 and January 1957 tobacco 
plantings. This represented a loss to the tobacco company of an 
estimated Rp. 24.5 million. 23 
During his discussions with the planters in Medan on 21 July, 
Minister Suhardi had asked Nolen for additional data, which were 
duly submitted in a letter24 tracing the postwar history of the 
tobacco industry and calling special attention to the following: 
1. Since illegal squatting was scattered over an estate, a consider-
abIe percentage of the remaining land could not be used because 
the fields were either too smallor too isolated for tobacco cultiva-
tion. 
2. Squatters had in many places disturbed drainage systems to 
such an extent as to leave large are as without the drainage 
required for plantation crops and thus useless to the estates. 
3. The remaining tobacco soils were becoming useless from the 
spread of plant diseases and pests as weIl as above-average growth 
of weeds spreading from nearby squatter holdings. 
An estimated 50,000 hectares of the best tobacco soils had 
thus one way or another been made uncultivable by squatters, 
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leaving only 65,000 - an area too small to sustain the Deli 
tobacco industry on the prewar scale, especially in view of the 
fact that these 65,000 hectares included the so-called tara lands 
plus land not suited for the growing of high-quality wrapper 
tobacco. Nolen illustrated the hopeless situation on five estates 
by giving the tot al area, the squatted area, the tara-Iand area, and 
the remainder available for use by the companies (see Table 12). 
All five faced closing unless the new squatters since 12 June 1954 
were quickly removed. Medan Estate, Deli Tuwa, and Mariëndal 
had already been forced to stop operations because squatters on 
Tuntungan Estate had made it impossible for the United Deli 
Company to raise the tobacco seedlings normally grown there for 
the three other plantations. 
Table 12 
Squatter situation on three estates of the United Deli Company 
and two estates of the Senembah Company (in hectares) 
Estate Tota! concession Occupied by Occupied by Tara- Remain-
area left af ter squatters by squatters by land ing area 
partition of 1951 12June 25 July 
1954 1956 
Rotterdam, 2,800 210 1,800 400 600 
of U.D. Co. 
Timbang 2,246 380 1,000 400 846 
Langkat, 
of U.D. Co. 
Glugur, 1,672 800 1,500 100 72 
of U.D. Co. 
Kwala Namu, 4,870 2,454 3,800 800 270 
of Senembah Co. 
Pagar Marbau, 4,424 1,832 4,000 300 124 
of Senembah Co. 
Souree: AVROS letter No. 953 of 1 August 1956. 
Nolen concluded by stressing that recent developments in the 
squatter situation were daily intensifying the threat of total dis-
ruption of plantation operations: a steadily rising number of 
mass invasions of squatters organized outside the tobacco region; 
theft by squatters from estate warehouses of eTer larger quan-
tities of building and roofing materiaIs; illegal occupation of 
tobacco soils that would lead to a 10ss of millions and millions of 
rupiahs in foreign exchange. By mid-August, some two weeks 
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af ter submission of the letter, the planters observed that police 
authorities had suddenly begun to drive incoming squatters off 
estate lands though, as if in accordance with a new standfast, 
leaving squatters of even a few weeks' standing undisturbed. 
Revision of Emergency Law No. 8/1954 
Months of prodding, lobbying, and a steady flow of memoranda, 
situation reports, and letters finally produced results. On 2 
October the Minister of Agrarian Affairs issued Emergency Law 
No. 1/1956, the purpose being to revise and supplement Emerg-
ency Law No. 8/1954. The explanatory memorandum accom-
panying the law referred specifically to the tobacco industry of 
East Sumatra, noting that the shift since July in the pattern of 
iIIegal occupation from fallow land only to land especially suited 
for seed beds or land already prepared for the tobacco crop of 
1957 posed a real threat to the continued operation of the 
plantations and, since estate closings would deal a death blow to 
a significant source of the national income, had to be met by an 
immediate strengthening of the aId law. 
This took the form of increases in the maximum jail term from 
three months to six months and in the maximum fine from 
Rp. 500 to Rp. 5,000 and, even more indicative, of an extension 
of culpability to anyone who, directly or indirectly, orally or in 
writing, incited others to enter estate lands without permission of 
the management, to anyone who organized an illegal occupation, 
and, finally, to anyone who took over or purchased illegally 
occupied land. The new Emergency Law No. 1/1956 also called 
for evacuation within two weeks of any person found guilty of 
iIIegal occupation of land irrespective of a pending appeal versus 
the earlier law's provision for evacuation af ter a sentence had 
been confirmed by the court of appeal. 
One of the first reactions in East Sumatra came from Resident 
Djalaluddin, who was quoted as favoring an agrarian law passed 
by parliament instead of an emergency law issued by a group of 
ministers who feared that they would not be able to win par-
liamentary approval of their ideas. Other East Sumatra officials 
were very slow in their response to the new law. As late as the 
end of October the police authorities of the kabupaten Deli· 
Serdang in the heart of the tobacco belt had not yet received 
instructions for the implementation of the revised emergency law 
and still no invitations were forthcoming for a conference Acting 
Governor Sutan Kumala Pontas reportedly intended to hold with 
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representatives o.f the vario.us peasant o.rganizatio.ns prior to. the 
implementatio.n. 25 
Three weeks later, o.n 21 No.vember 1956, BT1, Petani, RTl, 
STIl, Sakti, Gaperta, BPRP, and BP4R deluged the President, 
members o.f the cabinet, and members o.f parliament with tele-
grams pro.testing Emergency Law No.. 1/1956 and demanding its 
repeal. 26 Co.ncurrent with the pro.test campaign, ho.wever, the 
rate o.f new invasio.ns o.f estates by squatters declined markedly 
- a fact perhaps attributable to. the stiffening o.f the law but just 
as likely to. the seaso.n, No.vember and December being no.rmally 
rather quiet mo.nths o.n the agrarian fro.nt. Certainly the planters 
saw little evidence o.f o.fficial actio.n leading to. a large-sc ale 
transfer o.f squatters who. had vio.lated the law since June 1954. 
The Negotiations of the United Deli Company with the Barisan 
Tani Indonesia 
At the end o.f Octo.ber 1956 an unexpected crisis aro.se in the 
ranks o.f the planters. No.len and his staff in AVROS learned to. 
their utter co.nsternatio.n that the directo.rs o.f the leading to.bacco. 
co.mpany, the United Deli Co.mpany, had been secretly nego.tiat-
ing since September with the archenemy o.f the East Sumatran 
planters, the BT!. What sho.cked the directo.rs o.f A VROS and the 
planter co.mmunity as a who.le was no.t o.nly th at the United Deli 
Co.mpany had acted co.ntrary to. the o.fficial po.licy o.f A VROS 
against private nego.tiatio.ns, a po.licy its representatives in the 
executive co.mmittee and o.n the bo.ard o.f directo.rs had helped to. 
fo.rmulate and had backed by their vo.tes, but that it had do.ne So. 
witho.ut info.rming A VROS o.f its decisio.n. This develo.pment 
presented AVROS with a dilemma: either reaffirm its po.licy and 
persuade the United Deli Co.mpany to. break o.ff its nego.tiatio.ns 
with BTl o.r revise its po.licy and leave agrarian settlements up to. 
each member. Defending the decisio.n to. break the planters' so.lid 
front, a representative o.f the United Deli Co.mpany to.ld the 
AVROS bo.ard o.f directo.rs at a meeting o.n 20 No.vember 1956: 
"Desperate needs lead to. desperate deeds. lt may seem to. yo.u 
that the deed o.f the United Deli Co.mpany is indeed desperate. 
At this mo.ment it is a questio.n o.f life o.r death for the to.bacco. 
industry. 
Abo.ve all as aresult o.f the mass o.ccupatio.ns since the begin-
ning o.f th is year the situatio.n has deterio.rated at an alarming rate 
o.n several o.f o.ur estates. Unless the next mo.nth brings a so.lu-
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tion, we will be forced to close one estate in part and others will 
follow during the next year. 
Furthermore, we are confronted by the problem that for six of 
our seventeen tobacco estates the seedlings are being raised on 
the so-called black soils of estates no longer in operation. These 
estates are for all practical purposes completely taken over by 
squatters, including the soils especially suited for the raising of 
seedlings. Unless a solution is found soon, another six estates will 
have to be closed. 
On the occasion of the visit to Medan by the agrarian commis-
sion of parliament last September there developed by accident a 
contact with the BTI, which made it apparent that the BTI 
leaders were prepared to discuss matters. This has taken place, 
always in the presence of a government official. Naturally we did 
not knowat the beginning whether there would be any real basis 
for successful negotiations with the BTI. Then came completely 
unexpectedly Emergency Law No. 1/1956, which was received 
by us on 11 October 1956. I agree with you that certainly it 
would have been better had we notified the board of directors 
af ter the first exploratory discussions. Unfortunately we failed to 
do so, and for th at I tender my apologies. In the meantime we 
have already apologized to the Senembah Company, which is the 
most interested party. I do hope th at this company may profit 
from our experiences, whatever the outcome may beo 
All our experiences with existing occupation, where squatters 
had gained a foothold, have always been that not one squatter 
was expelled. We expect little from the actions of the authorities 
even af ter the proclamation of the new emergency law. 
We are trying to achieve with the help of the BTI that almost 
all land occupied since 12 J une 1954 be vacated. Locally areas 
will be rounded off. Every estate must retain an area large 
enough to allow profitable conduct of estate operations. New 
cases of squatting may not occur. I sincerely hope that the future 
will show that the road we have taken was the right one. The 
next few months will show this. We were desperate and some-
thing had to be done. ,,27 
Nolen, who had put so much emphasis on the importance of a 
collective front by the planters, countered with the following 
arguments: 
1. A possible agreement with the BTI would constitute a con-
firmation of the government's impotence and a recognition of 
the BTI as the power on agrarian issues. 
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2. The BTI will use a possible agreement as a propaganda tooI. 
The propaganda will be directed against the govemment and 
against the other peasant groups. Furthermore, the BTI will make 
use of this opportunity once and for all to make impossible a 
firm action for the protection of estate grounds on the part of 
thc govemment. The aims of the BTI should be a waming for us. 
3. We recognize alegal difference between occupants of before 
and af ter the proclamation of Emergency Law No. 8/1954. If 
occupants who came af ter 12 June 1954 are brought into the 
discussion, we see no reason why we could not be forced to 
accept future occupants as our counterpart in a negotiation. 
(Yesterday's occupants do not possess more rights than those of 
tomorrow! ) 
4. Other tani groups - and especially the independent rakyat 
penunggu - will react very strongly if the BTI interests are 
secured. It will be possible to drag the Petani along, but not the 
STIl and the BPRP. In short: it will not be possible to avoid 
political difficulties. 
5. The partial absorption of new squatters and the ejection of 
others by means of consultation will bring up the problem of 
compensation. 
6. This arrangement, which is perhaps possible for the United 
Deli Company, will not offer a solution for other companies. It 
will appear to be practically impossible to get rid of squatters 
without a local land offer. Other companies are already being 
told that it will not do to demand the vacating of occupied land 
without prior effort to reach a settlement with the illegal squat-
ters. 
7. The entrepreneurs and especially A VROS, which acted at the 
request and in the name of all the tobacco companies, will be 
seriously reproached that they until now made unreasonable 
demands. In this connection I wish to recall the position of 
Vorstman and the undersigned in the state commission 
(1953/54) as weIl as the recent remonstrations in the course of 
1956 in connection wi th the serious increase of occupations and 
the resulting shortage of tobacco soils. 
8. Agreements of the type which the United Deli Company 
hopes to reach have been made in the past several times (but with 
aId squatters). Only the entrepreneurs were always deceived. The 
occupied land was definitely lost and it led in fact only to greater 
loss of land. Those who in addition made financial sacrifices or 
provided technical assistance for the construction of roads or the 
clearing of land have done so always in vain. 
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9. The intended agreement is, in my opinion, a poor revival 
which has taken place in the tobacco region and which did not go 
hand in hand with satisfactory guaranties for the remainder of 
the tobacco area. 
10. Now that the United Deli Company has entered into 
negotiations with the BTI, the government officials have an 
excellent reason not to implement the government's intention to 
clear up illegal occupation. Other companies learn to their sorrow 
that local officials refer to these negotiations. I t must be feared 
that the BTI's only aim is to prevent the implementation of 
Emergency Law No. 1/1956. In any event, it must be noted that 
nothing happens in East Sumatra, while results have been 
achieved in Java. 
11. Should it be possible to reach an agreement with the BTI, it 
will mean th at Deli tobacco will stand or fall with the BTI or 
possibly with a certain leader of the BTI (S.M. Tarigan). 
In conclusion I have objections which are derived from my 
suspicion that the United Deli Company has become the victim 
of a political gamble on the part of certain persons who until 
now never showed any interest in the welfare of plantation agri-
culture in East Sumatra. 28 
It soon became clear no such arguments were going to deter the 
United Deli Company, which categorically rejected a suggestion 
th at its negotiations with the BTI be guided to a deadlock. Nor 
was the majority of the A VROS board of directors willing to 
consider any change in its policy of controlling the actions of its 
members, as it would be in conflict with the interests of its 
membership as a whole to leave agrarian settlements up to the 
individu al companies. Obviously, if the uni ty of action by all 
members was to be preserved, A VROS had either to enforce 
compliance to its policy by the United Deli Company or to expel 
the rebellious company from membership. After prolonged dis-
cussion it was decided to table the issue until members had had 
time to consult their respective headquarters in The Netherlands. 
It so happened that this critical problem arose just as President 
Nolen left A VROS, his successor J. Fernhout taking office 23 
November 1956. Fernhout, at a directors' meeting on 20 
November, announced th at he would be unable to lead an organ-
ization whose members we re not prepared unanimously to 
pursue a policy approved by its board of directors. Then at the 4 
December meeting Fernhout told the members of a suggestion 
made to the United Deli Company in an executive committee 
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session th at its representatives approach their BTI counterparts 
about the transfer of their agreements, now including mutual 
recognition of interests and possible solutions, to appropriate 
government authorities for final negotiation and implementation. 
Though still unwilling to break off its negotiations, the United 
Deli Company had seemed inclined to bend the negotiations in 
the direction of a consultation led and approved by the author-
ities. Thus the first steps had been taken toward a compromise 
that would place the negotiations at least under the authority of 
the government. 
At the same meeting the United Deli Company representative 
announced an extension of the negotiations, through the good 
offices of the Resident, to the other peasant organizations. The 
BTI knew of this widening of the negotiations, which had been 
the intention from the start. In Medan as weIl as Jakarta, the 
United Deli Company representative observed, the trend of the 
negotiations had been steadily shifting toward the government. 
For example, the United Deli Company had presented in Jakarta 
at the request of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs an elaborate 
budget for an irrigation project, and learned th at the government 
might be prepared to finance such a project in its entirety, with-
out contributions from the entrepreneurs - certainly an oppor-
tunity for AVROS as an organization to take matters in hand. 
Discussion of the possibility was ruled out of order by the chair-
man on the grounds th at the position of the United Deli Com-
pany remained basically the same and that the meeting had been 
called primarily to hear the views of the various headquarters. 
Furthermore, although several members of the board had heard 
from their directorates in The Netherlands, ongoing consultations 
in The Netherlands relative to the United Deli Company made 
tabling of the question advisable until the next meeting at the 
end of December. Meanwhile the representative of the Nether-
lands Trading Company (NHM) asked permission to read a state-
ment from his directors in Jakarta which gave qualified support 
to the position of the United Deli Company. The NHM directors, 
although regretting the break in A VROS solidarity, could weIl 
understand why the United Deli Company, in serious difficulties 
because of the growing squatter problem and with no govern-
ment solution in sight, had decided to act independently if 
necessary to protect its interests. Whether the United Deli Com-
pany had chosen the right way only the future could show, but 
the NHM directors felt strongly th at the very drastic measure of 
expelling the company from A VROS would be both premature 
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and unjustifiable, that beside the agrarian issues A VROS had 
sufficient opportunities for fruitful cooperation. The NHM state-
ment drew from the AVROS chairman the comment that the 
board wanted to wait for the views of the managing boards in 
The Netherlands and had not so much wanted to hear the 
opinion of directorates with seats in Indonesia. As for the place 
of agrarian policy in an organization of planters, the agrarian 
sector was probably the last one such an organization as A VROS 
could afford to leave to the individual discretion of its 
members. 29 
The following compromise is recorded in the minutes of 29 
December: 
"In the future the United Deli Company will not make any 
decision or take any steps in matters of importance reserved for 
AVROS action by the A VROS board of directors without first 
discussing the issue in the A VROS board of directors in order to 
receive the latter's approval. The United Deli Company reserves 
the right to choose its own course of action, should it be im-
possible to reach an agreement between the company's views and 
those of the other members of the board of directors. In the 
latter case the company is prepared to accept the con-
sequences ... 30 
This rather weak compromise seems to indicate th at several direc-
torates in The Netherlands shared the views expressed by the 
NHM at the meeting of 4 December. The chairman made the 
face-saving remark th at naturally every member company in 
principle reserved the right to choose its own course of action 
should it reach the conclusion that it definitely could not accept 
the viewpoint of the majority and was prepared to accept the 
consequences. But the whole affair had definitely weakened the 
position of AVROS in its negotiations with the govemment. The 
apparent willingness of the United Deli Company to go beyond 
the 1951 agreements and voluntarily agree to a further drastic 
reduction of its estates area exposed the other companies to the 
suspicion that they too had been overstating their cases and that 
therefore the pressure should be maintained. It was ironic that 
just at the moment when the govemment finally responded to 
many months of prodding and lobbying and met the demands for 
firm action, the oldest and leading company of East Sumatra had 
entered into negotiations with the spokesman of the Communist-
affiliated peasant organization. This certainly reduced the willing-
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ness on the part of provincial officials to enforce a most un-
popular law. It was only too convenient for them to sit back and 
to await the outcome of the United Deli Company - BTI discus-
Slons. 
Although the United Deli Company and BTI had agreed on the 
draft of their joint agreement by 1 November 1956, the agree-
ment was not signed until 14 January 1957 by D. van Eck and 
Chief Administrator G. den Broeder on behalf of the United Deli 
Company and by Secretary General S.M. Tarigan on behalf of the 
Board of Directors of the BTI for North Sumatra. The document 
was witnessed by Governor Sutan Kumala Pontas. lts chief pro-
visions stipulated that: 
The BTI expected that the largest village communities should 
become centers around which the widely scattered squatters 
would concentrate for the development of an efficient, intensive, 
and well-organized peasant agriculture; th at for each district joint 
consultation should determine: 
1. in how far assistance should be rendered for the preparation 
of the land offered in exchange; 
2. the rate of compensation for houses, huts, and crops that had 
to be moved or left behind; 
3. assistance with surveys and staking out of irrigation systems; 
4. assistance with transportation of squatters who had to be 
resettled; and 
5. additional assistance, such as the provision of technical guid-
ance in the field of agriculture through the development of an 
experiment station - two hectares in size - in which crops of 
interest to smallholders were to be grown. 
In return for these BTI demands, the United Deli Company stipu-
lated that: 
1. the company would keep at its disposal areas which were to 
be as compact as possible; 
2. the BTI accept the boundaries of the estate area as estab-
lished by the joint agreement with the understanding that there 
should not be any squatted areas within the boundaries of the 
estates; the remaining estate area should be regarded as the 
minimum for an economical conduct of business and that there-
fore no additionalland could be released; 
3. the company should have complete access to, control over, 
and maintenance of roads within the estates; 
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4. the company should have complete access t~, contral over 
and maintenance of watercourses that served the tobacco cultiva-
tion; 
5. the company should have ownership of all houses, sheds, etc. 
within the estate areas as they were being established district by 
district; and 
6. the target date for the evacuation of the squatters be set for 
31 December 1956. 
The joint agreement established nine districts, encompassing the 
following estates: 
District 1: Rotterdam, Timbang Langkat, and Sungai Mencirim 
District 2: Bandar Chalipah, Amplas, Mariëndal, and Deli Tua 
District 3: Medan, Sampali, Saentis, and Mabar 
District 4: Helvetia, Klambir Lima, and Klumpang 
District 5: Tandem, Tandem Hilir, and Bulu Cina 
District 6: Kwala Begumit and Kwala Bingei 
District 7: Padang Brahrang and Tanjong J ati 
District 8: Kwala Mencirim and Binjai 
District 9: Glugur and Tuntungan 
Even af ter four months of negotiations so much was left to sub-
sequent implementation and interpretation that there was ample 
opportunity for disagreements, as the months to come would 
show. 
In view of the well-established Indonesian pattern of the in-
ability of central authorities to enforce their commitments and 
laws and the unwillingness of lower echelons of the bureaucracy 
to accept and to implement unpopular laws, the question arises 
why the directors of the United Deli Company were so optimistic 
as to expect th at Tarigan and the board of directors of the BTI 
for North Sumatra would be able to enforce the agreement. This 
implied a willingness of every local branch of the BTI to accept 
the terms of an agreement calling for an upraoting of many 
squatters and a ban on illegal occupations in the future - when 
the BTI had for years ignored such bans issued by the govern-
ment. Apparently the United Deli Company and the BTI leaders 
decided to enter into direct negotiations because they were dis-
satisfied with the lack of initiative on the part of the KRPT, 
which had been given the assignment of bringing the opposing 
parties together to settle the outstanding issues estate byestate. 
The agreement arrived at without the intermediacy of the 
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KRPT incorporated many provisions of the Joint Decree of 30 
June 1955 which the BTI had welcomed but the United Deli 
Company had opposed bitterly. The agreement thus represented 
an about-face for the United Deli Company, a victory for Tarigan 
and his BTI followers, and a setback for the KRPT. 
As pointed out above, the Medan press and the provincial 
officials had been critical of the creation of the KRPT and the 
appointment of a J avanese to an office which required thorough 
familiarity with East Sumatra. It is therefore not surprising that 
the KRPT was carefully watched and constantly criticized. In-
structions issued by Minister Gunawan had sanctioned the delay 
in actual resettlement of any families until after the December 
1955 elections to prevent their loss of voting rights, but when in 
mid-J anuary complaints began to reach Jakarta about the in-
action of the KRPT, Imam Supangat was called to the ministry 
to give an explanation. Ris unsatisfactory answers brought his 
transfer back to Java and the appointment of Tengku Kotjik as 
head of the KRPT. Kotjik, bom in East Sumatra, at least met the 
local demands on that score. But the provincial officials also 
objected to the administrative change made by Singgih that put 
the KRPT under the direct con trol of the Ministry of Agrarian 
Affairs rather than under the govemor as its predecessor, the 
KPPT, had been. This resentment probably explains why 
Resident Djalaluddin's Badan Pembantu staffed entirely by 
provincial officials, which was to assist to KRPT, remained qui-
escent, apparently failing to meet even on ce during 1956. 
Another of the numerous difficulties that beset the KRPT was 
the bureaucratic struggle over funds absolutely critical for the 
forceful conduct of a resettlement program. By mid-year, Kotjik 
had succeeded in resettling some 500 squatter families from the 
HV A estates of Balimbingan and Laras in the kabupaten Sime-
lungun. These squatters gladly accepted the KRPT's resettlement 
proposal since their land was exhausted, so th at they needed new 
land. Because of the KRPT's failure to support the squatters in 
accordance with the provisions of the Joint Decree, the latter 
threatened to reinvade HV A estate lands. 31 
The steady sniping at Kotjik from the side of the BTI and 
Petani and their affiliated newspapers resulted in his removal 
from office in November despite the support which he received 
from such quarters as Masyumi, NU, PRN, STIl, and BPRP. The 
negotiations between the United Deli Company and BTI without 
the sponsorship of the KRPT contributed to the dismissal of the 
second he ad of the KRPT. 
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Collapse of the Agreement between the Barzsan Tani Indonesia 
and the United Deli Company 
The BTI - United Deli Company agreement reached on 14 
January 1957 af ter months of negotiations apparently foundered 
when the company proved unable to win similar agreements from 
the other peasant organizations. Representatives of the company 
claimed both in December 1956 and again in February 1957 that 
negotiations were proceeding to their satisfaction, but on 6 
March eight peasant organizations issued a joint declaration con· 
demning the BTI - United Deli Company agreement on the 
grounds that it called for direct transfer of land exclusively to the 
members of one organization. 32 By June five of the eight had 
reversed their position and, joining with the BTI to form the 
United Front of Peasant Organizations of North Sumatra, or 
Kesatuan Aksi Organzsasi Tanz·-Tanz" Sumatra Utara, signed an 
agreement with the United Deli Company. 33 
From all evidence the United Deli Company derived very little 
from the agreement - at the most the resettlement of a few 
squatters. Scrutiny of the Medan press during this period reveals 
no notabie resettlement and, in fact, several new cases of illegal 
occupation by groups of squatters belonging to the BTI. 34 The 
same picture emerges from the monthly AVROS statistics on the 
number of hectares of estate land occupied by squatters between 
January and October 1957. Nor do the minutes of the monthly 
meetings of the A VROS board of directors refer to changes on 
the tobacco estates of Langkat and Deli-Serdang, except to speak 
of a "fiasco". Apparently a major reason why the agreement 
never reached a significant level of implementation was the 
central government's decision not to finance the development of 
large-scale irrigation projects for the benefit of resettled squat-
ters, and the United Deli Company, true to its long-standing 
policy, was not willing itself to underwrite the expenses. By late 
October the company was trying to arrange the evacuation of 
squatters from land to be used for the cultivation of tobacco by 
1959 despite its full awareness of the difficulty for psychological 
reasons of clearing squatters from land that would then have to 
be left fallow for several years. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE NATIONALIZATION OF DUTCH PLANTATIONS 
The Agrarian Issues and the Military 
The declaration of martiallaw in North Sumatra on 24 December 
1956 had important consequences in that it involved the military 
authorities as a new party in the agrarian dispute. The immediate 
reason for the declaration of martiallaw was the short-lived coup 
of Colone! Simbolon, commanding officer of the First Military 
District, who on 22 December 1956 severed re!ations between 
the province of North Sumatra and the Ali Sastroamidjojo 
Cabinet. Simbolon's coup failed because he underestimated the 
ethnic complexity of East Sumatra and the great rivalry between 
the population groups. The striking postwar ascent of the Toba 
Batak from Tapanuli in the affairs of East Sumatra was resented 
by the native Malays and the Karo- and Simelungun-Batak as weIl 
as the ] avanese both within and outside the plantations. Lieute-
nant Colone! Djamin Gintings, Simbolon's chief of staff, a Karo, 
Lieutenant Colone! Sugi Arto, the commanding officer of the 
Medan garrison, a ]avanese, and Lieutenant Colone! Wahab 
Makmur, an Acehnese, all shared resentment of Toba Batak 
power in East Sumatra. All three turned against Colonel Sim-
bolon and forced him to retreat with his Toba Batak followers to 
their homeland in Tapanuli. Under martial law the territorial 
army commander, his staff, and subordinate regimental battalion 
and company commanders exercised powers normally held by 
their counterparts in the pamong praja corps of civilian adminis-
trators. 1 Among the issues with which the military became con-
cerned was the squatter problem, so that in 1957 A VROS had to 
deal with the military as weIl as the provincial and central govern-
ment authorities. 
The first indication that the military authorities were concem-
ing themse!ves with the agrarian problem came on 24 December 
1956 when the commanding officer of the Medan garrison issued 
a standfast order against illegal occupation of land within the 
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boundaries of the city of Medan, which included parts of tobacco 
estates bordering on Medan. This was foUowed on 1 J anuary 
19572 by an announcement issued by Major Zain Hamid, com-
manding officer of Battalion No. 133, as military administrator 
for the kabupaten Deli-Serdang, to the effect that as of 1 J anuary 
new squatting violations would be handled by the military police, 
with earlier violations to remain the responsibility of civilian 
authorities. On 10 January 1957 the press officer of the first 
Military Territory confirmed th at the military police (C.P.M., or 
Corps Polisz' Militer) had received instructions to take firm 
measures against squatters. Then in January 1957 Lt. Col. D. 
Gintings issued a decree 3 revoking both military standfast orders. 
These events transpired without public explanation - indeed 
without publicity. AVROS did not leam of the military standfast 
order for the kabupaten Deli-Serdang until some two weeks af ter 
its revocation, and the revocation order did not come to the 
attention of AVROS until March.4 It was also in March that 
A VROS first heard of a plan by Gintings to issue regulations 
conceming illegal occupation of estate land when his special 
secretariat for the enforcement of martiallaw requested copies of 
all letters and memoranda about agrarian conflicts for its in-
formation. 5 
There was a noticeable increase during April in squatter activ-
ities, i.e. in the illegal construction of semipermanent houses in 
Deli and of unauthorized irrigation canals in Simelungun as weU 
as in more widespread occupation of land. Some of this new 
activity was attributable to organized veterans graups, which 
went unchaUenged by the police authorities with the explanation 
th at soldiers and veterans came under the jurisdiction and super-
vision of the military police. The latter remained inactive. 
In mid-June 1957 AVROS unofficially obtained a copy of a 
decree signed on 10 May6 - but not yet released - by Gintings 
as Regional Military Administrator (Penguasa Militer) for North 
Sumatra, in which Gintings reconfirmed Emergency Laws No. 
8/1954 and No. 1/1956 and emphasized the military's determina-
tion to bring the agrarian situation under contral through their 
enforcement. 7 What disturbed AVROS about this otherwise 
- from its point of view - commendable decree was an article 
which permitted negotiations in cases of illegal occupation after 
12 June 1954, clearly in contradiction to Emergency Law No. 
1/1956 and, in effect, a post factum legalization of unlawful acts. 
It became apparent that civil authorities, notably the govemor, 
and KRPT, objected to military interference in agrarian matters. 
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So too of course did A VROS, which would have preferred a 
limitation on the military, e.g. to assisting civilian authorities 
evict convicted squatters. As was to be expected, the militant 
peasant unions protested against the proposed decree as much as 
they had protested against the original emergency laws. Possibly 
because of the objections raised in various quarters against the 
decree of 10 May 1957, it was never formally promulgated, al-
though several Medan newspapers referred to it indirectly as late 
as the end of June. 8 Quite obviously Gintings and his staff found 
the agrarian issue as difficult as had previously the civilian 
authorities, the police, and the prosecutors and judges - thus the 
lack of a clear line and the reticence to act, particularly in in-
stances involving organized veterans. On 16 July Gintings 
appointed an agrarian commission for the first Military Territory 
and requested its recommendations within two weeks. The com-
position of this commission is significant: the chairman and 
secretary were army officers; the first vice-chairman, the second 
vice-chairman, and four other members were high civil govern-
ment officials; and the remaining two members were from left-
wing peasant organizations. There were no planters. The two 
representatives of peasant organizations, S.M. Tarigan and Asjro 
Effendy, who had represented the Sekretariat Bersama in the 
state commission in 1954, were not identified in the new com-
mission as such, being listed instead respectively as civilian 
advisor to the Secretariat for the Administration of Martial Law 
and member of the Provincial Council of Representatives for 
North Sumatra (Effendy represented Petani). The inclusion of 
these two old opponents was a matter of considerable concern 
for A VROS, as was the absence of any representative from the 
Service for Estate Agriculture. 
Given only four days to prepare a statement on current dif-
ficulties with illegal squatters, AVROS nevertheless on 26 July 
submitted its comments and recommendations to the new 
agrarian commission. 1t pointed out th at the planters were really 
the "third party" in a conflict between squatters and government 
arising out of violations of the law, but it submitted statistics 
detailing the extent of standfast violations af ter 12 June 1954, 
24 December 1956, and 30 June 1957 for each of the kabupaten 
of East Sumatra. 1t stressed that the consequences of illegal 
occupation were even greater than the statistics indicated in th at 
widely scattered patches of squatted land made intervening land 
unusable for the tobacco industry. It also noted that, because the 
courts handled only a small portion of all the reported violations 
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of the standfast, most of the squatters were gaining a firm foot-
hold on the land by building permanent structures and planting 
trees. Even the declaration of martial law had not prevented the 
loss of another 4,800 hectares of estate land under the very eyes 
of the Regional Military Administrator between 1 January and 
30 June 1957. Uncontrolled illegal occupation of tobacco land 
would eventually mean the closing of estates and the con-
comitant unemployment of many more people than could 
support themselves on the same area as subsistence farmers. As 
for recommendations, the planters continued to advocate the full 
development of the agricultural potentialof uncultivated 
porti ons of the public domain and of the land retumed by the 
tobacco estates. This should include above all the development of 
irrigation projects in the tens of thousands of hectares of land in 
East Sumatra that could be tumed into excellent wet-rice fields 
though, the letter concluded, it made little sense to search for a 
solution of the agrarian problem without simultaneously bringing 
new squatting to a halt. 9 
By early September Lt. Col. Gintings, as Regional Military 
Administrator, had a set of recommendations by his agrarian 
commission ready to submit to Jakarta and so sent several com-
mission members (including Tarigan of the BTI and Ali Wasito-
hardjo of the KRPT) to the Army Chief of Staff, the Central 
Military Administrator, to ask for his approval. The commission 
recommended a coordinated regional planning and reconstruc-
tion program for North Sumatra as a whoIe. But first the flow of 
Batak squatters from Tapanuli into East Sumatra must be 
stopped. Among the suggested measures for accomplishing this 
was the opening of new settlement areas in Tapanuli and other 
parts of North Sumatra outside the plantation belt to divert 
potential migrant-squatters, the closing by the military of certain 
districts of East Sumatra (especially the kabupaten of Langkat 
and Deli-Serdang), and stricter regulation of exit papers issuance 
by the Tapanuli civil authorities. It was further suggested th at 
squatters from before the 12 June 1954 standfast be given two 
hectares per family, preferably at their present abode, and that a 
new standfast be decreed as of 7 May 1957 to provide at least 
temporary protection for all squatters who had arrived af ter the 
old standfast. 
At an interdepartmental conference held at the headquarters of 
the Army Chief of Staff on 11 September 1957, the Minister of 
Agrarian Affairs expressed objections to several points, especially 
the request for a new standfast, but realized the political ne ces-
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sity of balancing his opposition to the plan with constructive 
counterproposals worked out in cooperation with A VROS and 
the plantation companies. Rozendaal, the Jakarta representative 
of A VROS, rushed a letter to the board of directors eXplaining 
the urgency of the situation and why therefore Minister Sunarjo 
needed as soon as possible the maps showing the 180,000 hec-
tares the perennial-crop estates were to release so as to support 
his counterproposal that temporary long leases be issued at once 
for the estates' remaining land. An early arrival of AVROS 
President Femhout was important but, Rozendaal wamed, 
Femhout must come prepared to give Minister Sunarjo a binding 
answer, as any further temporizing would not work. 10 
In the same letter Rozendaal reported a new break in the 
planters' organizational solidarity, namelY' a round of talks 
between Van der Made, representative of HVA, and the Minister 
of Agrarian Affairs. In reply to the question why HV A had not 
first informed the A VROS board of directors in which it held a 
seat, Van der Made told Rozendaal that the concept of an in-
tegral handling of the agrarian problem was an anachronism and 
that each company had to find its own solution. The similarity of 
the HVA position and the position taken by the United Deli 
Company in 1965 seems to have been more than a coincidence, 
for Van Eek of the United Deli Company was in Jakarta at the 
same time and met with the HVA representative frequently. It 
tumed out that Van der Made had agreed to present to the 
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs the HV A maps which showed the 
land to be retumed to the govemment. 
Femhout opened a hurriedly called meeting of the board of 
directors 11 September with a report on the HVA talks and a 
request that the board settle once and for all the question of 
whether the handling of the agrarian problem should in the 
future remain a task for A VROS or whether it should be left to 
each individual company. It was a matter of putting the AVROS 
president in the impossible position, during negotiations with the 
govemment, of having to speak in the name of some AVROS 
members but not in the name of others - should the directors 
allow exceptions to their policy. With expressions of regret over 
the new break in AVROS' united front, the board reaffirmed the 
policy of collective negotiation on the agrarian issue. 
Mollified by this response, Femhout proceeded to outline the 
East Sumatran agrarian commission proposals then before the 
Central Military Administrator for approval. Rozendaal had al-
ready made AVROS' objections on some points known in the 
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Ministries of Agriculture, Agrarian Affairs, and Finance, and 
reported opposition in the Ministries of Defense, Agriculture, and 
Agrarian Affairs to a new standfast for East Sumatra. This latter 
was in keeping with a recent conversation with the Governor of 
North Sumatra, who had admitted that it was impossible, how-
ever great his own wish to do so, to enforce the law against 
squatting for the simple reason that effective enforcement 
depended on the backing of Jakarta and such backing could pre-
cipitate another cabinet crisis. 
As to Minister Sunarjo's request for the maps in exchange for 
his promise of action on the issuance of temporary leases valid 
until a new basic agrarian law could be enacted, Fernhout con-
sidered the offer both honest and acceptable. Not only would the 
planters gain a measure of security for future operations but the 
government, which in his opinion needed actual con trol over 
projected resettlement are as before any really effective removal 
of squatters could take place, would have a new basis for action. 
Eliminated at the same time would be the two main reasons for 
AVROS' refusal to submit these maps in the past, i.e. the un-
specified character of the new rights and the fear that a general 
knowledge of the location of the land to be released by the 
estates would lead to a new rush of squatters and to land specula-
tion. In a prolonged discus sion of the matter, one director 
reminded the gathering of the tobacco planters' similar situation 
in 1951, where agreement to a land partition had led to their loss 
of con trol over 145,000 hectares and a higher number of squat-
ters than before. Another director expressed concern that the 
alternative to release of 180,000 hectares now was the unaccept-
able set of recommendations made by the agrarian commission. 
Concluding the discussion, Fernhout summarized the 
arguments for cooperation with Minister Sunarjo as: 
l. Land would be made available for the resettlement of squat-
ters interfering with estate operations. 
2. The planters would receive agrarian rights better than those 
in the old agricultural concession contracts, at the same time 
greatly improving the legal position of estates with expired con-
tracts. 
3. The objectionable recommendations of the agrarian com-
mission could be cut out once the Minister of Agrarian Affairs 
was in the position of making counterproposals. 
The board of directors agreed but insisted on the following set of 
conditions in exchange for delivery of the maps: 
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1. Long leases would be issued for the approved target areas ll : 
thirty-year leases for tobacco plantations and forty-year leases 
for perennial-crop plantations, including sisal plantations, with 
such leases to be replaced as soon as the new agrarian law had 
been promulgated. 
2. The government would guarantee access roads to the planta-
tions and con trol over the water regime of their target areas. 
3. In principle, it would be the aim to resettle all squatters 
located within the approved target areas. 
4. Plantation laborers occupying land illegally would have to 
decide whether in future they wanted to be laborers or farmers, 
with those choosing to be laborers made to give up the squatted 
land and be satisfied with the small garden plot every laborer is 
given in accordance with the labor law}2 
Fernhout received the mandate to negotiate with Jakarta author-
ities and to offer the requested maps and the land in exchange 
for written confirmation of this set of four conditions. 13 
The same day the directors of A VROS were authorizing 
Fernhout to accept the proposals of the Minister of Agrarian 
Affairs an interdepartmental meeting of high officials was taking 
place in the headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff, who af ter 
examina ti on of the East Sumatran plan prepared these recom-
mendations for the Central Military Administrator.l~ 
A. Sector Development 
1. In principle we agree with the idea of planning an integral 
and coordinated development program of regions with the help 
of special funds, over and above the regular budget of the various 
departments to be involved. 
2. The execution of the planning should be the responsibility of 
a special committee operating under the leadership of the Region-
al Military Administrator or his deputy as chairman, with its 
members to be drawn from: 
a. the pamong praja corps, i.e. the group of territorial admini-
strators, and such technical services as the Services for Planta-
tion Agriculture, for Peasant Agriculture, the Forest Service, 
the Bureau for Land Planning, the Service for Transmigration, 
and the Service for Agrarian and Cadastral Affairs; 
b. peasant organizations and the Government Estates Admini-
stration, the latter representing plantation agriculture. 
B. Sector Legal Instructions 
1. In order to reduce the number of those who have to be 
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indicted because of illegal occupations, the govemment should 
establish the boundaries of the plantation area in such a manner 
that as many of those who squatted on land before 12 June 1954 
may keep their holdings without undue interf~rence with the 
economic operations of the plantations. 
2. Land illegally occupied by members of govemment organiza-
tions (armed forces, police, and other govemment officials) must 
immediately be vacated. 
3. Territorial officials (pamong praja) in the districts adjacent to 
the plantation belt should as much as possible reduce the 
issuance of exit-papers to the populace intending to migrate. 
4. Plantation areas which are to remain under the con trol of the 
planters should be declared military, i.e. closed, territory. 
C. Appointment of an Interdepartmental Technical Commission 
An interdepartmental, technical commis sion should be dis-
patched to East Sumatra as soon as possible for the gathering of 
concrete data both on specific projects and their costs, so that 
central and provincial officials can reach agreements on develop-
ment projects. 
These two meetings of 11 September prepared the ground for 
discussions held in Jakarta between delegates of A VROS and the 
Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Affairs on 18 and 19 Sep-
tember. IS In the 18 September meeting the Minister of Agrarian 
Affairs formally outlined his reasons for calling for maps showing 
the target area for each plantation of East Sumatra and explained 
how, upon their approval by the proper authorities of the central 
govemment, these target areas would be declared military zones 
and thereafter protected from illegal trespass. In addition, illegal 
occupants within an approved target area would be resettled, 
though the Minister hoped target areas would be selected in such 
a way as to keep the number of squatters to be resettled as small 
as feasible. Porti ons of agricultural concessions or long leases not 
part of target areas had to be retumed to the govemment. 
The planters then presented their four desiderata in the matter, 
all four of which the minister found acceptable. But, when asked 
for written confirmation of their acceptance, Sunarjo responded 
that such approval would have to come from the cabinet. The 
matter was resolved with an agreement that A VROS submit a 
formal document outlining their four points. As for delivery of 
the maps, which the planters insisted could not be prepared in 
less than a month, Sunarjo urged an earlier delivery with the 
counsel that it would be in the interest of the plantations to 
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obtain the approval of their target areas from the Ministry of 
Agriculture as quickly as possible. Even the speediest implemen-
ta ti on of the minister's plan, however, would be too late to 
forestall the closing of a certain few tobacco plantations or an 
end of the whole sisal industry, and for these emergency cases 
the planters suggested preferred handling under the plan coupled 
with special instructions to the military authorities to see that 
Jakarta's instructions for suppression of illegal occupation were 
actually carried out. Minister Sunarjo acknowledged the urgency 
of some planters' problems and promised his support of the 
proposed solution. Assuring Sunarjo of their full agreement with 
his plan, the planters then asked for further discussions following 
the cabinet 's deliberations. 
On 19 September the A VROS delegation met on the same 
matter with Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo, who like Sunarjo 
found the four desiderata acceptable but who raised two ad di-
tional questions. The first was whether the members of A VROS 
were willing to provide transportation for those squatters who 
had to move from the target areas. The planters "agreed to this 
with some reservation". As to the approval of the target areas 
- the second question which. arose - the minister promised to 
instruct the head of the Estates Service (Jawatan Perkebunan) to 
establish a team of officials for this task. 
In view of the great importance of the meeting with the Minis-
ters of Agrarian Affairs and Agriculture, AVROS called a special 
general membership meeting for 27 September in order to give 
members an opportunity to voice their opinion of the agreements 
which had been reached in Jakarta and were now awaiting formal 
approval by the cabinet. Fernhout agreed with the board of 
directors th at the proposals should be endorsed since under 
present circumstances no other solution was feasible, especially 
in view of the fact that the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs had had 
to drop its efforts to get the two emergency laws enacted by 
parliament as regular laws because of strong opposition. Appar-
ently the members concurred, for the ensuing floor discus sion 
produced no real dissent. The proposed designation of planted 
areas, land formerly planted but cleared during World War Il, 
and tara lands as target areas with small parcels to round off 
estates was attractive for perennial-crop estates since a high per-
centage of these estates were no longer interested in large invest-
ments linked with substantial increases of the area under produc-
tion. This definition of target are as posed problems for the to-
bacco estates of course, where the system of rotation required 
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the disproportionately large fallow areas that to the uninformed 
gave the appearance of underutilization or outright neglect, but 
even so the agreements promised a long-awaited stabilization of 
the agrarian situation. The meeting of 27 September accepted the 
recommendation of the board of directors, and the members 
agreed to prepare the required maps speedily.16 
Minister Sunarjo informed the Governor of Sumatra of the 
government plan worked out with the A VROS delegates and 
asked for his cooperation in letting A VROS know that maps 
showing size, location, and boundaries of their target are as were 
due in Jakarta by 2 November 1957. Sunarjo added that it would 
be in the interest of the entrepreneurs to draw the boundaries of 
their target are as in such a way as to avoid, as much as possible, 
the inclusion of squatters dating back prior to 12 June 1954. 17 
The next move was the appointment of an interdepartmental 
government technical committee consisting of ten members, with 
Singgih Praptodihardjo of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs as 
chairman. 18 This committee spent from 20 to 26 October in 
North Sumatra, including two days in Tapanuli, and on 22 
October met with A VROS representatives. In the course of these 
discussions chairman Singgih requested a formal letter addressed 
to the Minister of Agrarian Affairs stating the A VROS desiderata 
connected with the selection of target areas and the concomitant 
return of the land outside the target areas, eXplaining that such a 
letter was needed before the government could give A VROS the 
requested written confirmation. It proved to be a welcome 
request because during the discussions several points had arisen 
which had not been taken into consideration in the talks held in 
Jakarta on 18 and 19 September. AVROS thus gained an oppor-
tunity for review and reformulation of their demands. One of 
these points related to squatters within the target area of an 
estate and Singgih accepted the idea th at a circle drawn around 
the factory of an estate, with a radius to be determined, should 
be entirely cleared of squatters in order to provide the necessary 
security and freedom from interference for the factory complex. 
Although the agrarian commission of the First Military Terri-
tory was still pressing for acceptance of its plans, Singgih assured 
the planters th at the central government reserved the final settle-
ment of the agrarian issues for itself but would have to take the 
local demands as much as feasible into consideration. Fernhout 
called Singgih's attention to the great difficulties which the sisal 
and tea estates of Simelungun experienced and expressed the 
hope that the committee would devote some time to the problem 
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during their forthcQming visit to Simelungun and Tapanuli. 
Singgih promised to do so and also to discuss the matter with the 
governor before his departure for Jakarta on 26 October. 
The AVROS board of directors meeting of 28 October was in 
the main devoted to a careful review of issues that had come up 
during the meeting with Singgih's committee and to the official 
letter requested by Singgih. In order to avoid the impression of a 
considerable increase in the number of their requests, the direc-
tors recommended a complete change of the draft and suggested 
the letter avoid the numbering of demands. 19 
Referring to the meeting of 18 September and the meeting 
with the interdepartmental technical committee of 22 October, 
Fernhout recalied th at on both occasions the representatives of 
AVROS had declared the planters' readiness in principle to 
return land falling outside the target areas, provided that these 
target areas included all those lands considered absolutely neces-
sary by the planters to an economically sound continuation of 
the estates and that the planters received in exchange long leases 
valid until comparable new rights could be enacted in a basic 
agrarian law. Fernhout then requested the further conditions th at 
the conversion of the presently valid rights as a consequence of 
the target area procedure should include the planters' right to ask 
for a decisive answer fifteen years prior to the expiration of a hak 
usaha (right of exploitation) concerning the possible extension of 
this right; that the granting of new long-lease rights should not 
involve special financial consequences for the planters; that 
access roads to and con trol over drainage of the approved target 
areas should be guaranteed in accordance with Article 625 of the 
Indonesian Civil Code; that resettlement of all squatters within 
target are as should be effectively and promptly carried out; and 
that estate laborers holding land illegally should be made to 
choose between a future status of farmer or laborer and in the 
latter case made to give up all land but the estate laborer's 
customary vegetable garden. The letter closed with the hope that 
the Minister of Agrarian Affairs would obtain formal cabinet 
approval of the A VROS requests. A few days later, the AVROS 
delegate in Jakarta reported th at in all probability requested 
written guarantees would be forthcoming. 
The West /rian Crzsis and the Take-over of All Dutch Estates 
Vet the apparent progress of the Sumatran planters in their 
struggle to find a solution to the agrarian problem was soon 
158 Planters against Peasants 
brought to a halt as the West Irian issue once m~re began to 
becloud the politieal horizon. News of the decision in September 
by the lndonesian cabinet under Prime Minister Djuanda Karta-
widjaja to present the West lrian issue for th~ fourth time to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations signaled a feverish 
campaign to arouse nationalistic fervor in support of the Indo-
nesian demand for sovereignty over West lrian, the purpose being 
to draw the favorable attent ion of the outside world and especial-
ly the members of the General Assembly by mass demonstra-
tions, resolutions, and threats of countermeasures if West Irian 
was not transferred. At the beginning of October the cabinet 
approved the holding of a "West lrian Week" and the formation 
of a "West lrian Action" committee, the latter to be composed 
of representatives of the Ministries of Information and Foreign 
Affairs, of the National Council, and of various mass organiza-
tions. At the end of October Information Minister Sudibjo 
formed the "West lrian Liberation Committee" to be headed by 
the minister himself. 
Following the govemment lead, the Communist-dominated 
trade union federation SOBSI joined the nationalistie campaign 
by calling for firm political action to effect such goals as: 
1. restrictions on the transfer of profits of Dutch enterprises 
abroad, withdrawal of the special rights of the Dutch oil com-
pany (BPM), and the take-over of all Dutch-owned banks; 
2. the take-over of all shipping lines and shipyards so as to end 
the Dutch monopoly in interisland shipping; 
3. the take-over of all Dutch-owned plantations as weIl as im-
port and export houses; and 
4. a break in diplomatic relations with The Netherlands. 20 
Practically every party or mass organization was caught up in the 
nationalistic fervor which rose to a climax in November as the 
UN vote approached. The Surabaya city council, for example, 
passed a resolution calling for a boycot of Dutch business houses 
and "slow-down" actions against Dutch enterprises. The West 
Irian Liberation Committee launched the "second wave" of the 
liberation drive on 10 November. D.S. Tarigan, Secretary General 
of the Veterans Legion, leamed in Medan that the East Sumatran 
division of the Legion was urging immediate restriction of diplo-
matic relations between lndonesia and The Netherlands and com-
plete severance of diplomatie ties should the vote on the West 
Irian issue be unfavorable. 21 
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The socialist newspaper Pedo man quoted an unidentified of-
ficial of the Ministry of Finance as predicting that Indonesia 
would break off her trade relations with The Netherlands and 
nationalize Dutch business, banks, and plantations should the 
peaceful efforts for solution of the West Irian issue prove in-
effective. 22 And on 7 November 1957 Sukarno warned th at "if 
the United Nations fails us we will resort to methods th at will 
startle the world". Again and again nationalists and leftists re-
minded the public th at the Dutch enterprises in Indonesia 
provided The Netherlands with the funds necessary for its West 
Irian policy and th at only a complete take-over of these enter-
prises would force the Dutch government to transfer sovereignty 
over West lrian to Indonesia. On 18 November 1957 Sukarno, 
Prime Minister Djuanda, and several ministers of the cabinet 
attended a "West Irian Liberation" mass rally at Banteng Square 
in Jakarta at which Sukarno repeated his warning that "if the 
United Nations should fail again to effect the restoration of West 
lrian to Indonesia, we shall press our claim to the Dutch in such a 
way th at they will have to yield".23 A resolution adopted at the 
same rally called for such retaliatory steps in the event of an 
adverse UN vote as refusal to renew agricultural concessions and 
long leases, nationalization of Dutch-owned vital industries, re-
patriation of unemployed Dutch nationals "who are of no use to 
Indonesia's reconstruction", and the conversion of Dutch enter-
prises to corporate bodies subject to Indonesian laws. In still 
another move to mobilize public opinion, former Vice-President 
Hatta suggested that all of Indonesia come to a standstill for five 
minutes the day before the crucial vote in New Vork so that 
everybody could focus his thoughts on Indonesia's national claim 
to West lrian; such a demonstration of Indonesia's determination 
and solidarity would be more dignified than the painting of 
threatening slogans on the walls of Dutch houses, offices, and 
cars. 
This was the national mood when on 29 November 1957 Indo-
nesia lost the vote at the United Nations on the West Irian issue. 
What followed in Indonesia did not differ significantly from what 
had been predicted and promised in various quarters. In a nation-
wide broadcast on 30 November Prime Minister Djuanda 
exhorted the Indonesian people to keep their fighting spirit burn-
ing for the continuation of the struggle to regain West Irian from 
the Dutch on "another course".24 On 1 December Information 
Minister Sudibjo in his capacity as chairman of the West lrian 
Liberation Committee and with the approval of the cabinet 
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called for a national twenty-four-hour strike the next day by all 
workers employed in Dutch enterprises. As of 2 December, 
Royal Dutch Airlines planes were banned from Indonesian terri-
tory. On 3 December laborers of the Dutch shipping line KPM 
seized con trol of the company's head office in jakarta as their 
fellow employees did the same at KPM offices elsewhere in Indo-
nesia. The KPM employees' action set the pattern for laborers in 
other Dutch companies throughout Indonesia in the days that 
followed. At first the government did nothing about these take-
overs but on 4 December, in a speech before the National 
Reconstruction Conference, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Governor 
of the Bank of Indonesia and a Masyumi leader, warned th at 
"disaster . .. might befall the Indonesian people in connection 
with the steps now being taken against the Dutch and their 
property in carrying out the current West Irian liberation 
campaign". Sjafruddin added, "I completely agree with the liqui-
dation of all Dutch properties in Indonesia, but everything 
should be carried out according to a systematic plan and not just 
because of burning passions which might only stab the people 
themselves" . 
In the ensuing discussion of the matter, Sjafruddin maintained 
that the high-handed take-over of Dutch enterprises violated 
Articles 25 and 27 of the Indonesian Constitution, to which 
Prime Minister/Secretary of Defense Djuanda countered that his 
decree, issued on 29 November 1957 in his role as Central 
Military Administrator, had instructed the Chiefs of Staff of the 
three branches of the Armed Forces to channel all actions for the 
liberation of West lrian through the Central Action Committee 
for the Liberation of West Irian and that "up to now the govern-
ment is still living up to this principle". The record, however, 
shows that the take-overs had caught the government by surprise, 
for all the orders and decrees issued in an effort to "Iegalize" the 
actions taken against Dutch enterprises were issued several days 
af ter the wave of unauthorized take-overs had begun to roll over 
Indonesia on 3 December. 
On 5 December justice Minister G.A. Maengkom pronounced 
any high-handed seizure of Dutch enterprises by trade uni ons a 
contravention of existing laws, stressing th at only actions taken 
by the Central or Regional Military Administrators in order to 
supervise and protect Dutch enterprises in the interest of security 
and order could be justified. 25 The same day, following a special 
meeting on the unauthorized take-overs, the cabinet released this 
communique: 
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"The govemment realizes th at the actions of the various groups 
in the community are the manifestation of a spirit which has 
been running since long ago and has now developed into aflood 
which must be properly channeled, so that it may truly become a 
properly co-ordinated and well-disciplined national potential for 
achieving the national goal, namely the restoration of West Irian 
under the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. 
With re gard to the Dutch enterprises which have been taken 
over by the workers in the last few days, the cabinet has decided 
to put them under govemment control and to assign their 
management to a management board; in th at way business will go 
on under government control. .. 26 
The reassertion of govemment control of the take-overs came in 
a series of moves beginning with a nationwide broadcast appeal 6 
December by Army Chief Staff and Central Military Admini-
strator Major General Nasution to the people to refrain from 
arbitrary ac ti ons , which could not be condoned by the military 
authorities or the cabinet. Following the broadcast, Regional 
Military Administrator Gintings announced that all Dutch enter-
prises of East Sumatra would be under his direct supervision and 
that, to avert a bad impression on world opinion, the take-over of 
Dutch plantations and all other enterprises would henceforth be 
carried out in orderly manner and solely by the military. The 
next day Gintings proclaimed in a written statement that only an 
enterprise's administration was to be placed under military con-
trol. But on 9 December Prime Minister/Defense Minister 
Djuanda Kartawidjaja in his capacity as High Military Admini-
strator issued a decree placing all Dutch plantations and agri-
cultural estates - including their factories, agricultural research 
facilities, all other buildings, and movable as weIl as immovable 
goods - under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia and 
empowering the Minister of Agriculture to issue the necessary 
regulations. The Minister of Agriculture's implemental decree 
which was issued the following day, put the Dutch estates under 
the technical supervision of a new organization, PPN-Baru, whose 
nucleus came from the Govemment Estates Administration, or 
Perusahaan Perkebunan Negara (PPN), and the Estates Service or 
jawatan Perkebunan. Also on 10 December the Chief of Staff of 
the Army, in his capacity as Central Military Administrator, 
issued an order to all Regional Military Administrators to take 
over the administration of any Dutch enterprises in their respect-
ive military territories in the name of the Republic of Indonesia. 
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This order further directed that firm action be taken against any 
unauthorized take-over. 
In a simultaneous move, Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo 
called the representatives of the great Dutch plantation associa-
tions to a conference on 10 December to explain why the gavern-
ment felt compelled to take over the estates and what the decree 
meant for the Dutch owners_ 27 Insisting that the government's 
action was necessary in order to proteet the factories and other 
installations of the estates during this period of political agitation 
so as to preclude interruption of production. Minister Sadjarwo 
assured this listeners that the Dutch enterprises had not been 
nationalized but remained the property of their Dutch owners 
under the supervision of PPN-Baru, which expected the coopera-
ti on of all Dutch personnel in maintaining the undisturbed oper-
ation of the plantations. His remarks provoked the rebuttal th at 
the decree was nothing more than a one-sided governmental 
action with which the entrepreneurs were suddenly confronted 
and th at the owners not only reserved all their rights under inter-
national law but would hold the Indonesian government respons-
ible under the same internationallaw for its action. 
Then came the following series of questions: 
"Who is responsible for the management of the estates after the 
enforcemen t of the decree issued by the Minister of Defense?" 
Sadjarwo: "The PPN-Baru. The former management is only the 
executor of orders given by the new administration". 
"What happens to the" power of attorney which the Dutch 
owners have issued to the directars or representatives residing in 
Indonesia?" Sadjarwo: "These powers will be taken over by the 
Indonesian government and will be transferred to PPN-Baru. The 
directors and representatives no langer have any voice in manage-
ment, financing, and the like". 
"Is the government prepared to guarantee the safety of Dutch 
personnel ?" Sadjarwo: "I have brought this problem to the atten-
tion of Army Chief of Staff Nasution". 
"Isn't there a contradiction between your hope that the planta-
tion personnel will stay and the repatriation orders issued by 
other Indonesian authorities?" Sadjarwo: "The Indonesian 
government does not plan to order the repatriation of all Nether-
landers at once, but will proceed in stages. The planters will not 
belong to the first groups. Their repatriation will depend upon 
their importance for the maintenance of production". 
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"Have you taken fuIl cognizance of the international character of 
ALS and AVROS?" Sadjarwo: "The government will certainly 
take this into consideration, but since Dutch interests pre-
dominate in both these organizations they tGO will be placed 
under government supervision". 28 
A second decree, 29 issued on 11 December by the Minister of 
Agriculture, outlined the procedure for military administration 
of plantations and in East Sumatra the staff of Lt. Col. Gintings 
arranged a formal ceremony in the offices of the military pros-
ecutor for Saturday morning, 14 December, at which regional 
civil and military authorities and representatives of various 
parties and mass organizations gathered to witness the signing of 
the transfer papers. Af ter Gintings had re ad the decrees of the 
Minister of Defense and the Central Military Administrator, the 
company representatives were asked to sign the attendant legal 
documents - which all did, adding the letters "v.c." for "vi 
coactus" (under pressure ) af ter their names. Gintings then signed 
each document on behalf of the Indonesian government. 30 
During a press conference on 17 December Prime Minister 
Djuanda stated that the government had learned that Dutch 
estates were being instructed by their directors in The Nether-
lands not to cooperate with the Indonesian management boards 
- since Indonesia had no intention of closing the Dutch planta-
tions and a refusal to cooperate would not only harm the enter-
prises concerned but also Indonesia's economy. Furthermore, the 
plantations would be returned to the owners as soon as The 
Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty over West lrian to 
Indonesia. 31 
The Dutch Plantations under lndonesian Management Prior to 
Thez·r Natz"onaHzatz"on 
Over five hundred Dutch estates, roughly three-fourths of all 
plantations in Indonesia, as weIl as a great number of other 
Dutch enterprises, had been put under military supervision by 
December 1957 - ironically on the basis of the colonial law 
regulating the state of war and siege which the Governor-General 
of the Netherlands Indies had signed on 13 September 1939. 32 
The first Indonesian legislation relative to the Dutch property 
issue came on 17 December 1957 with the promulgation of a 
series of laws including No. 74/1957 on the state of emergency 
and No. 79/1957 on the state of war. This new legislation 
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entailed several changes in the existing regulatory system, e.g. 
because Article 60 of Law No. 74/1957 limited the validity of 
the decrees, ordinances, and instructions based on the prewar 
legislation to a period of four months, all documents connected 
with the actions taken af ter 1 December 1957 had to be re-
written to accord with the new Indonesian laws. 33 More con-
sequential, the new legislation made four distinctions - a "state 
of war", a "state of military emergency", a "state of civil emerg-
ency", and "a state free from emergency" - and made the 
military commander the highest authority in both civilian and 
military affairs of a region under a state of war or a state of 
military emergency and in military affairs alone of a region under 
a state of civil emergency or a state free from emergency. 34 
In view of President Sukarno's Decree No. 225 of 17 December 
1957 which declared Indonesia to be in a state of war, 35 this 
meant for East Sumatra a continuation of martial law with the 
regional military commander ranking in authority above the 
governor, the regimental commanders above the residents, battal-
ion commanders above the bupati, and so on down the military 
and civilian hierarchy. F ollowing the official transfer of the 
plantations to the military authorities, army officers were 
assigned to the various Dutch plantation companies in a super-
visory and controlling capacity , in the expectation that the 
Dutch staff could be persuaded to continue its services under the 
new arrangement. What actually happened was th at Dutch 
personnel began almost immediately to leave East Sumatra, 
precipitating near chaos on the plantations during the first 
months of 1958 as Indonesians with some practical experience 
but rarely any managerial training stepped into the vacancies left 
by their departure. (To help bridge the gap in their background 
PPN-Baru and the College of Agriculture in Bogor hastily 
organized special training courses for Indonesian plantation 
personnel. ) A VROS changed its name to Sumatra Planters 
Association, or Gabungan Pengusaha Perkebunan Sumatera 
(Gappersu). M. Manik, a Simelungun Batak, replaced President 
Fernhout and J. Suleika replaced Rozendaal as the representative 
in Jakarta. From Singapore or The Netherlands, the top admini-
strators of such tobacco companies as United Deli and Senembah 
and such rubber companies as Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij 
"Amsterdam" (RCMA) kept in close unofficial contact with 
select faithful members of their Indonesian personnel, who sent 
reports on operations and general conditions on the'ir various 
estates. American, British, French, and Belgian estates also some-
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times served as links between the Dutch head offices and their 
"contacts" in East Sumatra. In addition, the Dutch companies 
received all Gappersu mailings. 
One of the first letters sent to Medan by the new Gappersu 
representative in Jakarta, J. Suleika, concemed the target area 
maps whieh were supposed to have been in the hands of the 
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs by 2 November 1957. Very few if 
any of the companies had met that deadline and President Manik 
began prodding the member companies, though apparently with 
very little success. By 15 April 1958 only 21 and by 15 June 
only 52 of 250 plantations had submitted maps. In the case of 
the Indonesian managers of Dutch estates, there was the dilemma 
of having to clear such a map with the owners in The Netherlands 
or make decisions locally without proper authority - neither a 
palatabie procedure. For non-Dutch plantations the former 
reluctance to indieate prematurely the land to be retumed to the 
govemment now had to be weighed against the political hazards 
of appearing uncooperative. 
When Suleika reported soon thereafter th at Singgih's inter-
departmental committee was about to recommend a combined 
target area of 386,000 hectares for annual and perennial-crop 
estates, President Manik protested the way his predecessor would 
have done. He objected particularly to the proposed reduction of 
the tobacco area from 113,000 hectares to 45,000 hectares,36 but 
Singgih's allocations in his plan for only 231,000 hectares for 
rubber, 11,000 hectares for tea, and 9,000 hectares for sisal and 
other fibers were just as ~sturbing. 37 Though it is quite possible 
that Singgih threw out these figures merely to provoke counter-
proposals from East Sumatra, Manik reacted by referring Suleika 
to the previous agreements between the govemment and the 
Sumatran planters, which set far larger areas, and urging Suleika 
to protest that such a dras tic reduction of the plantation area 
would not only violate the agreements but also jeopardize the 
economie foundations of plantation operations. Furthermore, 
Manik told Suleika, the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs should be 
informed that, as matters stood in East Sumatra, neither was 
there one local authority ready to eject squatters from target 
are as nor did the new managers of the Dutch plantations in their 
strictly supervisory capacity have the authority to release any 
land since property rights still rested with the Dutch com-
panies. 38 
The squatter problem persisted and, if anything, grew worse 
under Indonesian military supervision of the Dutch plantations. 
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Whereas by 1 October 1957 a total of some 121,400 hectares 
were occupied by squatters, the area had increased to 122,000 
hectares by the end of 1957 and to 126,000 hectares by the end 
of 1958. The figures on annual expansion were 8,000 hectares in 
1957, 4,000 in 1958, and 5,000 hectares in 1959,39 with BTI, 
Petani, and various vete rans ' organizations the chief instigators of 
the new squatting. Frequent references in the Medan press to 
arrests and trials of squatters during 1958 show that the police 
authorities and the courts did try, however, to stem the squatter 
movement. 
Clashes between the autochthonous population and plantation 
laborers over the use of harvested tobacco fields had continued 
unabated and a particularly fierce one erupted in July 1958 as 
500 estate workers battled, reportedly for an hour, with 100 
villagers of kampong Kelambir on the ex-United Deli Company 
estate Bulu Cina in the kecamatan Hamperan Perak. Five workers 
and four villagers were injured sligh tly, one worker seriously 
wounded, and one villager killed. Three days later a fire de-
stroyed one of the estate's tobacco drying sheds which at the 
time was filled with construction timber. Local rumors attributed 
the fire to villagers revenging their fellow villager's death. 40 
The incident evoked from Minister of Agrarian Affairs Sunarjo, 
member of the NU party, another ardent defense of the tradi-
tional jaluran rights of the autochthonous people and was the 
proximate cause for the appointment of a Committee for the 
Solution of Land Problems in North Sumatra (Panitya Penye-
lesaz'an Persoalan Tanah Sumatera Vtara) by Gintings acting as 
Territorial War Administrator. 41 This committee never met, 
because two days later, on 16 August 1958, Minister Sunarjo 
rescinded Gintings' order and appointed a more powerful Execu-
tive Committee for the Solution of Plantation Land Disputes in 
East Sumatra (Badan Pelaksana Penyelesaz'an Sengketa Tanah 
Perkebunan Sumatera Timur) with the governor himself as chair-
man and the head of the KRPT as vice-chairman.42 The rest of 
the committee, nine members and a secretary, comprised seven 
high provincial officials, one high army officer, and a member of 
the Provincial Council. It was indicative of the dras tic changes in 
the political climate of Indonesia since December 1957 that there 
was no representative from any peasant organization. 43 
Once the army took over the supervision of plantation manage-
ment its officers became directly involved in labor and squatter 
disputes and, accustomed to military discipline rather than to the 
give-and-take of the bargaining their predecessors had been 
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forced to accept, relied more and more on the "state of war" 
regulations to impose solutions by military order. Thus strikes 
were outlawed in order to prevent a decline in production, wage 
increases for plantation workers peremptorily held to a 
minimum, and tractors ordered in to level the crops and buildings 
of squatters wherever the squatters did not have the protection 
of a standfast or where the management board of an estate 
deemed squatter holdings to be seriously interfering with oper-
ations. Similarly, army officers in Gappersu simply overruled the 
representatives of British, Belgian, and American companies if a 
proposed action would raise the costs of production. There was 
of course no place in this authoritarian pattern for the political 
accommodation of the peasant leaders and their costly demands. 
Vet only half a year earlier Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo 
had appointed an Advisory Board of the PPN-Baru, whose com-
position was quite the reverse,44 on matters pertaining to 
workers' and peasants' welfare and the productivity of estate 
laborers. Of the eight members serving under a representative of 
the Ministry of Labor as chairman and a representative of the 
Ministry of Agriculture as vice-chairman were three representing 
labor organizations, three representing peasant organizations, and 
one delegate each from PPN-Baru and the Ministry of Agrarian 
Affairs. (Another striking aspect was the strong representation of 
laborers and peasants both at the central and territorialIevel, the 
latter in anticipation of the territorial advisory committees being 
planned in connection with all PPN-Baru provincial offices.) A 
possible explanation for Sadjarwo's disregard of the new military 
presence is his own political background. A former member of 
the BTI, Sadjarwo joined Djuanda's cabinet in April 1957 as a 
nonparty member but was listed as a member of the PNI by the 
time Djuanda reorganized his cabinet in June 1958. Whatever the 
explanation, Sadjarwo was looking for cooperation between 
PPN-Baru, laborers, and peasant-squatters. 
The army took advantage of every opportunity to place 
officers in government agencies concerned with the admini-
stration of Dutch properties. In June 1958, for example, 
Nasution in his capacity as Central War Administrator (Penguasa 
Perang Pusat) assigned officers to the Central Administrative 
Committee of Dutch Industrial and Mining Enterprises, or Badan 
Pusat Penguasa Perusahaan-perusahaan /ndustri dan Tambang 
Belanda (BAPPIT), the Committee for Trade Matters, or Badan 
Urusan Dagang (BVD), and PPN-Baru. His instruction contained 
guidelines for cooperation between the Centra! and Territorial 
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War Administrators on the one hand and PPN-Baru on the other. 
Even more explicit was Nasution's order that the deputy director 
of the PPN-Baru headquarters in Jakarta be an army officer 
responsible directly to the office of the Central War Admini-
strator and appointed by the Prime Minister. Similarly, the 
deputy director of a provincial branch of PPN-Baru had to be an 
officer acting as the representative of the Territorial War Admini-
strator.45 In these ways the army filled key positions in all the 
agencies concerned with the supervision and management of 
Dutch enterprises - and army officers accrued great material 
advantages in these positions_ 
The functions, rights, and duties of those assigned to the 
plantations were detailed in an instruction issued by Nasution on 
18 September 1958_ Their primary task was to reorganize the 
administrative structure, to normalize and improve the enter-
prise, and to carry through the "Indonesianisation" of the 
personneL In the field of personnel and labor relations their 
authority was complete, from control of appointments, promo-
tions, and dismissals of the staff to initiation of measures to 
ensure cooperation among laborers, staff, and management. 
These army officers also controlled finances, countersigning 
every bank check. Housing, transport, maintenance of equipment 
and buildings all came under their management and it was their 
duty to oversee any sales of property and interdict those that 
would cause losses to the enterprise. In short, not a single aspect 
in the business life of the estates or other enterprises was outside 
the assignment of these officers. 
Nationalz'zation 
As the year 1958 advanced with no sign that The Netherlands 
was going to yield to Indonesian economie pressure, the labor 
unions and other mass organizations began to damor for nationa-
lization of all Dutch enterprises in furtherance of the revolution. 
On 15 November 1958 Nasution officially transferred the super-
vision of Dutch enterprises from military to civilian authorities at 
a ceremony in the Headquarters of the Army Chief of Staff 
attended by Prime Minister Djuanda and several ministers. 
Extraordinary circumstances, Djuanda noted in his remarks, had 
made military control of the estates necessary initially but with 
the return to normal conditions it was important that Dutch 
enterprises be under the supervision of civilian administrators. 
The Dutch plantations would thereafter come under the Minister 
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of Agrarian Affairs and his agency, the PPN-Baru. General 
Nasution stressed that the take-over of the Dutch enterprises was 
a political instrument in the struggle for West Irian and voiced 
the hope that the enterprises would not become a political in-
strument in the hands of groups endangering the national 
economy, a danger only continued civil-military cooperation in 
the supervision of these enterprises would avoid. Af ter the 
transfer, army officers went on inactive status while assigned to a 
Dutch estate or other enterprise and in hlany instances retired 
army officers were called to this duty, of ten effecting a striking 
increase in the size of an estate's staff. 
Also in November 1958 the cabinet submitted a draft national-
ization bill, which parliament, in record time (on 3 December), 
approved with little or no debate. President Sukamo signed Law 
No. 86 conceming "Nationalization of Dutch-owned Enterprises 
in Indonesia" on 27 December, to be retroactive to 3 December 
1957.46 The preamble states that nationalization constitutes 
"part of the struggle for the liberation of lrian Barat" and is to 
be considered "consistent with the policy of annulling the Round 
Table Conference agreements". Article 2 provides for com-
pensation of the former owners and gives the latter the right to 
seek remedy in Indonesian courts in case of dissatisfaction with 
the offered compensation. Explanatory notes give the new law's 
aims to normalize the well-being of the Indonesian people, to 
strengthen the national potential, and to abolish economie dis-
crimination and economic-colonial subjugation. In a series of im-
plemental ordinances that followed, every Dutch enterprise to 
which the law applied, was identified. Seventeen tobacco estates 
of the United Deli Company, five estates of the Senembah 
Company, and a total of 16 tobacco estates in Java were listed as 
subject to nationalization.47 Of some seventy-six perennial-crop 
estates identified in North Sumatra, including Aceh, fifty-four 
produced rubber, thirteen oil palm, five tea, and four sisal and 
other fibers. Among the more important companies named were 
United Deli (twelve estates) and Senembah (four estates counting 
their perennial-crop estates), HVA (four estates), Rubber Cultuur 
Maatschappij "Amsterdam" (twelve estates~, and Nederlandsche 
Handel Maatschappij (NHM) (four estates).4 
A note of protest to the Indonesian govemment was delivered 
on 28 February 1959 by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Nether-
lands Diplomatic Mission in Jakarta in whieh pointed reference 
was made to the Netherlands govemment's previous note of 16 
September 1958 regarding earlier measures taken against Dutch 
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interests in Indonesia. The Hague argued that Indonesia had 
violated the "fundamental principles of international law as weIl 
as of obligations voluntarily accepted by Indonesia under the 
United Nations Charter and by treaty". In its reply of 8 October 
1958, so recalied the Dutch note, Indonesia had ignored the 
Netherlands government's legal arguments, merely stating th at 
Indonesia could not discuss the financial and economic interests 
of The Netherlands in Indonesia so long as the dispute over West 
Irian had not been solved. The nationalization was "likewise at 
variance with the generally recognized rules of internationallaw. 
Under these rules any infringement of the property rights of 
aliens is anyhow unlawful when accompanied by discrimination. 
The unlawful character of the Nationalization Act is also evident 
from its own preamble. The Act is impeached by the preamble 
sin ce in it it is stated that the Act is intended as a means for 
exerting pressure in apolitical dispute, namely the dispute about 
Netherlands New Guinea." The Indonesians could "neither annul 
nor transfer the property and other rights of Netherlands 
nationals owning property in Indonesia, either natural or legal 
persons " and this applied as weIl to the pro duce of this property. 
(This last reference played an important role in lawsuits 
presented to the courts of Bremen in 1959.) The Dutch note also 
referred to the Indonesian intention of postponing the payment 
of compensation until such a time as the political dispute had 
been solved to Indonesia's satisfaction.49 
In reply, the Indonesian government held th at it was the 
sovereign right of a state to decide on such matters as the 
nationalization of alien property and the fact th at the National-
ization Act recognized the obligation to pay compensation to the 
former owners justified the Act as a lawful measure. Elaborating 
on this, Minister of Agriculture Sadjarwo told reporters at a press 
conference in July 1959 th at 
"the developments in the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West 
Irian last year had only precipitated the decolonization process 
of Indonesia's economy ... though Indonesia's independence 
was recognized in 1949, the country's economic structure had 
remained colonialist in spite of the political freedom. The Dutch 
still retained their economic privileges and the Indonesian econ-
omy was still under their control by virtue of the Round Table 
Conference agreements, which had been concluded when Indo-
nesia was in a disadvantageous bargaining position. The Dutch 
hold over the economy also entailed discrimination against the 
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ship, however, included men like Mohammad Tauchid who were 
members of the Indonesian Socialist Party. 
29 New York Times (November 6,1965). 
CHAPTER IV 
1 The articles were numbered 27, 29, and 33 in the Constitution of 1945 
and became artieles 7, 18, and 38 respectively in the Provisional Con-
stitution of 1950. Some modifieations were made in the first two but 
the third was unchanged. An English translation of the Provisional Con-
stitution of 1945 was published in Voiee of Indonesia, October 1945; 
the Indonesian and Dutch versions can be found in W.A. Engelbrecht, 
Kitab2 Undang2, Undang2 dan Peraturan2 serta Undang2 Dasar 1945 
Republiklndonesia, Brussels-Leiden, 1960,pp. 34-42. On 5July 1959 the 
Republic of Indonesia returned to the Provisional Constitution of 1945. 
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2 Pers on al communication from the former Sultan of Deli. 
3 Sarimin Reksodihardjo had been the head of the Agrarian Section in the 
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Indonesia before 1950 and had 
served as chairman of the Panitya Agraria Yogyakarta. In 1950 he was 
head of the Agrarian Service of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic 
of the United States of Indonesia. 
4 Urgency Program of 20 July 1950 (Urgensi-Program PPNKST, Tanggal 
20 Djuli 1950). 
5 The instructions, drafted by Abdul Hakim, a senior official of the 
Ministry of Interior who was attached to Sarimin's staff, were entitled 
Tjara Melaksanakan Urgensi-Program PPNKST, Tanggal 20 Djuli 1950, 
jang mengenai fatsallV Soal Agraria dan Ekonomi and were published at 
Medan, 26 September 1950. This document is reproduced as Appendix 
7 to Pelaporan dengan Pertimbangan-Pertimbangan serta Usul-Usul dari 
Panitya Negara Urusan Pembagian Tanah Perkebunan Sumatera Timur, 
Jakarta, 1954. 
6 This summary is based on an unpublished working paper entitled: 
Beknopte samenvatting van de huidige stand van het agrarisch vraagstuk 
in de Deli-tabaksstreken en uitstippeling van een onderhandelings- en 
werkbasis voor de Regering. 
7 Pengumunan No. 1219/IV, Medan, 28 September 1950. 
8 Unpublished report entitled: Vergadering betreffende het Gronden-
probleem in het Tabaksgebied, gehouden op 24 Maart 1951 ten kantore 
van de Djawatan Perkebunan te Djakarta. 
9 Decree Agr. 12/5/14, 28June 1951. 
10 Decree No. UP/5/3/27, 27 June 1951. 
11 Decree No. 36/K/Agr., 28 September 1951. 
12 I.J. Kasimo, a prominent Catholic politician, member of parliament of 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and member of Sekata, 
identified most of these; the remainder were included on the basis of 
newspaper articles and other contemporary sources. 
13 Suara Rakjat, 12 and 13 April 1950. A copy of th is report was cir-
culated among planters of East Sumatra. 
14 Waspada, 30 March 1951. 
15 This explains why the tobacco companies continued to pay the annual 
ground-rent for the total concession area rather than the 125,000 hec-
tares earmarked for their exclusive use. 
16 Suara Rakjat, 19 October 1951. 
17 They were BTI, RTl, Perti, Gaperta, and Gabungan Buruh Tani 
Tionghoa. The statement is included as Appendix 12 to Pelaporan ... 
Panitya Negara Urusan Pembagian Tanah Perkebunan Sumatera Timur. 
18 Order No. 26/K/Agr., 15 August 1951. 
19 On 2 J anuary 1951 the acting governor of N orth Sumatra canceled 
Decree No. 1138/VI/16 which had been issued 1 May 1947 by the 
Resident of East Sumatra. 
20 Rentjana Tuntutan Pekerdjaan Melaksanakan Pembahagian Tanah untuk 
Taraf Pertama, Medan, 11 February 1952. 
21 Mestika, 21 June 1952. 
22 Suara Rakjat, 4 March 1952, carried an account of a Petani meeting at 
which the speakers protested the discrimination against plantation 
workers who had become subsistence farmers during the war or the 
Notes pp. 63-83 
revolution. See also Suara Rakjat, 21 April 1952. 
23 Suara Rakjat, 26 March and 2,19,21, and 25 April 1952. 
24 /chtisar Parlemen, 1952, pp. 249-5l. 
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25 Kasimo was referring to the letter No. 22063/3/6 and directive No. Agr. 
12/4/16 of 28 May 1952 sent by the Ministry of Interior to Governor 
Hakim. 
26 Suara Rakjat, 4 March 1952; Mimbar Umum, 9 May 1952. 
27 Waspada, 30 May 1952. 
28 Letter No. 22063/3/6 and directive No. Agr. 12/4/16; Mestika, 17 June 
1952. 
29 Waspada, 4,5,6,7,9, and 10June 1952. 
30 Waspada, 9 June 1952. 
31 Mestika, 18,19,20, and 21 June 1952. 
32 Letter of Munar S. Hamidjojo No. 976/KPPT, dated 31 May 1952, 
reprinted in /chtisar Parlemen, 21 May 1953. 
33 Geraktani, KT!, STIl, and BPRP did not attend since they opposed 
policies pursued by BTI. Petani, too, was not represented in the con-
gress, but th is peasant union joined the Sekretariat Bersama shortly af ter 
the congress. 
34 Waspada, 26 February 1953. 
35 Waspada, 7 and 9 March 1953. 
36 Waspada, 11 March 1953. 
37 Waspada, 30 December 1952. 
38 See, for example, "Agrarian Structure and Reform in Indonesia", 
ECAFE Tsuchin No. 145 (Tokyo), 21 January 1958. 
39 Tangkas , 17 March 1953, reported th at the Chinese attacked the police 
shouting, "Attack! Life or death for Stalin! .. 
40 The account presented here follows the one given by Mohamad Roem, 
Minister of Interior, to a parliamentary committee. See also, Tangkas, 17 
March; Keng Po, 21 March; and Waktu, 2 May 1953. 
41 Antara, 22 March 1953. 
42 Chairman of the committee was Ersat Trunodjojo of Masyumi; secretary 
was Abdullah J usuf of PNI; members S. Sardjono and Mohammad 
Tauchid belonged to BT!, Maizir Achmaddyn to Masyumi. Trunodjojo, 
Tauchid, and Achmaddyn supported the Minister of Interior and the 
governor;Jusuf and Sardjono were highly critical and opposed the whole 
agrarian program. In September 1953 Mohammad Tauchid broke with 
BTI. 
43 Mimbar Umum, April 1953. 
44 Mimbar Umum, 7 April 1953. 
45 Herbert Feith, The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in 
Post-Revolutionary Indonesia, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958. 
CHAPTER V 
The appointments we re as follows: 
1 Subakti Pusponoto, Resident and Acting Governor of Central Java 
(Chairman). He became sick,left for Java in May, and did not return. 
His duties were assumed by the Vice-Chairman. 
2 Singgih Praptodihardjo, Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, Jakarta (Vice-
Chairman). 
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3 Radjamin, Ministry of Agriculture and Chief of Tata Bumi, Medan. 
4 S.M. Tarigan, representing the Joint Secretariat of Peasant Organi-
zations for the Settlement of the Agrarian Problem in North Sumatra 
(Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi Tani untuk Penyelesaian Tanah 
Sumatera Utara) in Medan. 
5 Sjamsul Bahri, re pres enting the Indonesian Islamic Peasant Union 
(Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia, or STIl), Sumatera Utara, in Medan. 
6 Abdul Kadir, representing the Council for the Struggle of the 
Autochthonous Population (Badan Perjuangan Rakyat Penunggu, or 
BPRP). 
7 Abdul Djafar, representing the Government Estates Administration 
(Pusat Perkebunan Negara, or PPN). 
8 R. Nolen, head of AVROS, representing the perennial-crop estates. 
9 E.M. Vorstman, representative of the United Deli Company, re-
pres enting the tobacco estates. 
10 Asjro Effendi, representing the Sekretariat Bersama (see Tarigan, 4, 
above). 
11 Amiruddin Tito, representing the Sekretariat Bersama. 
12 J .M. Simbolon, representing the Sekretariat Bersama. 
13 Zainal Abidin, representing STIl, North Sumatra. 
14 Kongsi Semiring Depari, representing the BPRP. 
15 Soerdjadi, representing the Council of Cooperating Peasant Organiza-
tions of North Sumatra (Ba dan Kerdja-Sama Organisasi Tani 
Sumatera Utara, or BKOTSU). 
In addition, the following two staff appointments were announced: 
Iman Supangat Sastrohadiprodjo, chief of subsection Agrarian Policy, 
Ministry of Agrarian Affairs, Jakarta (First Secretary). 
M. Parlindungan, chief of the Agrarian Section for the province of North 
Sumatra (Second Secretary). 
2 See Memorandum inzake "De Richtlijnen voor de Staatscommissie voor 
de verdeling van ondernemingsgronden ter S.O.K.". This memorandum 
was prepared by the Agrarian Committee of AVROS and distributed to 
the officers of the organization as an appendix to a letter of 4 May 
1954. 
3 The tension between Subakti and Singgih is believed to have greatly 
contributed to Subakti's decision to obtain a doctor's certificate and not 
to return to Medan at the end of puasa in mid-June. For a brief period in 
June, Singgih showed a more objective behavior - possibly in response 
to criticism expressed by Minister Hanafiah - but by July he was acting 
once more "as if he were a member of the 'Sekretariat Bersama"'; R. 
Nolen in a letter of 4 August 1954. 
4 Algemene Verklaring: Particuliere ondernemers in de Staatscommissie 
voor de verdeling van ondernemersgronden in Sumatera Timur, Medan, 
26 March 1954 (mimeo). 
5 Memorandum inzake het Grondenvraagstuk in Sumatera Timur, Medan, 
17 June 1954 (mimeo). 
6 Algemene Beschouwing over de Wijze van Oplossing van het Gronden-
vraagstuk ter Oostkust van Sumatra, Appendix 111 of R. Nolen's letter, 
Medan, 26 April 1954. (Indonesian text, Pemandangan umum untuk 
djalan penjelesaian masaalah tanah di Sumatera Timur, Medan, 16 April 
1954, Appendix 21 of Pelaporan dengan Pertimbangan-Pertimbangan 
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Serta Usul-Usul dari Panitya Negara Urusan Pembagian Tanah Perkebu-
nan Sumatera Timur.) 
7 R. Nolen's letter of 4 August 1954. 
8 Keterangan Umum para Wakil dari "Badan Perdjuangan Rakjat Penung-
gu lndonesia Sumatera Timur" dalam Panitya Negara untuk Pembagian 
Tanah Perkebunan di Sumatera Timur, 12 April 1954, Appendix 20 of 
Pelaporan .•• dari Panitya Negara. 
9 lchtisar, p. 7, in Pelaporan . .. dari Panitya Negara. 
10 Persoalan Pendudukan Tanah Perkebunan di Sumatera Timur, Appendix 
30 of Pelaporan ... dari Panitya Negara. 
11 Konsepsi mengenai soal pembagian tanah-tanah konsesi perkebunan 
Sumatera Timur, Appendix 22 of Pelaporan . .. dari Panitya Negara. 
12 K. van der Molen's letter of 3 May 1954 to Abdul Djafar, head of PPN 
(Govemment Estates Administration) in Medan and member of the state 
commission. 
13 The altemating hope and frustration of Nolen over the outcome of the 
sessions, and reports of his clashes with Tarigan and Singgih, can be re ad 
in his letters to the A VROS Board of Directors dated 24 April, 4 
August, and 10 August 1954. 
14 The report is available in both Indonesian and Dutch: Pelaporan dengan 
Pertimbangan-Pertimbangan Serta Usul-Usul dari Panitya Negara Urusan 
Pembagian Tanah Perkebunan Sumatera Timur (44 pp. and 33 appen-
dices, mimeo); and Rapport alsmede Adviezen en Voorstellen van de 
Staatscommissie voor de Verdeling van Ondernemingsgronden in 
Sumatera Timur (30 pp. and only 5 of the 33 appendices, mimeo). 
15 See, for example, AVROS letter No. 151,25 January 1954, addressed to 
the Govemor of the Province of North Sumatra. 
16 AVROS letter No. 397, 1 March 1954, addressed to the Attomey 
General of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta. 
17 Maklumat No. 1138/XXV/KPPT. 
18 Maklumat No. 1416/XXV/KPPT. 
19 Maklumat No. 33966/3. 
20 AVROS letter No. 1207, 19July 1954. 
21 Letter No. 3068/XXV/KPPT, Medan, 31 August 1954. 
22 Maklumat No. 4393/XXV/KPPT. 
CHAPTER VI 
1 Kort Verslag bezoek Minister Agrarische Zaken (appended to AVROS 
letter No. 26/Bl., 7 February 1955). 
2 Kort Verslag bezoek Minister Agrarische Zaken. 
3 Decree No. Agr. 12/5/14. 
4 Decree No. 36/K/Agr. 
5 Text will be found in the Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting of 
15 May 1955. 
6 AVROS letter No. 750, 19 May 1955. 
7 Letter Ka 12/2/16,26 May 1955. 
8 Letter No. 121, 3 June 1955, addressed to the attention of Singgih 
Praptodihardjo, Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. See AVROS letter, Medan, 
7 June 1955. 
9 AVROS letter No. 891, 16June 1955. 
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10 Interne Nota t.b.v. Dagelijks Bestuur inzake Agraria, 20 August 1955. 
11 Nota inzake Gezamenlijk Besluit No. 1/1955, d.d. 30 June 1955 van de 
Ministers van Agraria, van Landbouw, van Economische Zaken, van Bin-
nenlandse Zaken en van Justitie, Medan, 29 August 1955 (mimeo). 
12 AVROS, Memorandum inzake de uitvoering van de Noodwet No. 
8/1954, Medan, 6 September 1955 (mimeo); also issued as an appendix 
to AVROS letter No. 163/B1., Medan, 6 September 1955. 
13 AVROS, Memorandum betreffende het agrarisch probleem in Sumatera 
Timur, October 1955; also issued as an appendix to AVROS letter No. 
188/B1., Medan, 12 October 1955. 
14 Memorandum nopens de Toepassing van de Strafbepalingen tegen "On-
wettige Occupaties" in de Noodwet No. 8/1954 (appended to A VROS 
letter No. 17/B1., Medan, 17 January 1956). 
15 Resumé van het besprokene op de vergadering der Agrarische Commissie 
der Contactcommissie Grootlandbouw-organisaties, gehouden op 27 
January 1956 (mimeo). 
16 This is illustrated by an article in Medan's Tangkas, 29 February 1956, 
citing a resolution passed by the directors of the Gerakan Tani Indonesia 
in Bogor on 27 February 1956. 
17 The problems of expired concessions were discussed in A VROS letters 
No. 32/B1., 2 February 1956; No. 46/Bl., 8 March 1956; No. 58/B1., 3 
April 1956; and No. 103/B1., 6 June 1956; as weIl as in a legal memoran-
dum prepared by W.J. Borgerhoff Mulder, dated Klein Sungei Karang, 
10 April 1956, and deposited in the A VROS archive in Medan. See also 
Pendorong, 1 June 1956, and Mestika, 30 May 1956. 
18 Pendorong, 7 April 1956. 
19 See, for example, the editorials in Tjerdas, 20, 21, and 30 April 1956, 
and in Tangkas, 19 April 1956. 
20 Mestika, 6 April 1956. 
21 Pendorong, 2 May 1956. 
22 AVROS letter No. 808, Medan, 3 July 1956 (attached to AVROS letter 
No. 126/B1., Medan, 4 July 1956). 
23 Tjerdas, 23 July 1956. 
24 AVROS letter No. 953, Medan, 1 August 1956; this letter was also 
attached to AVROS letter No. 150/Bl., Medan, 3 August 1956. 
25 Mimbar Umum, 31 October 1956. 
26 Lembaga, 23 November 1956. 
27 AVROS letter No. 236/B1., Medan, 21 November 1956. 
28 AVROS letter No. 234/B1., Medan, 16 November 1956. 
29 Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting of 4 December 1956. 
30 Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting of 29 December 1956. 
31 Some ten years later, in January 1967, when I interviewed the retired 
Tengku Kotjik about this incident, he recalIed th at the PKl and the BTI 
had made every effort to block this project for political reasons but had 
failed to win the support and cooperation of the squatters. For them the 
choice was between illegally occupying other estate land or moving with 
government assistance to land to which they would receive agrarian 
rights. 
32 The eight organizations were: Petani, STIl, GTI, BPRP, Sakti, Gaperta, 
BPRTI, and BPR. 
33 Petani and GTI continued to oppose such agreements. 
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34 Lembaga, 31 July 1957, reported the arrest of 65 members of the BTI 
because of illegal occupation of land belonging to the United Deli Com-
pany estates of Bulu Cina and Paya Bakung. 
CHAPTER VII 
1 Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in Indonesia, ed. 
Ruth T. McVey, New Haven, 1963, pp. 332-34. 
2 Pengumuman, No. Peng/00001/1/1957. 
3 Surat Keputusan, No. KPTS 0030/1/57. 
4 AVROS letters No. 44/AH., Medan, 16 February 1957, and No. 59/AH., 
Medan, 12 March 1957. 
5 Maandberichten van de Algemeene Vereeniging van Rubberplanters ter 
Oostkust van Sumatra, No. 4 (1957), p. 6. 
6 Surat Keputusan, No. PM/KPTS 0007/5/57. 
7 The Indonesian text together with a Dutch translation were sent to the 
Board of Directors with AVROS letter No. 87/Bl., Medan, 19 June 
1957. 
8 See, for example, Lembaga and Mestika, 28 June 1957. 
9 AVROS letter No. 897,26 July 1957 (distributed to the members with 
letter No. 153/AH., Medan, 20 August 1957). 
10 Rozendaal's letter No. 842/M,Jakarta, 10 September 1957. 
11 A "target area" is th at part of a plantation which the planter regards as 
the minimum necessary for its continued operation. 
12 The law gives each member of the permanent labor force the right to ask 
for a garden not less than 200 square meters and not more than 600 
square meters. 
13 Resumé van de Vergadering van het Bestuur der Algemeene Vereeniging 
van Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra (A VROS), gehouden op 
Woensdag, 11 September 1957, Medan, 12 September 1957 (mimeo). 
14 Samenvatting van de besprekingen vertegenwoordigers ministeries op het 
hoofdkwartier van de Landmacht op 11 September 1957 bij wijze van 
recommandatie aan de Centrale Militaire Gezaghebber, Jakarta, 11 
September 1957. This document was attached to AVROS letter No. 
142/Bl., Medan, 21 September 1957. 
15 The AVROS delegation includedJ. Femhout, G. van Wezel, D. van Eck, 
J .D. Schoon and F. Benders. 
16 Unpublished minutes headed "Resumé van de Buitengewone Algemene 
Ledenvergadering, gehouden op Vrijdag de 27 September 1957". 
17 Minister Sunarjo's letter No. Ka 13/19/5 of 2 October 1957 was dis-
tributed to all A VROS members together with A VROS letter No. 
210/Ah., Medan, 18 October 1957. 
18 The composition, as listed in AVROS letter No. 165/Bl., Medan, 22 
October 1957, was: 
Singgih Praptodihardjo, Chairman Ministry of Agrarian Affairs 
M. Hardjoamidjojo, Vice-Chairman Ministry of Agriculture 
Saleh Wariatmadja, Member Ministry of Agriculture 
Ir. Agus Prawiranata, Member Ministry of Public Works 
M. Muntoha, Member Cadastral Service 
Gozali, Member Ministry of Labor 
Sosroharsono, Member Ministry of Sodal Affairs 
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Sumitro Tjokrowardojo, Member Ministry of Agrarian Affairs 
Major Sukardi, Member Headquarters, Army Chief of Staff 
S. Anwar Kasim, Member Ministry of Agrarian Affairs 
19 This explains the striking difference between the first draft, given in 
AVROS letter No. 168/Bl., 25 October 1957, and the finalletter No. 
239, addressed to the Minister of Agrarian Affairs on 31 October 1957 
and attached to AVROS letter No. 219/AH., Medan, 5 November 1957. 
20 Persbiro Indonesia-Aneta, 22 October 1957. 
21 Persbiro Indonesia, Weekly Airmailer, Jakarta, 13 November 1957, 
p.4. 
22 Weekly Airmailer, 20 November 1957, p. 1. 
23 Weekly Airmailer, 4 December 1957, pp. 17-18. 
24 Weekly Airmailer, 4 December 1957, p. 1-2. 
25 Weekly Airmailer, 12 December 1957, pp. 2-3. 
26 Weekly Airmailer, 12 December 1957, p. 19. 
27 The "Algemeen Landbouw Syndicaat" (ALS) was represented by W.H. 
Meijer and A.H. van Geuns, the "Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerfabri-
kanten in Indonesië" (ASSI) by L. de Jong and C. van der Made, and 
AVROS by P. Rozendaal. 
28 Resumé van de bespreking van de Minister van Landbouw met een 
delegatie van vertegenwoordigers van Nederlandse cultuurmaatschap-
pijen op 10 December 1957 in het Ministerie van Landbouw te Djakarta, 
Jakarta, 10 December 1957. 
29 Minister of Agriculture, Decree No. 247/UM/57. 
30 Chief Justice Mahadi of the North Sumatran Provincial High Court later 
officially witnessed the signatures; Weekly Airmailer, 19 December 
1957, p. 13. 
31 Weekly Airmailer, 26 December 1957, pp. 18-19. 
32 Staatsblad 1939, No. 582. 
33 For example Djuanda's Decree No. 1063/PMT/1957 of 9 December 
1957 was replaced by Ordinance No. 24/1958 of 17 April 1958, signed 
by both Sukarno and Sadjarwo. Sadjarwo's Decree No. 229/UM/57 was 
replaced by his Decree No. 49/UM/58 of 17 April 1958. These two legal 
documents permitted the continued supervision of Dutch plantations. 
34 Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in Indonesia, ed. 
Ruth T. McVey, p. 332. 
35 Decree No. 225 superseded a similar decree issued in March 1957. 
36 As it turned out later, the final target area approved for the tobacco 
industry was fixed at 60,911 hectares, of which 44,000 were assigned to 
the former United Deli Co., 15,000 to the former Senembah Co., and 
1,911 to the Cinta Radja Co. 
37 Gappersu letter No. 192/M,Jakarta, 3 March 1958. 
38 Gappersu letter No. 160/Djk., Medan, 8 April 1958. 
39 The figures for December 1957, 1958, and 1959 are taken from A.E. 
Johann, A la Indonesia: Sorgen und Hoffnungen eines unfertigen 
Landes, Gütersloh, 1961, pp. 276-77. Johann's figures co me from 
Gappersu. His figures for earlier years agree with my figures in Table 11, 
so that I have no doubt abou t their validity. 
40 See Waspada, 29July 1958, andMestika, 1 August 1958. 
41 The order was No. PP/KPTS-0132/8/1958 issued on 14 August 1958. 
42 Minister Sunarjo's decree was No. Sk. 224/Ka./1958. 
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43 Suleika's letter No. 572/M of 4 September 1958 reports that the original 
plan provided for the representation of laborers, peasants, and Gappersu 
(i.e. planters) but th at Sunarjo had crossed these out because he feit th at 
their presence in the committee would only lead to delays. 
44 Minister of Agriculture, Order No. 30/Vm/58 of 3 March 1958. 
45 In the other organizations, i.e. BVD and BAPPIT, the army officer 
served as director of the agency. 
46 Berita Negara 1958, No. 162. 
47 Ordinance No. 4. Ordinance No. 2 provided the guiding principles for 
implementation of the Nationalization Act. Ordinance No. 3 established 
a Nationalization Board of Dutch Enterprises (Badan Nasionalisasi 
Perusahaan Belanda, BANAS). These ordinances (Nos. 2, 3, and 4) were 
all signed and promulgated on 23 February 1959. 
48 Ordinance No. 19 of 2 May 1957, promulgated on 20 May. 
49 The fuIl text of the NetherIands no te of 28 February 1959 was released 
by The NetherIands Information Service in New Vork on 16 March 
1959. 
50 Minister of AgricuIture Sadjarwo on Nationalization Act, lndonesian 
Spectator, 15 July 1959. 
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